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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation uses the methods of interpretive social science to explore the 
multidimensional nature of the stem cell controversy, its competing epistemologies, and 
types of resolution and policy closure that have been sought in the United States and the 
European Union. It provides a comparative perspective on the social dynamics of public 
involvement in stem cell research and evaluates efforts by governments and bioethics 
advisory bodies to integrate dialogue and deliberation in science policy and decision 
making. The analysis highlights the agenda-setting and framing roles of the print and 
electronic news media in the public discourse over stem cells and human cloning, 
including their ability to validate conflicting knowledge claims about stem cell science 
and frame uncertainty about its clinical promise. I argue that stem cell policy debates are 
deeply embedded in particular socio-political and cultural contexts, and therefore 
regulatory responses to the societal challenges arising from this biomedical innovation 
have largely been shaped by non-epistemic factors (considerations external to science and 
its episteniologies ). In the US, the issue of human embryonic stem cell research was right 
from the outset framed in terms of the contentious politics of abortion, became caught up 
in America's culture wars, and the funding policy debate revived salient political themes 
of earlier controversies over abortion and fetal transplantation research. By contrast, 
efforts by EU policymakers to develop a framework for the ethical governance of stem 
cell technologies and their applications in regenerative medicine were intertwined with 
fundamental questions of EU federalism, common European cultural values, and the 
traditional consensus-oriented politics. I claim that in both cases the moral and policy 
IV 
dilemma was brought to a conclusion by non-epistemic procedural closure. By sealing off 
the debate through legislative and administrative procedures, policymakers have failed to 
achieve a morally justifiable resolution of the issues central to the stem cell controversy 
either through the method of consensus closure or on the basis of epistemic (knowledge-
based) factors. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has become one of the most 
controversial areas of contemporary biomedicine and has sparked a global ethical 
controversy over the ontological status of the human embryo and the morality of the 
creation and use of embryos for research. There is widespread consensus within the 
scientific community that this research holds immense promise for the development of 
novel, cell-based therapies for diabetes, multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer's disease, 
Parkinson's disease, spinal cord injuries and other life-threatening conditions (Bongso & 
Richards, 2004; Mimeaults, Hauke, & Batra, 2007; Strode, 2002). Nevertheless, it is 
expected that the transition from promising research results to the general use of stem-
cell therapies in clinical practice will require substantial investment in research and 
lengthy clinical trials (Braude et al., 2005; Coutts & Kierstead, 2008; Daley, Goodell, & 
Snyder, 2003 ). While stem cell advocates have often exaggerated the prospects for 
immediate clinical impact, most researchers in the field have expressed cautious 
optimism. As the renowned expert in stem cell science George Daley points out, "Just as 
small-molecule pharmaceuticals revolutionized medicine in the last century, cellular 
therapeutics are destined to emerge as a major modality for treating the degenerative 
diseases of an aging population, but it may take the better part of this century to get it 
right" (2002, p. 611 ). Although there is serious concern about the safety of new hESC-
based treatments, such therapies are directly marketed to patients via the internet by 
privately operated clinics across the world, such as Beike Biotech in China, ACT in 
Turks and Caicos, and Emcell in Ukraine (Lau et al., 2008). In most countries with 
advanced biotech industries the development of stem-cell technology has generated 
contentious public and parliamentary debates over the ethical regulation of biomedical 
research involving human embryos. More importantly, the stem cell controversy has 
revived perennial philosophical debates over human nature, the moral and legal status of 
pre-nascent life, the boundaries of human longevity, and our proper moral stance towards 
nature. 
The prominence of religiously informed moral arguments in stem cell debates 
worldwide has also coincided with recent reconsiderations of the sociological thesis of 
secularization (Bruce 1992, 2002; Joas, 2008) and the emergence of a new sociology of 
religion in the "post-secular world society" (Habermas, 2006, 2008b ). Stem cell policy 
debates, especially in the United States and in some catholic regions of Europe, have 
provided yet another visible manifestation of the increasing public influence of religious 
traditions both globally and within national public spheres. Habermas (2008b) has 
claimed that challenges to the secularization paradigm, which had long ago predicted the 
waning of religion in the political arena and public life of modern societies, are by no 
means limited to regional conflicts that have unleashed violence innate in major world 
religions. Rather, the dissonance between religious and secular worldviews is reflected in 
value conflicts on scientific and social issues that have entered the public spheres of 
Western pluralistic societies. In recent years, divisive moral arguments over the 
legalization of abortion and voluntary euthanasia, the ethical issues of reproductive 
medicine, animal protection and climate change have intensified and there are indications 
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that political regulation by the state is needed to resolve these societal conflicts 
(Habermas, 2008b ). Since religion can help citizens articulate convincing moral intuitions 
on some of these biomedical issues, Habermas (2006) has argued that we should not 
exclude religious perspectives as a legitimate background for contributions to an open 
public debate. Their significance in political and policy decisions, however, is largely 
contingent on the translation of religious arguments into a generally accessible language 
which requires the shared effort of religious and non-religious citizens. 
In the public discourse the value and meaning of human embryonic stem (hES) 
cells have extended beyond their status as experimental biological objects and they have 
become contested categories in the domains of bioeconomy, politics, religion and law. 
Stem cells and lines are precious commodities in a fast expanding global market for 
human tissue, political objects subjected to intense scrutiny and regulation, sacred objects 
with metaphysical qualities and dignity, and legal objects that are subject to patent 
protection (Ganchoff, 2004). Human embryonic stem cells are imagined as repositories of 
multiple meanings that occupy intersecting social worlds. As such, they have entered the 
category of "boundary objects"-scientific objects that are "both plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust 
enough to maintain a common identity across sites; they are weakly structured in 
common use, and become strongly structured in individual site use" (Star & Griesemer, 
1989, p. 393). These new living entities, along with other ambiguous products of clinical 
biotechnology, genetic engineering and xenotransplantation, resist disambiguation and 
defy categorizations that have long been considered foundational in the ordering of 
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societies; they have called into question "the fundamental divisions between nature and 
culture, moral and immoral, safe and risky, god-given and human-made" (Jasanoff, 2005, 
p. 26). 
Located at the intersection of the complex interdisciplinary fields of science and 
technology studies (STS) and social and political thought (SPT), this dissertation aims to 
compare the political and policy contexts for stem cell innovation in the United States 
and the European Union, the two leaders in the emerging regenerative medicine. My 
analysis of the stem cell controversy focuses on how the biopolitics of stem cells has 
become the subject of contentious public and political debates and has generated 
extensive public involvement in techno-science policy and decision making. The 
development of stem cell research and regenerative medicine in both political entities 
currently takes place in heavily contested and/or regulated settings, as there are strong 
ethical objections against the morality and permissibility of research that involves 
destruction of human embryos, but also a vast array of problems arising from the global 
bioeconomy. The stem cell controversy has made visible deep tensions between science 
and society, with public communication campaigns on both sides of the Atlantic 
constructing stem cell technologies as a type of scientific innovation that entails difficult 
philosophical, ethical, legal and social dilemmas for democratic societies. The biopolitics 
of hESC research has presented unexpected regulatory challenges for governments and 
policymakers as public contestations have transcended narrow policy considerations 
regarding the ethical governance of different stem cell derivation techniques. Rather, the 
scope of the public discourse surrounding stem cell technologies has extended to intricate 
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questions of how the rapidly expanding biotechnology sector impinges on personal and 
social identities, communities, and life forms. It is not surprising that efforts to resolve 
the stem cell controversy have become inextricably bound up with political attempts to 
ensure the deployment of human biotechnologies for the common good. Political 
mobilizations around the issue of "stem cells" have subsequently implicated rather 
diverse social groups and representatives of civil society-scientists, academics, patients, 
patient rights' advocates, religious communities and churches, biotech corporations, 
politicians, radical activists, celebrities, and lay persons who have often ventured into the 
public sphere to question policy decisions and develop legislative initiatives. 
While stem cell debates have revived some salient political themes of earlier 
controversies over abortion and fetal transplantation research, there are also significant 
differences in rhetorics, tactics of organization, participation strategies and political 
interventions that have given rise to claims about stem cell research exceptionalism. My 
analysis of the public engagement with stem cell policy and ethics in a comparative US-
EU context aims to highlight such convergences and divergences. I argue that an attempt 
to historicize and contextualize emerging practices of public involvement with stem cell 
science can help us achieve a better understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of this 
controversy, its competing epistemologies and patterns of closure that have occurred in 
different political and cultural contexts. Public involvement is by no means a simple, one-
dimensional process that can be easily understood and evaluated; neither is there one 
single mechanism for enabling and enacting effective participation of citizens in policy 
decisions and other public affairs. When looking at communicative interactions between 
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science and society around the biopolitics of stem cells, it is important to recognize that 
public participation or public engagement (with the two terms often used interchangeably 
in the scholarly literature) is a rather contested analytical category which designates 
different communication practices, deliberative processes, dialogue events and multiple 
framings of public contestations emerging around science and technology issues. There 
have been different attempts to develop a typology of public engagement activity and 
mechanisms and to define key terms in the public participation domains. Conceptual 
issues in public participation research have been considered by Rowe and Frewer (2005) 
who have defined "public participation" as "the practice of involving members of the 
public in the agenda setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of 
organizations/institutions responsible for policy development" (p. 254). This definition, 
albeit too broad, makes it possible to distinguish participatory models of governance from 
more traditional forms in which policy making authority is delegated to elected 
representatives without the requirement for public input. At the same time, it does not 
clearly indicate in what ways and at what levels of participation lay people may be 
implicated. While in some situations the public may be involved by simply being a 
passive recipient of information from regulatory bodies, in other cases policy makers may 
intentionally seek public input in a variety of ways, ranging from public opinion research 
projects to the inclusion of public representatives in the decision-making process (i.e., lay 
persons participating in deliberations of advisory bodies). Therefore, Rowe and Frewer 
(2005) argue that earlier distinctions between communication and participation do not 
suffice to categorize the plethora of public involvement situations and suggest a typology 
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of public engagement activity based on the directionality of information flows. They use 
public engagement as an overarching term for public communication, public consultation 
and public participation. There are respectively three types of engagement mechanisms-
communication, consultation and participation-that enable these forms of public 
engagement. Figure 1 presents a more detailed outline of this typology of public 
engagement activity from an information flow perspective. In public communication, 
information is conveyed from the sponsors of the initiative (i.e., a policy-setting 
organization) to the general public and there is no public involvement per se, as there are 
no mechanisms to record and evaluate feedback. Public consultation is characterized by 
an inverse directionality of information flow, from the public to the sponsor, and yet there 
is no formal dialogue but rather the public's opinions on the issue are simply conveyed to 
the sponsor. Public participation is a more dialogical activity as both the sponsor and 
members of the public are open to negotiation and possibly changing their positions. This 
type of engagement activity can contribute to "maximizing the relevant information from 
the maximum number of all relevant sources and transferring it (with minimal 
information loss) to the other parties, with the efficient processing of that information by 
the receivers (the sponsors and participants) and the combining of it into an accurate 
composite" (Rowe & Frewer, 2005, p. 263). 
A different typology of science-society communication interactions has been 
proposed to distinguish between participatory activities which aim to directly influence 
policy outcomes and other forms of public engagement with science and technology that 
are not policy-related (Davies et al., 2009; Davies, 2009). The second type includes 
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"dialogues" and "dialogue events" hosted by organizations which have no direct 
involvement in the policy process and scientific governance such as scientific 
communities, science centers and museums. Innovative public engagement mechanisms 
developed by these organizations exemplify the growing tendency towards participatory 
activities in the field of scientific communication, with institutional responses indicating 
that dialogue has become a key practice for effective communication between scientific 
institutions and the public. The emphasis on dialogue also signifies a departure from the 
traditional deficit model of science communication and the much criticized public 
understanding of science (PUS) paradigm (Davies et al. 2009). Rather, it is believed that 
concurrent with the growing number of recent public controversies and dialogical 
activities in the domains of biotechnology, health and the environment in the UK and 
elsewhere is a deliberative or dialogic turn in science policy (Irwin & Michael, 2003; 
Rowe & Prewer, 2005; Davies, 2009). Although public involvement retains its discursive 
fluidity and is essentially contested, the concept has been used as a generic term that 
covers diverse activities and emerging practices of deliberation, consultation and 
dialogue, with some scholars using the terms "public engagement" and "dialogue" 
interchangeably (Davies, 2009). 
My inquiry into the public engagement with hESC research aims to evaluate to 
the extent to which governments and policymakers have sought to integrate dialogue and 
deliberation in the science policy-making process. I focus on communicative interactions 
between citizens, interest groups, regulatory and advisory bodies, and the media at 
different levels and in a variety of formats. First, I look at how the news media have 
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influenced the public communication of stem cell science and ethics. Mass media, 
together with the general education system, presently constitute the primary source of 
health and science information for the public (Garrett & Bird, 2000; Geller, Bernhardt, & 
Holtzman, 2002). The news media can significantly influence the ways in which 
scientific controversies are negotiated and resolved in the public domain through their 
ability to act as gatekeepers and filter the information they convey to the audience. 
Furthermore, McCombs and Shaw (1972) have established that the main effect of news 
media is agenda-setting-although media organizations cannot tell people what to think, 
they can still influence people what to think about by highlighting certain issues for 
public debate and excluding others from coverage. There are also normative expectations 
associated with the ability of different news media, i.e. newspapers, radio, television, and 
online news, to serve as "watchdogs" of government behavior and activity and act in the 
public interest. My analysis is premised on the assumption that mass media play an active 
role in shaping and constructing scientific controversies, rather than simply reporting 
scientific facts and discoveries, and that their important position in the public domain is 
heightened by their ability to open up controversial scientific and technological 
innovations for public criticism. Print, broadcast and Internet-based media in the US and 
the EU member states have used specific framings of the ethical, legal and social 
implications (ELSI) of stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine to instigate 
societal responses and influence policy outcomes. The news media have become an 
important factor in the evolution of the stem cell controversy not only by validating 
knowledge claims and ethical perspectives around the politics of potentiality, but also by 
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shaping public judgments about policy decisions (Nisbet, Brossard, & Kroepsch, 2003; 
Kitzinger & Williams, 2005; Doring & Zinken, 2005). While they traditionally provide a 
forum for debating science policy within which controversial health and medical issues 
have been defined and played out (Miller, Kitzinger, & Williams, 1998), media 
representations of the stem cell controversy have given legitimacy to conflicting utopian 
narratives and dystopian predictions about the societal impact of biomedical science 
(Kitzinger & Williams, 2005). These narratives have also evoked powerful bio-fantasies 
(Petersen, 2001) by combining traditional ways of claiming scientific authority with more 
emotive discourses and appeals. 
Secondly, I intend to demonstrate how attempts to resolve the stem cell 
controversy have become intricately related to more overarching political and ethical 
concerns about the regulation of human biotechnologies for the public good. I examine 
public debates over what policy oversight would best ensure the ethical development of 
stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine. Such negotiations have taken place in 
diverse forums of public communication and consultation: public relations campaigns by 
interest groups and citizens' associations, political debates in the US Congress and the 
EU Parliament, and deliberations of expert advisory bodies such as the USN ational 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), the President's Council of Bioethics (PCBE), 
the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), and the 
European Expert Group on Science and Governance appointed by the European 
Commission Directorate General for Research (DG RTD). I also aim to compare modes 
of deliberations adopted by national bioethics advisory bodies in the US and the EU, and 
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how their recommendations have outlined different frameworks for ethical and policy 
decision-making regarding hESC research. 
Why Stem Cell Policy in a Comparative Perspective 
Recent debates on the nature and the future development of the European Union 
have drawn parallels to American federalism and have generated a significant body of 
scholarly work comparing the US and EU institutions, policies, and developmental 
trajectories (Menon & Schain, 2006; Sbragia, 2006; Howse & Nicolaidis, 2001; Fabbrini, 
2005). Despite their comparative orientation, many early theorists of European 
integration have consistently emphasized the EC/EU exceptionalism and, as a result, have 
failed to recognize the potential benefits of comparison with other federal systems, 
especially the United States (Menon & Schain, 2006). While there seems to be "a 
consensus in defining the EU as a supranational polity pursuing the project of post-
national democracy" (Fabbrini, 2005, p. 3), it is argued that a comparative perspective on 
the EU institutional structure vis-a-vis that of the US could challenge prevailing notions 
of a European uniqueness. Fabbrini (2005) points out that the EU is unique only in 
comparison with the European nation-states; however, its formation and functioning as a 
democratic polity that is compound, rather than unified, closely resembles the American 
federal experience. There are both structural and functional reasons for a comparative 
analysis of the two systems. Similarities between the US and the EU are visible in their 
characteristics of a compound republic, that is, the presence of a mixed system 
territorially organized around a plurality of centers of authority (Fabbrini, 2005). In a 
nutshell, the EU is presently characterized by the coexistence of governance 
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(supranational level) and government (national level). It is also based on a vertical or 
supranational federalization and a horizontal multiple separation of powers. A similar sort 
of fragmented sovereignty could be observed in the vertical and horizontal separation of 
powers in the American federal system. Unlike other models of democracy, the purpose 
of such double separatio~ of power elaborated in Philadelphia in 1787 was to prevent the 
formation or identification of a political majority (Fabbrini, 2005). Although there are 
clearly many differences between the two systems, the institutional context and the 
functional logic of the EU and the US are similar since the decision-making process is by 
no means limited to a single authority or level of government (Fabbrini, 2005). 
Nonetheless, this institutional convergence between the EU and the US appears rather 
surprising given the significant disparities in historical development and nation-state 
building processes between the European states and America that are highlighted in a 
cross-national comparison (Fabbrini, 2005). 
Regardless of the growing literature on comparative federalism, scholars have 
indicated some deficiencies in comparative research on highly complex federal systems 
such as the US and the EU (Menon & Schain, 2006). Problems for comparativists arise 
from the apparent dissimilarities of these two federal political systems; each system has 
been viewed as a product of unique historical circumstances that have driven the 
development of particular federal compromises. Scholars in the field have claimed that 
comparative EU-US scholarship could be counterproductive, as researchers often slip 
into general characterizations, rather than focus on complicated aspects of the two 
polities that make the subject so intriguing (Menon & Schain, 2006). By contrast, Sbragia 
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(2006) has argued that a comparison of the US and the EU can be productive if we 
consider the wide dispersal of power in their federal systems that make them unique in 
comparison with any other political system. Both the US and the EU stand in stark 
contrast to all other advanced industrial democracies in their ability to deliberately avoid 
institutional concentration of political power. As she points out, "the dispersal of power is 
so striking in both systems and shapes the policymaking to such a degree that these two 
systems would be situated in the same box of whatever matrix one cares to construct" 
(Sbragia, 2006, p. 16). 
Menon and Schain (2006) have claimed that comparative research efforts could 
provide valuable empirical contributions to the significant body of scholarship on 
federalism since they allow scholars to indentify "variance among single variables that 
operate within each system," are essential in developing and testing theoretical 
propositions, and can help generate new theoretical insight (p. 3). They have also 
observed that examination of specific public policies in a comparative European-
American perspective can shed light on key questions of federalism such as tensions 
between territorial diversity and advantages of centralization, special problems of 
democratic legitimacy that stem from blurred divisions of national and local decision-
making, and problems with "democratic deficit" experienced by federal systems. Case 
studies on a variety of social and political issues "examine policy as an outcome of a 
political process embedded in a federal framework" (Menon & Schain, 2006, p. I 0) and, 
therefore, provide important insight into the complex dynamics of the federal process in a 
comparative US-EU context. In addition, comparative policy analyses that scrutinize the 
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policy-making process and review impacts of policy outcomes in each case can help us 
develop a broader understanding of how the efficiency of centralized policy-making is 
complicated by its implementation in decentralized administrative environments. 
Tensions in federal systems of government are often manifested in conflicts 
between national government and subnational governments over aspects of economic 
policy and social regulation. Federalism scholars in the United States have indicated 
increasing disagreements between the federal government and sta~e governments in the 
period between 2001 and 2008 due to the Bush administration's conservative policy 
preferences and attempts to gain control over policy administration (Mintrom, 2008). 
Disagreements have occurred over policies in the areas of education, welfare and 
homeland security, but also as a result of the administration's effort to re-centralize 
oversight of environmental policy (Mintrom, 2008). State activism has also emerged 
around the issue of stem cell research, with state-level policy initiatives in response to the 
federal government's failure to establish comprehensive national regulation of this 
controversial scientific innovation. During his two terms, President Bush focused 
exclusively on restricting federal funding for research to the already existing hESC lines, 
rather than developing a national regulatory framework. This lack of regulatory oversight 
at the national level has undermined federalism by prompting states to assume a 
leadership role in the funding and regulation of stem cell research (Mintrom, 2008). The 
politics of stem cell research in the US and different state policies after the federal 
funding restrictions in 200 l, but also as a result of the widely-anticipated shift in policy 
under the Obama administration, will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
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Similarly, policy debates on stem cell research in the EU have become linked to 
the issue of federalism, but also to key questions about European cultural values and the 
role of citizenship as essential to the politics of twenty-first century Europe. My 
comparative analysis of the stem cell policies in the Unites States and the European 
Union therefore has a two-fold objective: (1) It compares and contrasts specific policy 
outcomes; and (2) It considers the larger issue of how their institutional responses to 
ethical challenges raised by stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine are shaped 
by their divergent political cultures and institutional development as federal states. My 
effort to contextualize the policy making processes is informed by the notion of both 
knowledge and policy as culturally embedded, and also by the understanding that 
comparative studies of science policy should by no means be limited to analyses of how 
successful different nations or political systems are in implementing particular policy 
goals. As suggested by Jasanoff (2005), "rather than prescribing decontextualized best 
practices for an imagined global administrative elite, comparison should be seen as a 
means of investigating the interactions between science and politics, with far-reaching 
implications for governance in advanced industrial democracies" (p. 15). This new type 
of comparative analysis, she claims, has shifted the focus away from static categories of 
political actors, interests and institutions towards a more dynamic notion of political 
culture and its key role in constituting the civic epistemologies of modem nation states. 
Therefore, Jasanoff (2005) proposes a rather broad definition of political culture as "the 
systematic means by which a political community makes binding collective choices'' and 
suggests that it "encompasses institutionally sanctioned modes of action, such as 
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litigiousness in the United States, but also the myriad unwritten codes and practices with 
which a polity supplements its formal methods of assuring accountability and legitimacy 
in political decision making" (p 21 ). This use of the term allows an analytical reflection 
beyond formal politics and decision making (i.e., the state) onto less apparent strategies 
of legitimation and social practices that shape the governance of science and technology. 
I argue that Christian religious ideas and values have played a key role in the US 
stem cell debate and have subsequently determined policy outcomes, especially between 
2001 and 2008. By contrast, during this time period, most EU member states have 
adopted stem cell policies that are more consistent with the democratic values of 
secularism, religious pluralism, and scientific freedom. My analysis aims to show how 
the public debates on stem cell research in the US and the EU exemplify the two 
divergent socio-political trends that had shaped the development of these political 
entities. As Habermas (2006) has noted, while the trend towards social modernization in 
Europe, particularly after World War II, has gone along with an increasing wave of 
secularization, the unfolding of political modernity in America has coincided with the 
political revitalization of a strong religious consciousness. This tendency towards 
increasing religiosity has become highly visible in American public discourse over the 
last few decades, a time when religious traditionalism had been established as a strong 
predictor of political behavior. Given the profound influence of religiously informed 
moral arguments in the American public sphere, it is by no means surprising that the 
Christian Right and bio-conservatives have succeeded in setting a strong public agenda 
on most issues concerning the politics of life, with abortion, euthanasia and hESC 
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research reaching the top of the political agenda on Capitol Hill and the White House. 
Politics and religious conservatism became even more tightly linked during the two 
presidencies of George W. Bush. In the field of bioethics, the shift to conservative 
ideologies and values was exemplified by the President's Council on Bioethics (?CBE), 
an advisory body within the executive branch, which did not hesitate to adopt a narrow, 
embryo-centric approach to current bioethical issues, rather than a conceptually richer 
approach and diversity in perspective that would be more appropriate for this type of 
presidential commission (Annas, 2005). Under the political pressure of the Religious 
Right, in 2001, the Bush administration implemented a restrictive federal funding policy, 
which became not only unpopular, but also triggered an increase in embryo research 
through state-level programs (Reynolds, 2008). The policy has left the United States 
without a comprehensive legal and ethical oversight at the federal level of the 
development of stem cell technologies and other controversial biomedical research such 
as cloning, pre-implantation genetic diagnostics, and the creation of animal-human 
chimeras for stem cell research. Different research and ethical standards apply to the 
public and private sectors, as well as at the state and federal levels, and there is no unified 
national strategy for the development of stem cell medicine within an ethically regulated 
environment (Reynolds, 2008). Rather, at the federal level, the issue of hES cells has 
been framed in terms of the embryo's contested moral status, thus precluding a 
substantive public debate on the potential medical benefits and the broader ethical issues 
created by this research. A change in policy direction was initiated by President Barack 
Obama on March 9, 2009 with the signing of The Stem Cell Executive Order and 
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Scientific Integrity Presidential Memorandum which put an end to the eight-year ban on 
federal funding for research on new hESC lines (The White House Press Room, 2009). 
The reversal of Bush stem-cell policy had been long expected by the scientific 
community and stem cell advocates; however, the new federal policy has failed to 
address the key issue of what types of hESC research and derivation techniques will be 
supported with tax payers' money. While commentators expected that Obama would 
limit the federal funding to research that utilizes stem cells derived from discarded IVF 
embryos, his order delegated to the National Institutes of Health the authority to decide, 
within 120 days, whether funding will be allocated for research on hESC lines from more 
contentious sources such as cloning and embryos produced solely for research (Stein, 
2009). Likewise, it is yet to be seen whether the present administration will address the 
broader policy dilemma in regulating human biotechnologies faced by the US: a largely 
unregulated private sector, different ethical standards in federally funded and private 
research facilities, the Biotech lobby propaganda, and strong opposition against hESC 
research as one of the defining issues in America's relentless culture wars. 
By contrast, the current policies governing hESC research in the EU have 
reflected a more balanced approach at the supranational level to the issue of protection 
and respect owed to embryos used for research, which was carefully weighed against the 
moral imperative to develop new medical treatments that could potentially save the lives 
of EU citizens with degenerative diseases. Although European Community funding was 
allocated for research on hES cells obtained from supernumerary IVF pre-implantation 
embryos (in member-states where permitted), no EU financial support for research using 
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therapeutic cloning to create embryos was allowed. Despite religious divisions, 
differences in national policies of member states, and considerable opposition by the 
Vatican, the European Commission has established strict ethical guidelines for public 
funding of research on both adult and embryonic stem cells that reflect the position that 
this biomedical innovation is a compelling public good. Policy decisions have also been 
influenced by the EU's 2000 Lisbon agenda, which focused on scientific research and 
technology development as a way to build the most competitive global knowledge-based 
economy by 2010 (Wynne et al., 2007), and also as by traditional notions of "consensus 
politics." Nonetheless, EU member states have responded to the controversy with 
different ethical and policy assessments of what type of regulatory approach will best 
serve the public interest. For example, while the stem cell policy debate in Germany has 
revived old anxieties about Nazi science and unethical human experimentation in the 
context of the rebuilding of German identity in the aftermath of two world wars, biotech 
countries like the UK, Sweden, and Belgium have elevated the development of hESC 
research and regenerative medicine to the top of their national agendas. It is worth 
exploring how political culture has played out in EU debates and has shaped policy 
decisions regarding hESC research. Therefore, my dissertation strives to understand the 
intricate relationship between universal ethical values, cultural specificities, and 
regulatory regimes that apply to human biotechnologies and to deconstruct dominant 
themes in framing the biopolitics of stem cells. This perspective can also help us gain 
better insight into the complicated public responses to stem cell technologies and their 
impact on the political life of communities, nations and federal states. 
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The next sections of this chapter provide background information on the 
controversy over hESC research and examine ethical and political considerations in the 
US and EU policy debates. The chapter concludes by outlining the methodology and 
structure of the dissertation research. 
Defining the Public Interest 
The main premise of this dissertation is that the stem cell controversy raises 
important challenges for a democratic politics of communication. Public deliberations on 
the ethics of hESC research have been characterized by political polarization and partisan 
rhetorics. The ethical objections against research on hES cells have revolved around their 
derivation from human embryos at the blastocyst stage of development (from the fourth 
or fifth day of embryo genesis to the moment of implantation in the uterus). Much of the 
embryo politics involved in the stem cell controversy has its deeper roots in the earlier 
abortion debate and the rise of the pro-life movement in the 1960s and the 1970s 
(Holland, Lebacqz, & Zoloth, 2002). As a result, the public interest in stem cell 
innovation has been repeatedly debated in relation to a fundamental political, moral and 
legal question: "Do we destroy a potential human being when a blastocyst is used in 
hESC research?" Public deliberations on the embryo's highly contested status have 
reflected a deep moral divide in contemporary pluralistic societies. On the one hand, stem 
cell activists have repeatedly questioned the validity of both religious and secular beliefs 
in the moral equivalence between blastocysts and born people (Sandel, 2004; Kaplan, 
2007). In mass media and popular discourses the issue has consistently been framed in 
terms of the intense conflict between religious traditionalism and scientific freedom, 
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conservative bioethics and the scientific community (Maienschein, 2003 b ). On the other 
hand, opponents of embryo research have claimed that stem cell activists had undermined 
a rational public discussion on biological issues by dismissing arguments about the 
ontological status of human embryo as fundamentally religious and thus beyond the 
scope of a legitimate public debate (Shields, 2007). It was argued that stem cell advocates 
had taken advantage of people's suffering and had manipulated the public opinion 
through the effective use of propaganda techniques, impassioned rhetorics and appeal to 
human emotions (Shields, 2007). In the US, the two camps have framed the issue in 
accordance with their preferred outcome and have waged nationwide lobbying and public 
relations campaigns. They have offered competing views of what constitutes a 
responsible governance of the stem cell technologies. 
The stem cell wars have become a good case study to evaluate the legitimacy of 
religious-based values in public debates over science policies, as well as the complexities 
of public communication of scientific controversies in contemporary multicultural and 
pluralistic societies. Religion has played an important role in stem cell debates worldwide 
and therefore appropriate consideration should be given to the significant differences 
between the major religious traditions on the issue of moral respect and legal protection 
owed to embryos and fetuses (Walters, 2004; Waters & Cole-Turner, 2003). Religious 
perspectives on the ethics of hESC research have significantly shaped public attitudes and 
influenced the present regulatory regimes not only in the US, but also in EU member 
states with predominantly Roman Catholic populations, such as Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Austria, Slovakia, Malta, and Lithuania. The stem cell controversy, however, was not 
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solely based on the embryo's highly contested moral status; it also involved public 
anxieties and misconceptions about stem cell science. While hESC research has become 
the subject of theological and ethical debates and its implications for humanity have been 
widely debated, the topic is still about science and the production of fundamental 
knowledge in scientific fields such as developmental biology and embryology. Scholars 
have claimed that both academic and public discussions need to be properly informed by 
accurate scientific knowledge on the issue (Jones, 2004; Finlay, 2004). 
A substantive public debate on hESC research should consider the ethical issues 
within their larger scientific, political, social, cultural, and legal contexts and address the 
difficult normative questions arising from new developments in biomedicine. It should 
also involve efforts at developing strategies to promote civic engagement with science 
policy and increase public knowledge about stem cell technologies. Stem cell research 
has quickly developed into an important interdisciplinary field of inquiry, especially as 
innovations in regenerative medicine have become the target of global corporate interests, 
political agendas of governments and interest groups, and citizens' activism. It is the 
ultimate goal of this dissertation to provide critical reflection on how contemporary 
biopolitics affects collective decision-making in democratic societies. This objective will 
be accomplished by addressing, in light of the stem cell controversy, the philosophical 
and political question of how new developments in biomedicine challenge the 
communicative processes of public opinion and will formation in the democratic public 
sphere. I also examine how the issue of hES cells has been extended to metaphysical and 
normative questions over traditional notions of personhood, human nature and the status 
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of the human in the world (Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2007) and has been linked to ethical 
critiques of post-humanism (Fukuyama, 2002). 
At the close of the twentieth century, many predicted that we were entering "the 
age of biological control" (Wilmut, Campbell & Tudge, 2000). With the growing power 
of biotechnology to produce novel forms of life and transform our own biology, it has 
become necessary to exercise greater political control over biomedical research that could 
have negative consequences for future generations (Cole-Turner, 2001; Fukuyama, 
2002). We are presently witnessing epistemological shifts in contemporary life sciences 
that have uprooted conventional understandings of what constitutes "human nature" and 
have forced scholars to reconsider concepts of living organisms, species, individual, 
community, and race. Rose (2007b) has argued that the most visible mutations of 
contemporary biopolitics were the molecularization, optimization and subjectification of 
technologies of life, as well as the emergence of bioeconomy and biocapital. Advances in 
the life sciences and biomedicine, such as the human genome project, cloning, genetic 
testing, somatic gene therapy, germline gene modification, and pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis, have also generated technologies of biopower in the form of risk politics. 
These new "economies of vitality" were "fuelled not merely by the commercial interests 
of biotech companies, but also by parental desires for a perfect child in an age of 
manipulated consumerism and reproductive choice" (Rose, 2001, p. 2). Contemporary 
biomedical knowledge systems have become an integral part of the neo-liberal tendency 
towards the privatization of health risks. Subsequently, questions concerning the 
regulation of human biotechnologies and biomedical research have spawned heated 
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scholarly debates and have triggered political mobilization and action. Some have viewed 
that the ideological shift towards individual choice and autonomy that has taken place 
within our highly medicalized, neoliberal societies as concurrent with a reductionist 
social agenda. In his philosophical critique of liberal eugenics, Habermas (2003) has 
warned against the resurgence of genetic determinism and scientific racism which would 
eliminate those considered biologically abnormal. By contrast, analyses of genetic 
governmentality have shifted the focus away from the preoccupation with problems ·of 
reductionism, reproduction and repression in an attempt to achieve a better understanding 
of the relationship between the government of risks and the development of technologies 
of the self (Lemke, 2004; Novas & Rose, 2000). Genetic reductionism was seen as a truth 
program that functioned in the context of power strategies and political rationalities. As 
Lemke (2004) has pointed out, "Rather than being viewed in terms of objective fate, 
genes today are increasingly seen to represent subjective potential: they refer to the 
supremacy of the consumer, who aims at profitable optimization of individual human 
capital and personal quality of life" (p. 551 ). Biopolitics as subjectification has produced 
medical subjectivities that are oriented towards the norms of personal" responsibility, risk 
aversion, and informed decision making (Novas & Rose, 2000). 
Stem cell research has arguably become the most prominent issue in the highly 
contested, molecularized biopolitics of the twenty-first century. In both Europe and 
America, extensive publicity has been given to this biomedical innovation, its ethical 
implications and the future of regenerative medicine. Stem cell activists have tended to 
emphasize potential benefits for society, e.g. the promise of regenerative medicine to 
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radically transform global tissue economies and optimize healthcare systems, while 
overlooking the significant risks associated with clinical translation of stem cell therapies.· 
Currently, these potential adverse effects of stem cell transplants vary from tumorigenesis 
to immunological complications and problems associated with phenotype transformations 
of transplanted ESCs such as dedifferentiation or excess proliferation. Nonetheless, some 
scientists believe that we are on the brink of a new revolution in biomedicine, with stem 
cell therapies having the potential to transform the twenty-first century medicine in a 
manner similar to the small molecule drugs in the twentieth century. 
In their book Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late 
Capitalism, W aldby and Mitchell (2007) observe that the public interest in the 
development of stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine arises from their 
potential to provide solutions to two arduous biopolitical problems faced by the nation-
state. The first issue is the difficulty of encouraging organ and tissue donations. The 
existing organ donation and procurement regimes are inefficient and remain plagued by 
systemic problems, with an ever-growing demand far outstripping the supply of availabLe 
organs. The unlimited capacities of hESCs to generate various types of body tissues 
promise, at least in theory, to resolve this problem. In this context, hESC research is 
clearly viewed as a pure public good, while "the stem cells are imagined as an unlimited 
resource, the precise opposite of individual organs" (Waldby & Mitchell, 2007, p. 63). 
The second biopolitical problem concerns the changing demographics of the 
industrialized Western nations. Aging populations currently present a number of 
economic, social and policy challenges to governments. Regenerative medicine and stem 
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cell technologies have the potential to develop treatments for chronic and degenerative 
conditions associated with aging that place significant burden on national healthcare 
systems. Therefore, significant biovalue-a concept introduced by Waldby (2002) to 
designate the relationship between the promotion of health, the production of capital and 
the question of ethics in the use of human tissue in stem cell research-has been assigned 
to the hESC tissue, as it is believed that the science of "stem cells" has finally provided 
the fast growing biotech industries with an easy shortcut to the prolongation of life. 
Recent research has shown that aging processes in the human body are correlated to the 
diminishing capacity of stem cells for self-renewal, which is caused by DNA damage and 
changes in their supporting niches (Sharpless & DePinho, 2007). Decline in the 
replicative function of certain stem cell types as age progresses could also be induced by 
mechanisms that protect against cancer development, such as senescence and apoptosis, 
which depend on telomere shortening and the tumor suppressing proteins p53 and 
pl6INK4a (Sharpless & DePinho, 2007). Finding connections between this decreased 
regenerative capacity of stem cells and mammalian ageing clearly advances a "stem-cell 
hypothesis" for medical conditions commonly associated with aging such as frailty, 
atherosclerosis, and type 2 diabetes. 
Most nation-states with advanced biotech industries have carried out 
parliamentary debates on the ethical regulation of hESC research and funded efforts to 
advance stem cell innovation. The stem cell debates in the US and the EU have largely 
focused on the issue of regulation and funding for this biomedical research. There are 
profound disagreements in these multicultural, pluralistic societies on whether public 
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funding should be allocated for research that some constituencies believe to be at least 
ethically objectionable. While opponents of embryo research have advocated prohibitions 
of public funding, research activists on both sides of the Atlantic have contended that 
private investments would not provide the best opportunity for realizing the therapeutic 
potential of hESC research. The US National Academies Committee on the Biological 
and Biomedical Application of Stem Cell Research in 2001 has emphasized the crucial 
role public funding had played and would continue to play in generating and optimizing 
scientific advances in biomedicine (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). First 
of all, conducting basic biomedical research is the key to the development of new 
medical treatments. Such research involves a systematic approach that can help scientists 
achieve a better understanding of essential aspects of phenomena and produce new 
fundamental knowledge in their respective fields (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 
2002). In the United States and elsewhere, basic research in biomedicine and the life 
sciences has traditionally been the domain of public funding. Despite the growing 
investments of private pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies in overall 
biomedical research in recent years, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal 
agency under the umbrella of the Department of Health and Human Services, is still the 
largest sponsor of basic biomedical research that produces fundamental knowledge, with 
an annual budget of $29.4 billion in 2007. By comparison, basic research comprised a 
small percentage of all private sectors pharmaceutical R&D, with only 14 percent in the 
1990s and, as illustrated by the 2001 Report of the National Research Council, with 
pharmaceuticals being the main area of concentration (Stem Cells and Regenerative 
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Medicine, 2002). Basic research is often removed from commercial applications and, 
therefore, it is unlikely that it would be vigorously pursued by private companies that are 
oriented towards fast returns of R&D investments and satisfying profits for their 
stakeholders. 
Science, technology and engineering innovation in the EU is presently funded 
though the Seventh Framework Program (FP7) of the European Commission, which will 
allocate approximately 73 billion euro for a seven year period (2007-2013) in four 
specific program areas: cooperation, ideas, people and capacities (FP7, 2008). Health 
research is one of the priority areas under FP7, with an emphasis on translational research 
(e.g., the translation of basic discoveries to clinical application), the development of new 
therapies, methods for health promotion and effective diagnostics, as well as sustainable 
healthcare systems (FP7, 2008). In most EU member states, public funding is 
indispensable for the production of fundamental knowledge in the field of biosciences 
and biomedicine which is a necessary precondition for the development of new 
biomedical treatments. The European Commission has acknowledged the importance of 
public investment in health care and biomedical research by heavily investing in 
cooperation projects for basic and translational research between EU research networks 
and national health institutions (FP7, 2008). 
Science policy advisory bodies, such as the US National Research Council, have 
indicated that restrictions on public funding for hESC research would limit the number of 
scholars engaged with basic research in the field of stem cell biology (Stem Cells and 
Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Most stem cell scientists work in academic institutions 
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and laboratories that are funded with federal funds. While these academic researchers 
may in principle accept funding from private organizations, conducting research that is 
subject to federal restrictions in NIH-funded facilities entails significant risks, including 
revoking the scientist's individual funding, and may also jeopardize the funding of the 
institution as a whole (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Another negative 
consequence of federally imposed funding restrictions is that the development of stem 
cell innovation will be confined to only a few avenues of research (Stem Cells and 
Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Such constraints will inevitably diminish the rate of 
discoveries and knowledge development and will adversely affect translational research 
(i.e., the transition from basic research to actual clinical applications). By contrast, public 
funding in any scientifi~ field greatly increases the rate of discovery and knowledge 
production through the encouragement of a broad range of diverse research activities 
(Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Publicly funded biomedical research also 
facilitates open exchange and access to data, experimental methods, and technologies 
within the scientific community. Finally, one of the strongest arguments in favor of the 
governments' involvement in and financial support for hESC research is the need to 
provide appropriate ethical oversight of controversial biomedical research (Stem Cells 
and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Therefore, the 2001 report released by the US 
National Academies Committee on the Biological and Biomedical Application of Stem 
Cell Research concluded that public funding, combined with established standards of 
open scientific exchange, peer-review, and public oversight, would constitute the most 
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efficient and responsible way to realize the potential of stem cells for regenerative 
medicine (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). 
Despite the sound argumentation of science and public policy advisory bodies in 
America and Europe, determining what policies will best ensure the deployment of stem 
cell technologies for the common good continues to be a real challenge in stem cell 
debates. Ethical and religious critiques of hESC research arise from framing the 
controversy around some fundamental questions that society has grappled with over the 
centuries. Similar to scientific controversies involving human reproduction, such as 
abortion, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and inheritable genetic modification, 
experiments with hESCs have revived perennial philosophical debates over the definition 
of human life and the moral status of the human embryo. The public understanding of the 
stem cell controversy, as Jane Maienschein (2003a) points out in her article on the role of 
language in the stem cell debate, was further complicated by discrepancies between the 
public use of language and the complex terminology adopted by scientific communities. 
Such discrepancies have traditionally been a source of confusion in public debates on 
issues related to science, technology and innovation. As the stem cell controversy has 
unfolded, the public use of biological concepts pertaining to hESC research has 
contradicted conceptual paradigms in developmental biology (Maienschein, 2003a). 
Subsequently, most public debates over the morality of embryo research have overlooked 
conceptual differences between the terms "embryo" and "pre-embryo" outlined by 
embryologists and have failed to consider how the focus on "embryo" had been shifting 
historically in science and research (Maienschein, 2003a). Scholars have also observed 
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that bioethical discourses on stem cell research could be particularly confusing to lay 
persons, as only few experts are familiar with the complex scientific, philosophical, and 
theological debates over the beginnings of human life (Nisbet 2004b; Scott, 2006). 
Political debates and public communication campaigns in America and elsewhere have 
often reduced these complexities to irreconcilable polar-opposite positions by framing the 
controversy in terms of an irresolvable conflict between morality and science, religion 
and secular bioethics, pro-lifers and pro-choice positions. This has led to a significant 
bifurcation of opinions on whether hESC research constitutes a pure public good that is 
worthy of government funding and protection, with advocates emphasizing the potential 
health benefits for the community and our moral obligation to pursue life-saving 
biomedical research in response to their opponents' criticism of controversial 
technologies used in stem cell studies such as embryo destruction and cloning. 
Rhetorical Challenges in the Stem Cell Debate 
The ethical and policy issues pertaining to hESC research have deeply affected 
the democratic politics of communication in America, but also in EU member states with 
strong social movements against abortion and embryo research. An interesting twist in 
the almost decade-long debate was the contention of some right-wing US intellectuals 
that the contemporary public sphere had failed to produce a legitimate public discourse 
on this thorny bioethical issue. In his 2006 article "Bioethical politics," Jon Shields 
(2006) argued that the Secular Left in America had undermined a rational public 
discussion on biological issues by dismissing arguments about the ontological status of 
the human embryo as fundamentally religious and thus beyond the scope of a legitimate 
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public debate. Furthermore, in an article published in Social Science and Modern Society, 
Shields (2007) claimed that proponents of hESC research in America had won 
overwhelming public support not with rational, substantive arguments, but rather with 
persuasive images of human suffering, impassioned rhetorics and strong emotional 
appeals. Although research advocates sincerely believe that embryos are not human 
beings, they-similarly to the pro-choice supporters-have failed to articulate convincing 
philosophical arguments that establish a morally significant dividing line between the 
zygote and the person. Shields (2007) has also alleged that conservative intellectuals had 
offered well-reasoned defenses of the full moral respect and protection owed to the early 
embryo, as well as a sound ethical justification for restrictions on hESC research. 
Nonetheless, the Right has found it difficult to persuade the public of the validity of their 
arguments since they were unable to provide compelling sentimental evidence confirming 
the human nature of the early embryo. Unlike the pro-life activists who could take great 
advantage of shocking pictures of human fetuses with crushed skulls and broken bodies, 
opponents of hESC research could hardly build their case on visual representations of 
blastocysts from which pluripotent stem cells are derived. The embryo at this stage does 
not possess any anthropomorphic characteristics, but rather looks like a simple cluster of 
cells. People tend to be less compassionate about the destruction of blastocysts in 
research than to the suffering of those dying of Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, type-I diabetes 
or other degenerative diseases. Shields (2007) has concluded that, regardless of the strong 
philosophical arguments against embryo research that had been offered by opponents of 
hESC research, the Left would eventually prevail in the stem cell fight due to its 
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sentimental advantage. Their emotional appeals have also resonated well with utilitarian 
claims about the potential medical benefits from this research. 
Arguments by Shields (2007) and other commentators (Lawler, 2007; Kaye, 
2007; Levin & Cohen, 2007) that persuasive communication campaigns and media hype, 
rather than rational arguments and evidence-based reasoning, have shaped public 
attitudes and activism are by no means unique to the stem cell debate. In their critiques of 
the right-to-life movement, pro-choice supporters expressed similar concerns about how 
the politics of images which provoke visceral responses could affect the rationality of 
deliberative public engagement processes. Abortion-rights activists in the US have used a 
line of argumentation similar to Shields' claims in order to reflect on the persuasive 
nature of shocking, graphic images in Jack and Barbara Willke's Handbook of Abortion 
( 1971) which had played an instrumental role in the mobilization of several generations 
of pro-life citizens. Debates on highly contested social and medical issues such as 
abortion and research on stem cells involve conflicting normative claims and ideologies, 
with both sides in the dispute deploying scientific theories and concepts as a resource in 
their social struggles. This raises doubts of whether such controversies are purely rational 
debates, with only one defensible position on the issues under consideration and whether 
they could be negotiated, resolved, or terminated simply through the use of evidence-
based reasoning, rather than evaluating competing moral claims to rationality made by 
participants in the debate. While the position defended by Shields has some ancillary 
merits, his argument is poorly substantiated and overlooks the political realities and 
conflicting epistemologies of the stem cell controversy as it has unfolded in the US. 
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Although both sides have framed the issue as a moral matter according to their preferred 
policy outcomes, the religious Right and pro-life groups have played a key role in the 
politicization of public bioethics on all institutional levels by framing the stem cell debate 
around the contested politics of abortion. During the Bush presidency, conservative 
bioethicists on the President's Council of Bioethics (PCBE) have consistently provided 
intellectual ammunition for the Right on controversial bioethical issues that range from 
abortion and embryo research to the right-to-die debate. Right-wing intellectuals such as 
Leon Kass, Wesley J. Smith, Gilbert Meilaender, Robert P. George, Eric Cohen, and 
William Kristal have heavily relied on emotional appeals to make the case against 
"embryonic stem cells" and have capitalized on the power of rhetoric to provide ethical 
justification for the Bush stem cell policy announced in his televised address to the nation 
on August 9, 2001. They have utilized dystopian visions to claim that hESC research not 
only involves the destruction of nascent human life, but is yet another step toward the 
creation of a post human race in a biotech-dominated "Brave New World" of designer 
babies, human clones, and fetal farming (Bush, 2001; Kass, 2001, 2002, 2003; Smith, 
2004). Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932), the famous dystopian tale of how 
advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering have brought into existence a society 
of dehumanized benevolent dictatorship and pharmacological hedonism, has served as a 
common reference point for critics of stem cell technologies and has provided validation 
for the administration's regulatory approach. 
In order to stifle a substantive and inclusive debate on the public interest in the 
development of stem cell technologies, the Right has relied on the rather emotional 
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appeal that public support for hESC research would only ensure that the culture of death 
becomes deeply entrenched in American society. Their opposition against the use of 
human embryos in research is grounded on the much contested belief that full 
personhood begins at conception and therefore embryos are morally equivalent to born 
humans. Right-wing organizations such as the Family Research Council, Concerned 
Women for America, Christian Coalition for America, the U.S. Council of Catholic 
Bishops, and the American Life League, among many others, have been relentless in 
spreading misconceptions about the science of embryonic stem cells. Their activists have 
made outrageous statements that public funding for hESC research will increase the rate 
of abortions and that stem cell scientists encourage women to have abortions so that they 
can conduct experiments on late-stage fetuses. Anti-stem cell advertisements 
commissioned by pro-life groups have incorrectly defined the pluripotent stem cells 
derived from blastocysts as synonymous to "human embryos" and "babies." An example 
of such propaganda campaigns is a TV commercial sponsored by NoStemCell.com which 
claims that "stem cells" are "are tiniest of human beings harvested from human embryos" 
and that the microscopic cell lines grown on Petri dishes used in stem cell research are 
"babies" that will be subjected to cruel experimentation (Sky Soft Consulting, n.d.). 
Christian Fundamentalist leaders like Reverend Pat Robertson, Reverend Jerry Falwell 
and Jam es Dobson have opposed stem cell research using similar rhetorical strategies and 
pseudoscientific notions. In 2006, when the Congress passed its first bill to increase 
federal funding for hESC research, the Campaign to Defend the Constitution (DefCon), 
an online grass-roots movement to combat threats to American democracy posed by 
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Christian fundamentalism, published full-page advertisements in New York Times in May 
and June criticizing the President and the Religious Right for holding the stem cell 
legislation "hostage" and "imposing its will on all Americans, through limits on a 
woman's right to privacy, a steady assault on gay and lesbian rights" and "the march to 
teach creationism as science" (Figure 2). The May ad was more specific, as it included 
. photos of the three conservative religious leaders beneath the headline "Meet America's 
Most Influential Stem Cell Scientists." It also quoted Falwell's references to embryonic 
stem cell research as "dangerous and unethical," Dobson's claim that it compares to Nazi 
human experimentations and Pat Robertson's statements that "before long, we' 11 be 
harvesting body parts from fully formed people" and that "once you begin 
this ... utilitarian use of cells, then everything is up for grabs" (Figure 3). Stem cell 
advocates have also consistently targeted the hypocrisy of Bush's stem cell morality in 
numerous cartoons and spoof ads, posted online or in various print media (Figure 4). 
While Shields (2007) rightfully highlights the power of rhetorics in politically 
effective communication, his defense of the conservative position is dismissive of some 
strong arguments against the "equal moral status view" articulated in the stem cell debate 
that have helped mobilize public support for this biomedical innovation. The first 
compelling ethical defense of public investment in stem cell technologies stems from the 
so-called "research imperative" (Callahan, 2007). This is the view that we have moral 
obligation to pursue biomedical research that can save human lives and ease the suffering 
of millions of people with degenerative diseases, and that this obligation outweighs the 
respect and protection owed to pre-implantation embryos. From this perspective, the 
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central bioethical issue for policy makers becomes how to weigh the moral worth and 
respect owed to embryonic forms of life against the lives of those that can be saved by 
advancements in hESC research. Stem cell advocates have raised at least two compelling 
logical arguments that cast doubt on the Religious Right's unproblematic acceptance of 
the moral equivalence between embryos and people. The first objection concerns the 
belief that all embryos have the potential to develop into human life. In reality, almost 
half of the pre-implantation embryos never become human life. The embryo can become 
a person only if it is placed in a woman's uterus and provided that it implants. Therefore, 
many believe that the embryo's adherence to the uterine wall of the mother constitutes a 
pivotal moment in realizing its potential to develop into a human being. ESCs are usually 
derived from donated unused embryos which were created during in vitro fertilization. 
Such embryos, which are routinely discarded or kept in frozen storage for many years by 
IVF clinics, are a pure potential since it is unlikely that they will ever be implanted into a 
woman's womb and become human beings. The second argument in favor ofhESC 
research has resonated even more powerfully with the American public. While right-wing 
bioethicists and pro-lifers claim that the destruction of the pre-implantation embryo is 
morally wrong, they disregard the fact that it is a common occurrence in the process of 
sexual procreation (Caplan, 2007). In reality, the rate of early pregnancy loss remains 
high, and approximately half of all fertilized eggs either do not implant or are simply lost. 
People view the natural loss of embryos as an event that is by no means morally and 
religiously equivalent to the tragic death of an infant (Sandel, 2005). Embryo destruction 
is a daily practice at the IVF fertility clinics. Stem cell advocates have accused President 
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Bush and his supporters in hypocrisy for accepting the destruction of surplus embryos in 
IVF labs, while, at the same time, opposing such destruction in medical research that 
could potentially save lives. If opponents of embryo research are consistent in their belief 
in the full moral respect owed to pre-implantation embryo, it only makes sense that they 
should strongly oppose the "test-tube" baby technology (Kaplan, 2007). Sandel (2005) 
has also argued that defending "the full moral status view" would inevitably entail 
support for a total ban on destruction of human embryos in research, not just restrictions 
on federal funding. It is these well-reasoned arguments that had won the "battle over stem 
cells," secured strong bipartisan support for the Stem Cell Enhancement Act of 2007 
(S.5) in the US Congress, and mobilized voters to organize ballot initiatives and pass 
constitutional amendments in California, Missouri, and Michigan. 
In his book L!fe 's Dominion: An argument about abortion, euthanasia, and 
individual freedom, Ronald Dworkin ( 1994) has argued that we need to distinguish 
between the public rhetoric in which people frame their opinions and their actual 
opinions, and that it is not always possible to find out what exactly lay persons think by 
simply focusing on the high rhetoric of the abortion debate. When people are asked to 
express their views on the issue in a general way, they tend to "use the strident and heated 
rhetoric that leaders of various interests groups have made prominent, whether or not it 
fits their actual instinct and convictions (Dworkin, 1994, p. 20). In reality, people often 
make decisions about abortions that are clearly at odds with the pro-life rhetoric in which 
they express their position. When lay persons use emotionally charged descriptions of 
abortion such as "murder" or "homicide" and express the notion that the fetus is a person 
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from the moment of conception, Dworkin ( 1994) argues, they often do so because they 
hold the detached, not the derivative view, that is, they condemn the act of deliberately 
terminating pregnancy "not because they think a fetus has rights and interests but just to 
emphasize the depth of their feeling that abortion is wrong because it is the deliberate 
destruction of the life of a human organism" (p. 21 ). I believe that these considerations 
about the independent emotive power of rhetoric should be taken into account when 
evaluating public discourses surrounding stem cell research, particularly if we strive to 
achieve a historical reflection on convergences between the public rhetoric of the 
abortion debate and framings of the stem cell controversy around the intricate questions 
of what sort of entity the embryo is and when personhood begins. 
Methodology and Chapter Outline 
The comparative account of the politics and public engagement with hESC 
research in the US and the EU offered by this dissertation utilizes the methods of the 
interpretive social sciences to elucidate some far-reaching socio-political and ethical 
implications of what has been described as the "new biomedical revolutions" in the life 
sciences, biomedicine and biotechnology. I engage in textual analysis of theoretical 
perspectives and empirical studies in disciplines such as science and technology studies, 
sociology, political science, communication theory, media studies, philosophy, and 
bioethics that have examined the impact of these new developments for democratic 
theory and practice. Although I undertake a qualitative analysis of policy and political 
developments primarily in the field of stem cells research, I also want. to illustrate how 
the stem cell controversy has become a reference point for larger and more salient 
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debates over the appropriate limits of biomedical research and innovation. The politics of 
biotechnology has occupied the center stage of public and political arenas over the past 
ten years and contested developments have called into question fundamental democratic 
values such as individuality, privacy, freedom, equality and solidarity. Advances in the 
fast-growing field of biomedical engineering have also posed immense ethical challenges 
for humanity, with the technology making the generation of novel biological entities, as 
well as human germline genetic modification, a foreseeable future. As Nikolas Rose 
(2007) has pointed out, the intersection of human reproductive technologies and stem cell 
engineering has led to the appearance of a whole set of liminal entities such as "stem cells 
and stem cell lines, the embryonic stem cell clusters, containing cells from all three germ 
layers, termed "embryiod bodies," which can be induced to differentiate into various 
types of tissue or to express particular enzymes" (p. 49). The nature of such new 
biological entities, their legal status and the legitimacy of practices that generate them are 
highly contested; they also incite critical discussions about how paradigm shifts in the 
biosciences have redefined our knowledge practices, legal categories, political concepts, 
and personal identities. 
The next two chapters set out to examine entanglements of science, religion and 
ethics that have shaped public discourses on hESC research. I argue that the stem cell 
debate constitutes a "scientific controversy with a heavy political and ethical overlay" 
(Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987) and that scientific disputes of that nature are not amenable 
to closure without proper consideration of their epistemologies and structural political, 
social and economic issues. Therefore, I attempt to disentangle scientific, ethical and 
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political claims that are intermingled in the controversy and evaluate the impact of social 
struggles and cultural contexts in validating knowledge claims regarding the ethics and 
science of stem cells. Chapter 2 outlines key scientific developments in hESC research 
and fundamental concepts in stem cell biology, including different types of stem cells and 
their clinical potential for regenerative medicine. I illustrate how the field of stem cell 
research has become the subject of heated public debates and how proponents and 
opponents of this biomedical innovation have offered competing interpretations of the 
biological properties and clinical utility of embryonic and adult stem cells in attempts to 
shape the public discourse and influence policy decisions. I also discuss recent 
developments in stem cell studies such as methods for the reprogramming of more 
differentiated cells (i.e., somatic stem cells) into induced pluripotent (iPS) cells, which 
are expected to resolve the ethical dilemma of using human embryos. 
Chapter 3 looks at how the stem cell controversy has revived contentious debates 
over the moral standing of the human embryo, the role of religion in public life of 
pluralistic democratic societies, and the appropriate limits to biomedical research that 
infringes on human dignity. It provides an overview of religious arguments on the use of 
human embryos in stem cell research and related technologies developed by major 
monotheistic religions such as Catholicism, Judaism and Islam. This intercultural 
perspective on the ethical issues in hESC research aims to highlight discrepancies 
between the major monotheistic religions on thorny bioethical issues and address the 
intricate question about the validity of religious arguments in public debates over stem 
cell policies. The chapter also provides insight into the diverse ethics of hESC research 
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by analyzing three major bioethical issues that have become prominent in the US and EU 
public policy debates: (1) secular defenses of the embryo's moral status, (2) the ethics of 
human cloning, and (3) concerns about women's reproductive rights and health in 
embryo donation for stem cell research. These ethical considerations have influenced 
specific framings of the stem cell controversy in national policy debates. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of mass media in setting the public agenda on stem 
cell research in a comparative US-EU context. My analysis emphasizes the active role of 
media in shaping and constructing public discourses on the ethics and politics of stem 
cells against the conventional understanding that media coverage of controversies in the 
field of science and technology is rather limited to reporting new scientific discoveries 
and technological developments. I look at how the news and print media represent an 
important site of struggle for different interest groups in their lobbying efforts to sway 
public opinion in favor of specific policy outcomes by gaining extensive press coverage. 
In this process, mass media have also followed their own agenda in framing and 
sensationalizing ELSI issues related to stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine. 
The chapter presents an overview of scholarly literature (Friedman; Dunwoody, & 
Rogers, 1999; Mazur, 1981; Weingart, 1998) on the role various media outlets play in 
engaging the public with scientific controversies by framing scientific uncertainty and 
providing legitimacy to knowledge claims, moral values, and political interests. I contrast 
and compare frames and narratives about risks and benefits of stem cell technologies 
presented and validated by mass media in the US and EU member states such as Britain, 
France and Poland from the perspective of two normative models for public discourse on 
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scientific controversies outlined by Gerhards and Schafer (2009)-the science-dominated 
scientific public sphere and the contextualized scientific public sphere. 
The concepts of risk society, biopolitics, and the public sphere can provide useful 
analytical lenses to examine political mobilizations around stem cell technologies in the 
US and the EU. Chapter 5 discusses how these contested theoretical notions allow us to 
reflect on the nature of public discourses surrounding hESC research. I refer to two major 
traditions of contemporary social and political thought that have suggested different 
theoretical reflections upon the unfolding of political modernity and its underlying 
institutions: Foucault's analysis of biopower and biopolitics, and Habermas's 
communicative theory. Foucault's thesis (1984) that the object of politics in modernity 
has become human life itself and we now live in a "biopolitical" age has provoked a 
continuous theoretical debate on the growing significance of the biosciences in the 
political and economic development of late capitalism (Lazzarato, 2002; Lemke, 2001; 
Rose, 2001; Rabinow & Rose, 2003). Recent shifts in the technologies and stratification 
of biopower have extended biopolitics beyond the anatomo-politics of human bodies and 
the bioeconomy of population into forms of molecularized biopolitics which include 
regulatory control on the micro level of human tissues and cells (Rose, 2001 ). I examine 
how stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine have given visibility to such 
structural changes in the stratification of biopower by redefining what is considered to be 
human or non-human, living or re-animated. In order to bring a normative perspective on 
divergent discourses on hESC research that simultaneously compete for policy initiative, 
the chapter evaluates the multidimensional model of discourse in the democratic public 
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sphere, proposed by Habermas (1991a, 1991b, 1996) as a normative ideal of democratic 
politics. This multifaceted notion of discourse presupposes that the pursuit of collective 
goals is best accomplished through rational processes of collective will formation in 
which power differentials attached to conflicting interest positions are neutralized. In the 
light of the stem cell controversy, I aim to gauge whether interest-oriented and value-
based perspectives on stem cell innovation can be transcended in search for the common 
interest in a practical discourse of justification and, furthermore, to what extent the model 
outlined by Habermas represents a realistic normative ideal for public deliberations in the 
democratic public sphere. I argue that hESC research appears to be yet another ethical 
controversy which indicates that rational agreement on contested political and policy 
matters in pluralistic societies may not be an attainable goal when there are fundamental 
divergences in value orientation between participants in practical discourse. 
A comparative perspective on the US and the EU stem cell policies is presented in 
Chapter 6. I examine different cultural, political and social forces which have led to 
sustained public discussions on the issue of stem cell research and have influenced policy 
outcomes in these two political entities. In the US, political debates on the morality of 
research involving human embryos and fetal tissue have their own complex history. The 
stem cell controversy constituted yet, another chapter in a long-term policy debate 
instigated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade in1973 which legalized abortion 
nationwide. I look at how a heated national debate on the politics of stem cells has 
unfolded in the context of vigorous anti-abortion advocacy, the existing congressional 
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ban (i.e., the Dickey-Wicker Amendment) on federal funding for research that harms or 
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destroys human embryos, and America's relentless culture wars. I also outline the 
differences between the stem cell policy adopted by Bush administration and Obama' s 
guidelines for federal funding for hESC research. The chapter discusses major socio-
political factors and cultural differences between EU member states that have influenced 
policy decision regarding stem cell technologies in Europe. I analyze the complicated 
regulatory environment of the EU, with national governments which have adopted a 
variety of approaches to regulating stem cell research, while most research activities are 
currently being carried out with EU funding for transnational research networks and 
collaborations between different countries. I emphasize how the EU's strategic 
investment in the development of stem cell technologies and the regenerative medicine 
has largely been driven by the political goal of establishing the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge based economy. 
The concluding chapter compares the different ways in which the stem cell 
controversy has been brought to a conclusion in the US and the EU. My analysis draws 
on Beauchamp (1987) and McMullin's (1987) classifications of different modes of 
closure in scientific controversies to evaluate the type of ethical and political closures that 
have occurred in the US and the EU stem cell debates. I explore the role of epistemic 
(knowledge-based) and non-epistemic factors in resolving or terminating the public 
controversy over human embryonic stem cells. I suggest that non-epistemic factors, 
rather than scientific evidence alone, will continue to play a pivotal role in these debates. 
Ultimately, my research aims to shed light on how the issue of hESC research has 
simultaneously evoked great hopes and strong fears about the biopolitics of the future, as 
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well as how these various utopian and dystopian representations have played out in the 
public arena. Like other contested applications of medical biotechnology, stem cell 
research has generated heated debates about whether or not its clinical promise is real and 
will be realized in a foreseeable future. The divergent futures of this biomedical 
innovation envisioned by scientists, politicians, religious groups, and lay persons remain 
contingent and contested. Research on the sociology of expectations has provided an 
analytical framework to consider the dynamic role that societal expectations play in the 
field of science and technology innovation (Brown, Rappert, & Webster, 2000; Brown & 
Michael, 2003; Novas, 2001). This recent sociological orientation within STS engages 
with the future as an analytical object by emphasizing "the situatedness of future-oriented 
discourse and the complexity of innovators' roles expressed in these overlapping 
accounts of established and emerging, networks and activities, certainties and 
uncertainties" (Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 17). It also conceptualizes how expectations 
differ between various social groups such as scientific communities, policymakers, the 
industry, and the public. The fast developing field of stem cell innovation invites such an 
analytical reflection on the "interpretative registers" used to construct multiple, contested 
or embraced biopolitical futures, including both the "retrospecting prospects" 
(recollecting past futures) and the "prospecting retrospects" (past futures integrated into 
the real-time construction of future) (Brown & Michael, 2003, p. 4). 
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CHAPTER2 
THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF STEM CELL RESEARCH 
In his book Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Ulrich Beck (1992) 
conceptualized an epistemological shift in the unfolding of industrial modernity, an 
unintended, reflex-like movement from the industrial society towards a risk society, 
which confronts itself over the environmental, social and economic risks of technological 
modernization. This novel period of social change took the form of a reflexive learning 
about systematically produced dangers of unprecedented nature that could be neither 
gauged by the industrial society's own institutionalized standards, nor contained by the 
protective institutions of its provident state. Moreover, Beck (1992) claimed that we were 
witnessing a transition from a state of fatalistic passivity in late industrial modernity to a 
conflictual and self-critical risk society whose advent was manifested in a new form of 
reflexivity over the government of risks and an increasing public awareness about 
profound transformations in the industrial society's relationship to nature, its social 
practices and institutions, intimate relationships, politics, and democratic participation. 
The concept of "reflexive modernization" (Beck, 1996) is a complex term that cannot be 
limited to the idea of a passive reflection on conflicts of techno-scientific nature, but 
rather designates a societal process of self-confrontation of the consequences of 
modernization with its basis. Essentially, the self-reflexive modernity entailed a radical 
shift towards the democratization of societal self-critique, scientific expertise and the 
management of risk discourses. The notion of risk society allowed us to recognize the 
system-breaking consequences of potential and actual conflicts over the environment, 
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genetics, molecular biology and information technology. For Beck ( 1992), the 
paradigmatic case of incalculable hazards produced by technical-industrial development 
was the destruction of the environment, which transcended state boundaries and 
compelled modernity's self-reflection on the foundations of its social context. In the late 
twentieth century, environmental catastrophes and related ganders such as climate 
change, destruction of the ozone layer, water pollution, famines, and energy shortages 
exemplified the risk society's "conflicts of accountability" and led to the rise of 
environmental politics (the Green movement). 
Nowadays, more than two decades after the apocalyptic event in Chernobyl, the 
tensions of risk society range from the imminent threats to human life, society and the 
environment presented by nuclear power and environmental pollution to societal conflicts 
over transgenic crops, genetic engineering, stem cell research, the limits of human 
genetic modification, security and bioterrorism, neuroscience, and the military uses of 
nanotechnology and converging technologies. As Sheila Jasanoff (2005) has pointed out 
in her book Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, 
these deep contradictions highlight the central role of science and technology in 
contemporary knowledge-dominated economies, in which state policies and interventions 
"are geared more and more toward nurturing and exploiting knowledge, with scientific 
knowledge and technical expertise commanding the highest premiums" (p. 4). They have 
also raised concerns regarding the partiality of scientific knowledge and have presented 
significant challenges for the governance of risks in democratic societies. Conflicts of 
accountability created by technological modernity are particularly visible within the 
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contested terrain of the life sciences, as new revolutions in biomedicine, genetic 
engineering and genomics in the twenty-first century are redrawing topographies of 
scientific knowledge, state power and economic investment (Jasanoff, 2005). Within the 
biotechnology sector, debates over the morality of embryonic stem cell research and. 
other controversial human biotechnologies remain particularly salient. 
It is commonly held that contested scientific and technological innovations should 
be debated, negotiated, resolved, or terminated through the use of an evidence-based 
approach which involves sound logical reasoning and rigorous analysis of empirical data 
(Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987). While reliance on the institutions of science and the 
validity of scientific authority may be an effective method for resolving some scientific 
controversies, this is not necessarily the case with debates that involve complex, 
overlapping scientific, ethical and political concerns. In their analysis of patterns of 
controversies and closure in science, Engelhardt and Caplan (1987) have argued for the 
need to map the interplay of scientific, ethical and political interests in scientific 
controversies that have heavy political and ethical overlays. In contrast to objectivist 
views, they have also claimed that the understanding of multidimensional conflicts in 
science and technology often entail reassessment of claims to rationality. Therefore, 
scholars should give proper consideration of "the extent to which the movement of 
science towards more ample and secure knowledge is shaped, directed, or impeded by 
forces external to science, such as the values and political forces of the scientist's cultural 
milieu" (Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987, p. 3). Scientific controversies with heavy ethical 
and political overlays often extend to philosophical questions about the impact of cultural 
49 
assumptions and political forces on scientific reasoning and the validity of objectivist 
perspectives on scientific knowledge as characterized by a clear distinction between facts 
and values, nature and culture (Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987). Resolution or closure of 
such disputes is of great importance to a variety of social groups, including policymakers, 
academics, activists, patients and the general public. The end result of greater public 
involvement with controversies in which scientific issues are amalgamated with ethics 
and political disputes is a higher degree of uncertainty about the validity of scientific 
reasoning and the internal logic of scientific investigation. 
Controversies that stem from the central position of science and technology in 
modern society have also evoked sociological critiques of scientific knowledge such as 
Ulrich Beck's critical analysis (1996) of the unreflective "culture of scientism" which has 
shaped public discourses on risks in the industrial modernity. The perils of scientism in 
modernity are seen in the false claims and expectations it creates in society, but also the 
tendency to exclude reflexivity from deliberations on risks (Beck, 1992, 1996). The 
theory of risk society developed by Beck ( 1996) advances the notion of democratization 
of critique vis-a-vis the special authority delegated to technical and scientific experts to 
define the public agenda by setting up the major terms and a priori premises of risks 
discourses. Lash and Wynne (1992) have argued that such a democratized, reflexive 
critique can lay a moral claim to rationality which is equal to that of modem science. 
Furthermore, recent perspectives in science and technology studies have suggested the 
notion of dialogical democracy to challenge a deeply rooted belief that there is a 
profound difference between knowledge developed by professionals and that of 
. 50 
laypersons and have argued that we need to enrich political institutions and democratic 
participation in science policy (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009). The notion of 
"delegative democracy" is transforming traditional representative democracy by 
extending its political institutions to "hybrid forums" of scientific experts, politicians, and 
lay people (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009). Public forums for debating, negotiating, 
and resolving scientific controversies with strong ethical and political dimensions are also 
hybrid because questions are addressed at different levels and in a variety of seemingly 
disparate domains such as science, ethics, law, and politics. 
Scholars have argued that in order to fully understand conflicts in science and 
technology that have been elevated to the top of the public agenda proper consideration 
should be given to both their epistemology and structural political issues (Engelhardt & 
Caplan, 1987; Martin, 1989; Kleinman et al., 2008). As Engelhardt and Caplan (1987) 
have pointed out, disputes over highly visible and contested domains of scientific 
knowledge and authority create challenges for researchers to bind the sociology and 
history of scientific controversies with their epistemologies and to disentangle scientific, 
ethical, legal and political claims that are intermingled in the scientific controversy. 
Understanding patterns of scientific disputes, therefore, is inextricably bound to the 
question of the individuation of different controversies that are blended in a single 
scientific controversy with a heavy political and ethical overlay (Engelhardt & Caplan, 
1987). A possible resolution of such conflicts should involve a reconsideration of both 
epistemic factors, that is, claims to rationality raised by both proponents and opponents in 
the debate, and socio-political forces that influence the positions of the participants. A 
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similar critical perspective on the resolution of scientific controversies was suggested by 
Martin (1989) in his analysis of the fluoridation controversy through the lens of the 
relativist position in sociology of scientific knowledge. He claims that we need to 
develop a more critical attitude towards notions of objectivity in scientific debates and 
examine the ways in which scientific knowledge can be used as a resource in social 
struggles in controversies in the field of science and technology. We should also focus on 
how assessments of rationality in controversies over scientific developments are always 
socially negotiated and deeply influenced by cultural assumptions. 
My analysis of the stem cell controversy draws on the afore-mentioned 
theoretical perspectives on contemporary controversies in science and technology to 
determine the number and nature of conflicts involved in the stem cell debate. By 
focusing on entanglements of science, politics and ethics, I aim to explore its competing 
epistemologies and illustrate how the issue has generated intense communicative 
interactions between the institutions of science, the government, the biotechnology sector 
and the public. I argue that stem cell research constitutes a paradigmatic case of scientific 
controversy with a heavy political and ethical overlay, and as such, it is not amenable to 
closure without proper consideration of its epistemology and structural political, social 
and economic issues. From a social constructivist perspective, it is also important to look 
at how scientific innovations in stem cell biology and regenerative medicine are 
embedded in specific cultural contexts and social relationships. 
In this chapter I discuss the scientific dimensions of the stem cell controversy and 
major factors that have contributed to the extreme politicization of this field of 
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biomedical research. I present a brief overview of scientific literature from the fields of 
embryology, developmental biology and stem cell studies to clarify differences in 
biological properties and clinical potential of different types of stem cells: embryonic, 
adult and induced pluripotent stem cells. I then look at scientific advances in hESC 
research that have become the subject of heated public debate. While the field of stem 
cell biology has a long history, with major discoveries in stem cell studies on mice and 
mammals reported in the 1960s and 1970s, the chapter's primary focus is on scientific 
developments in from 1998 to the present. I have chosen this period for three major 
reasons: First, the stem cell studies did not receive significant public and media attention 
prior to the announcement of the isolation of the first human embryonic stem cell lines by 
Dr. James Thomson in the November issue of Science in 1998 (Thomson et al., 1998). 
Secondly, these new discoveries in stem cell research and their potential therapeutic 
applications in biomedicine have incited extensive public involvement in techno-science 
policy and decision making. As Jasanoff (2005) has argued, the recent spawning of 
collective action around biotechnology, biomedical research, and advancements in 
genetics and genomics has reaffirmed the significance of biopolitics as an indispensable 
axis of modem governance and has redefined preexisting political landscapes on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Thirdly, the potential clinical translation of discoveries in stem cell 
research has promised significant economic gains and has attracted key players within a 
globalizing biotechnology sector. It is safe to say that stem cell lines and tissues have 
become an indispensable component of an ongoing transition to a global bioeconomy. 
The major purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide the scientific context for a 
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critical examination of the role of economic, socio-political and cultural factors in 
validating knowledge claims regarding the ethics and science of stem cells. Such an 
analysis is further undertaken in Chapter 3 which examines and deconstructs risk 
discourses around the use of stem cell technologies in biomedicine. 
Biological Properties and Types of Stem Cells 
Since the concept of "stem cells" is relatively new for the general public, it is not 
surprising that many are still confused about the science behind stem-cell technology and 
its experimental and clinical applications. The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has 
published two reports on stem cells and regenerative medicine that have introduced the 
public and policymakers to fundamental concepts in stem-cell biology, biological 
properties of stem cells from adult, fetal tissue, and embryonic sources, recent research 
on origin, isolation, and specialization of stem cells, and potential applications of stem-
cell therapies in regenerative medicine (NIH, 2001, 2006). These reports present 
scientific research on both mammalian and human embryonic stem cells that points to the 
unique protean ability of these most versatile and primitive cells to undergo divisions for 
indefinite periods of time and differentiate into all types of specialized cells and tissues. 
Stem cell researchers have used the term pluripotency to designate the capacity of 
certain types of cells to produce thousands of highly differentiated cell types in animal 
and human organisms (Chang & Cotsarelis, 2007). It is observed that a good indicator for 
pluripotency is the ability of a cell to differentiate into all types of adult cells, including 
germ line (Rossant, 2007). There are different types of stem cells that are usually 
classified based on their developmental potential which researchers assess through the 
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following functional criteria: 1) in-vitro differentiation, 2) teratoma formation, 3) chimera 
formation, 4) germline contribution, and 5) tetraploid complementation (Jaenisch & 
Yong, 2008). While there are more complex systems of categorization, stem cells are 
generally classified into two broad categories: embryonic stem cells (ESCs) and somatic 
stem cells (SSCs ). 
The category of SSCs includes endogenous progenitor cells, which are 
responsible for the regeneration and replacement of tissues in human bodies, and other 
cells and cell lines derived from fetal tissues, neonatal tissues and adult tissues, such as 
neural stem cells, mesenchymal stem cells, etc. (Rossant, 2007). Unlike normal somatic 
cells, ESCs have shown unlimited capacity for differentiation and self-renewal. When 
proper techniques are utilized in laboratory settings, these primordial cells preserve their 
protean ability and do not undergo the genomic, mitochondrial and epigenetic changes 
that characterize the developmental cycles and ageing of SSCs (Zeng & Rao, 2007). 
Scientists are presently able to propagate cell cultures indefinitely and in large quantities 
in vitro, well as to genetically manipulate and reinserted them into embryos to create 
animals with tissues and cells that genetically match the donor ESCs (Coutts & Keirstead, 
2007). Tissue engineered products derived from ES cells have shown ability to integrate 
into many different organs, and could be used to repair damaged or diseased tissues in 
animal and human bodies (Coutts & Keirstead, 2007) 
The differentiation of human tissue during early embryogenesis undergoes a 
number of stages as shown on Figure 5. Embryonic development begins with the 
fertilized ovum (zygote), a large diploid cell which is produced by the contact of a sperm 
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(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and the fusion of their pronuclei (the 
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) carrying the two pairs of chromosomes (Moore & 
Persaud, 2003). The zygote constitutes a single totipotent cell that possesses the capacity 
to produce the specialized cells that form the extra-embryonic membranes and tissues, the 
embryo, and all postembryonic tissues and membranes (NIH, 200 l ). The process of cell 
division begins as the fertilized ovum travels down the fallopian tube and reaches the 
uterus after six days of post-fertilization development. Approximately 24 to 30 hours 
later, the zygote completes the first mitotic division into two daughter cells with identical 
sets of chromosomes into their nuclei. Through the process of mitosis these two 
genetically identical, totipotent cells continue to divide into a four-cell embryo, eight-cell 
embryo, etc. About 3 to 4 days after fertilization, the embryo assumes a spherical shape, 
known as morula, which contains between l 0 and 30 dividing cells (blastomeres ). The 
morula stage is followed by the formation of a fluid-filled cavity (blastocoel) which 
marks the transition to the blastocyst developmental stage. The blastocyst is composed by 
an outer layer of cells (trophoblast) around a hollow ball of cells which contains a cluster 
of cells called the inner cell mass ( embryoblast). In the process of human embryo genesis, 
the trophoblast forms the placenta and other tissues needed for the fetal development in 
the uterus, whereas the embryoblast contains pluripotent stem cells that generate the 
multiple cell types in the human body (NIH, 2001 ). These pluripotent stem cells are also 
known as human embryonic stem cells and, over the last ten years, their derivation from 
human blastocysts as well as other sources has become a subject of continuing scientific, 
medical, ethical and political controversy. Through the process of cellular differentiation 
56 
ES cells develop into more specialized, multipotent stem cells which perform vital 
functions necessary for the human organism. For example, the hematopoietic stem cells 
located in the bone marrow and, in a small number, in the bloodstream as multipotent 
peripheral blood stem cells give rise to all the blood cell types and thus continuously 
replenish our blood supplies (NIH, 2001 ). 
Clinical Potential of Embryonic Stem Cells 
Stem cell activists have often defended hESC research with arguments that ES 
cells themselves are not human embryos since they have no capacity to become human 
beings by themselves. It was also argued that these cells cannot produce the placenta and 
other supporting tissues that make possible the actual implantation and intrauterine 
development of the embryo/fetus. Even if such cells are transferred to a woman's uterus, 
they will not develop into a fetus. Moreover, scientists and supporters of hESC research 
have emphasized the clinical significance of ES cells which is heightened by their 
unusual capacity to produce more differentiated cells from all three embryonic germ 
layers long after their derivation and development in a culture (NIH, 2006). In addition, 
their immortality is manifested through indefinite proliferation in laboratory culture 
which makes these primal cells an unlimited source of specific, clinically important adult 
cells such as bone, muscle, liver or blood cells as shown on Figures 6 and 7. 
ES cells can be derived from a variety of sources: ( 1) pre-implantation embryos 
(i.e., unused embryos created during in-vitro fertilization procedures); (2) from fetal 
tissue obtained though terminated pregnancies; (3) by means of somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, or cloning; and ( 4) through parthenogenetic activation of eggs (Cibelli et al., 
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2002). The first five hES cell lines were isolated from the inner cell mass (ICM) of 
human blastocysts in 1998 by Dr. James Thomson of the University of Wisconsin at 
Madison and his research team of developmental biologists (Thompson et al., 1998). 
Independently, that same year Dr. John Gearhart of John Hopkins University isolated 
similar hES cells from fetal tissue obtained from terminated pregnancies of fetuses older 
than eight weeks of development (Gearhart, 1998). His research team secured informed 
consent from the donors after they had already independently decided to terminate their 
pregnancy. Pluripotent stem cells were derived from that part of the fetus which was 
supposed to develop into the testes and ovaries (NIH, 2001 ). 
While the term "stem cells" became prominent in the political discourse and 
everyday language after Thomson's groundbreaking discovery, life scientists have long 
been familiar with the concept (Maienschein, 2003b). The discovery of the stem cells' 
capacity to give rise to more specialized cell types was made as early as 1896 by E. B. 
Wilson (Maienschein, 2003b ). In late 1950s, the use of bone marrow transplants for 
treatment of leukemia patients proved the significance of hematopoietic stem cells as a 
generalized source of other types of blood cells (Maienschein, 2003b). The discovery of 
the astonishing potential of ES cells can be traced to the early work of Kleinsmith and 
Pierce (1964) whose experiments demonstrated that a single embryonal carcinoma cell 
had the capacity for self-renewal and could generate multiple mature cell types. In the 
1980s research on cell lines derived from cultured blastocyst-stage animal embryos 
provided additional evidence for the plasticity and potential of ES cells (Evans & 
Kaufman, 1981; Martin, 1981 ). A landmark experiment in stem cell studies (Nagy, 
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Rossant, Nagy, Abramow-Newerly, & Roger, 1993) was the use of mouse ES cell lines to 
generate completely ES cell-derived mice. As evidence confirmed the extraordinary 
plasticity of ES cells, the field raised a lot of interest among life scientists and medical 
researchers interested in clinical approaches to repair and replace damaged tissues. 
Nevertheless, stem cell studies on mice and mammals conducted in the 1960s and 
1970s did not receive serious public attention (Maienschein, 2003b ). What really changed 
after the generation of the first hES cell lines in 1998 was our understanding about "the 
limits of stem cell capabilities and how differentiation occurs, epigenetically, during 
development" (Maienschein, 2003b, p. 251). Human embryonic stem research received 
significant attention within and outside the scientific community since it generated new 
and innovative ways to investigate fundamental questions of human biology 
(Maienschein, 2003b ). Due to their capacity to generate all three germ layers in vitro, ES 
cells made possible the observation of embryogenesis at the cellular level, including 
germ-layer formation, which had been technically challenging to study in mammalian 
embryos (Nishikawa, Jakt, & Era, 2007). 
Research on hES cells demonstrates great potential for at least three different 
areas of biomedical research, as shown on Figure 8. First, these cell types could help 
scientists gain a better understanding of human development and the factors that 
determine cell specialization and the cellular decision-making processes (NIH, 2006). 
Terminal medical conditions, such as cancer and various human congenital 
malformations, are caused by problems that occur somewhere in the process of cell 
specialization and cell division (NIH, 2006). Greater knowledge of the process of normal 
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cell development could allow biomedical researchers to develop procedures to correct 
abnormal cell specializations that cause terminal diseases. Secondly, hESC research 
could provide novel ways to develop medications and test their effectiveness and safety 
(NIH, 2006). The utilization of hES cell tissue in experimental drug testing could help 
minimize risks for human participants in clinical trials. Thirdly, the most promising 
application is the so-called cell therapies, the generation of cells and tissues to treat 
medical conditions caused by disturbances in cellular functions or destruction of vital 
body tissues (NIH, 2006). ES cells could become a renewable source of highly 
specialized cells and tissues in the human body, and could be used in transplantation 
therapies for the treatment of degenerative and other medical conditions (NIH, 2006). For 
example, the application of hES cell-based therapies to treat spinal cord injuries can be 
effective in a number of ways such as: l) the replacement of damaged or diseased cells; 
2) as a cell-based electrical 'relay' between neurons above and below the injury; 3) for 
amelioration of clinical deterioration and/or facilitation of regeneration by providing 
neuroprotective or growth factors; and 4) by playing other indirect roles in therapy, such 
as promoting neovascularization or providing a permissive substrate for regeneration of 
endogenous cells (Coutts & Keirstead, 2007). 
Research on Adult Stem Cells 
Opponents of hESC research have claimed that scientists should pursue research 
with adult stem cells since this alternative source of stem-cell tissue does not involve the 
destruction of human embryos. In the United States, the 200 l ban on federal funding for 
research on new hES cell lines was justified with ethical arguments against embryo 
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research and the belief that "great scientific progress can be made through aggressive 
federal funding of research on umbilical cord, placenta, adult, and animal stem cells 
which do not involve the same moral dilemma" (Bush, 2001, p. 13). Scott (2006) points 
out that between 1999 and 2002 a number oflaboratories in the U. S. announced results 
which suggested that adult stem cells had the same enormous therapeutic potential as 
their embryonic counterparts. Religious groups and conservatives have used the data to 
claim that hESC research was not only immoral, but also unnecessary, and that more 
effort and federal funding should be invested in research on adult stem cells. These early 
experiments have clearly reflected the increased politicization of biomedical research on 
stem cells since their results could not be independently confirmed by other laboratories, 
and new discoveries refuted the original claims (Scott, 2006). 
By contrast, a study conducted by Wagers, Sherwood, Christensen and Weissman 
(2002) showed little to no evidence for developmental plasticity of adult hematopoietic 
stem cells (HSCs ). In order to examine the in vivo cell fate specificity of bone marrow 
HSCs, the team generated chimerical animals by transplantation of a single green 
fluorescent protein (GFP)-marked HSC into lethally irradiated non-transgenic recipients 
(Wagers et al., 2002). Whereas the HSCs reconstituted peripheral blood leukocytes in the 
experimental animals, these cells were not found to be efficient in generating non-
hematopoietic tissues, such as brain, kidney, gut, liver, and muscle. The researchers also 
observed substantial chimerism of hematopoietic but not non-hematopoietic cells in 
GFP+:GFP- parabiotic mice (Wagers et al., 2002). The experiments led to the conclusion 
that transdifferentiation of circulating HSCs and/or their progeny is unlikely to occur 
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(Wagers et al., 2002). Other studies have similarly voiced strong skepticism regarding 
the prospect of in vivo transdifferentiation of cells derived from bone marrow, brain and 
skin into different cell lineages, as researchers have indicated significant flaws in either 
experimental design or interpretation of experiments with positive results (Wagers & 
Weissman, 2004). 
Similar conclusions about the limited capacity of adult stem cells to differentiate 
and self-renew in culture were presented in the report entitled Stem Cells and the Future 
of Regenerative Medicine which was released by the US National Academies Committee 
on the Biological and Biomedical Application of Stem Cell Research in September 2001 
(hereafter Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine). The Committee was formed by the 
National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine to evaluate the potential of stem 
cell research and develop recommendations on relevant et.hical and policy issues in 
consultations with renowned experts in stem cell studies, as well as philosophers, 
ethicists, and legal scholars (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). Their 
assessment of research data on the therapeutic potential of adult and embryonic stem cells 
found that adult stem cells could not match the protean ability of ES cells to produce 
multiple types of human tissue (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). By and 
large, leading scientists in the field of stem cell studies have agreed that research with 
adult stem cells does not hold the same potential for breakthroughs in biomedicine (Scott, 
2006). Such research has shown that adult stem cells are more difficult to isolate and 
grow; their ability for transdifferentiation is very limited and does not measure up with 
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the capacity of ES cells; and they tend to contain more DNA abnormalities due to 
exposure to toxins and daily living conditions (NIH, 2006). 
Attempts to misrepresent scientific results in the field of stem cell research are by 
no means limited to the US debate. In his book Staminalia: Le cellule "etiche" e i nemici 
de/la ricerca (Staminalia: Ethical cells and the enemies of research), the philosopher of 
science Armando Massarenti (2008) has indicated that opponents of hESC research in 
Italy have consistently spread false information about the therapeutic superiority of adult 
and induced pluripotent stem cells. He emphasizes the instrumental role of the Catholic 
political hierarchies and the media in creating confusion about the scientific and ethical 
aspects of stem cell research. Although the prevailing view within the Italian scientific 
community is that adult stem cells do not have the same therapeutic potential as stem 
cells derived from human embryos, Church leaders continue to claim that research on 
hES cells is unnecessary for the development of regenerative medicine. Moreover, the 
media and the Catholic political milieu have manipulated the public by emphasizing 
uncertainty and disagreements among stem cell researchers and by depicting the 
scientific community as equally divided on issue of what type of stem cells shows greater 
promise for clinical treatments. 
The Use of Cloning Technology in Stem Cell Research 
Scientists have predicted that the use of cloning technology in stem cell research 
could help generate embryonic stem cells that are immunologically compatible with the 
patient's own cells. Human cloning became a highly controversial issue after the world's 
first cloned mammal, Dolly the sheep was created by Dr. Ian Wilmut and his team at 
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Scotland's Roslin Institute in July 1996. Cloning, or somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT), involves the transfer of a cell nucleus from a normal somatic cell into an 
unfertilized egg cell from which its own nucleus had been removed. After such 
intervention, substances present in the oocyte activate the reprogramming of the donated 
nucleus and lead to the development of a blastocyst whose ES cells possess the donor 
genotype. Human cloning involves two separate tec~nologies: reproductive cloning and 
the so-called "therapeutic" or research cloning. Reproductive cloning, as shown on 
Figure 9, is the creation of a cloned blastocyst, genetic~lly identical to the donor cell 
used, which is then implanted into a woman's uterus, develops into a fetus and is brought 
to term (McLaren, 2002). By contrast, the cell nuclear replacement technique is used in 
stem cell research to create embryos that would be used for the cultivation of patient-
specific hES cells and· tissues (Figure 10). The cloned hES cell lines are likely to be 
immunologically compatible with their recipients and could be chemically induced to 
further differentiate into potentially therapeutically useful cells, such as dopamine-
producing cells for the cure of Parkinson's disease (McLaren, 2002). The possibility of 
using human cloning for therapeutic purposes was put firmly on the agenda by leading 
research institutions and biotechnology companies such as the Roslin Institute in 
Edinburgh, UK, the University of California at Irvine, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT) 
in Massachusetts, Stemagen Corporation lab in La Jolla, California, and few others. The 
first announcement of cloning human embryos for research purposes came from the 
biotech company ACT in November 2001. The experiment had only limited success, as 
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scientists had produced eight cloned eggs, with only one of them capable of dividing into 
six cells before stopping. 
Proponents of research cloning have attempted to draw a clear line between the 
two types of cloning with the argument that the cloned blastocysts used in stem cell 
research would be destroyed after the removal of their IMC and would never be 
implanted in a woman's uterus. Nonetheless, when stem cell researchers initially started 
experimenting with SCNT to develop patient-specific hESC lines, the general public was 
confused about the meaning of "cloning" and its applications in stem cell research. The 
Stanford Professor Christopher T. Scott (2006) has indicated this hype around human 
cloning in his book Stem Cell Now: From the Experiment That Shook the World to the 
New Politics of Life: 
Scientists and journalists used words such as embryo and cloning so cavalierly 
that the lay public wasn't sure what distinguished animal cloning from babies 
conceived through IVF and embryonic stem cell research. As the millennium 
drew to a close, many people felt that a knock on the door from their human 
clones seems a distinct possibility. (p. 8) 
Public anxieties about the use of cloning technology in hESC research from the early 
years of stem cell debate reappeared in 2005 as a result of the Hwang cloning fraud. 
Significant international recognition was given in 2004 and 2005 to the experiments 
conducted by Dr. Woo-Suk Hwang in South Korea. Hwang had announced the successful 
derivation of hESC lines from cloned human embryos, until it was discovered that the 
results of these experiments were fabricated and the two articles he published in Science 
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were editorially retracted (i.e., Hwang et. al, 2004). The Hwang cloning fraud in late 
2005 presented an unexpected setback for stem cell science not only because it once 
again raised questions about the therapeutic effectiveness of human cloning, but also due 
to the unethical collection of ova which was practiced by the Korean scientist. Research 
cloning usually requires a great number.of high-quality human oocytes, and those are not 
easily available. There were numerous allegations that Hwang had forced female 
researchers in his lab to donate their eggs for his stem cell experiments. 
Given that the applicability of cloning technology for yielding ES cells that 
possess the donor genotype was severely compromised, scientists have tested the 
efficiency of two alternative approaches that may lead to the generation of patient-
specific stem cells for tissue engineering and cell-based therapies. The first method 
involves ESC fusion-induced reprogramming of adult cells, a process which triggers 
changes in adult nuclei function by in-vitro hybridization with ES cells and transforms 
differentiated adult cells into pluripotent cells (Chang & Cotsarelis, 2007). Successful 
nuclear reprogramming of somatic cells to a pluripotent state by creating such ES cell 
hybrids was first reported by Tada et al. (2001 ). The downfall of this procedure is genetic 
instability since each fused cell possesses two nuclei, as well as four copies of each 
chromosome instead of two, and it is still ethically controversial due to the use of hES 
cells. The second method to create donor-specific ES cells involves the application of 
genetic factors and/or chemical stimulation that induce somatic cells from a patient to 
revert to a pluripotent state (Chang & Cotsarelis, 2007). It is expected that this approach 
could eventually provide a resolution for the ethical dilemma by eliminating the need to 
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use human embryos for the creation of pluripotent stem cell lines. It was initially used in 
2006 by Yamanaka and his colleagues, who discovered a set of four genes that triggered 
the reprogramming of mouse embryonic fibroblasts into cells with ESC characteristics. 
Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells 
While politicians have continuously debated the two alternatives in stem cells 
research (e.g. adult vs. embryonic stem cells), scientists responded by seeking ethical 
alternatives of ES cells that may replicate their therapeutic potential. Successful 
experiments to unlock the same regenerative capacity in adult differentiated mammalian 
cells were first conducted with mouse cells in 2006, and then with human somatic cells in 
2007. Scientists used retroviral introduction of the four transcription factors Oct3/4, 
Sox2, c-Myc, and Klf4 in mouse skin cells (fibroblasts) to reprogram them to act like 
embryonic stem cells (Okita, Ichisaka, &. Yamanaka, 2007; Wernig et al., 2007; Maherali 
et al., 2007). These genetically altered cells became known as induced pluripotent stem 
(iPS) cells. 
The first announcements for the creation of iPS cells came in November 2007 
when James Thompson and Junying Yuat the University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
Shinya Yamanaka and his research team at Kyoto University in Japan independently 
reported that they had used similar methods to reprogram adult human cells back to a 
pluripotent state. The process involved genetic modification of human skin cells by the 
integration of up to four DNA-transcription factors into the adult cell genome. The 
creation of iPS cells through reprogramming of somatic cells by defined transcription 
factors is believed to hold a great promise for regenerative medicine. Nevertheless, their 
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therapeutic potential is yet to be explored as genetically modified iPS cells contain a large 
number of viral vector integrations that limit possible clinical applications. As Harvard 
Medical School researcher George Daley stated in a recent interview, "These viruses can 
be mutagenic and have the potential to activate oncogenes, so at the moment iPS cells 
remain a research tool and not a potential therapeutic agent" (Anonymous, 2008, para. 2). 
Recently, researchers at the University of Edinburgh and Mount Sinai Hospital in 
Toronto reported the development of a safer non-viral plasmid vector for generating iPS 
cells that are applicable to regenerative medicine, drug screening and the establishment of 
disease models (Kaji et al., 2009; Woltjen et al., 2009). The new method creates 
reprogrammed hES cell lines from embryonic fibroblasts with dynamic expression of 
pluripotency markers and minimizes genome modification in iPS cells, as well as 
eliminates exogenous reprogramming factors (Kaji et al., 2009). 
Jaenisch and Young (2008) have outlined three other techniques, besides the 
method of reprogramming by defined transcription factors, used by stem cells researchers 
for the conversion of somatic cells to a state of pluripotency (Figure 11 ). The three major 
strategies for reprogramming of differentiated cells into an embryonic state are: (1) 
nuclear transplantation, (2) fusion of somatic cells and embryonic stem cells, and (3) 
culture-induced reprogramming. These methods have shown to have different 
shortcomings and advantages for potential therapeutic applications. 
Although the use of nuclear transfer for reproductive cloning is generally 
considered an highly inefficient process due to faulty reprogramming that either leads to 
deaths of clones shortly after implantation or results in births with significant 
68 
abnormalities, experiments have indicated the therapeutic utility of this method for the 
creation of patient-specific ES cells (Jaenisch & Young, 2008). This conclusion was 
confirmed by subsequent experiments that have clearly shown no biological or molecular 
differences between ES cells obtained from fertilized embryos and those produced 
through nuclear transfer (Jaenisch & Young, 2008). Nevertheless, the practical 
application of nuclear transplantation for medicine is still hindered due to the need to 
obtain significant amount of unfertilized oocytes which raises serious ethical concern 
about possible exploitation of women donors in research. Presently, the possibility that 
"cloned ES cells and mice can be generated from somatic donor nuclei transplanted into 
enucleated zygote recipients if drug-induced synchronization of donor cells and zygote is 
employed" is promising, especially if it is adapted to the human system (Jaenisch & 
Young, 2008, p. 568). 
The second method for epigenetic reprogramming of somatic nuclei to an 
undifferentiated state discussed by Jaenisch and Young (2008) involves the creation of 
hybrids by fusion of somatic cells with ES cells or embryonic germ (EG) cells. The 
generation of murine hybrids has shown shared features with the parental pluripotent ES 
cells, as well as the presence of dominant pluripotent phenotype. Human ES cells have 
similar potential to reprogram the somatic nuclei of hybrid cells by triggering of silent 
pluripotency markers (e.g., Oct4) or reactivation of the inactive somatic X chromosome 
(Jaenisch & Young, 2008). This method, however, presents challenges for the possible 
clinical translation into customized, patient-specific stem cell therapies due to the 
inevitable formation of tetraploid reprogrammed cells. It is worth noting that the use of 
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such reprogrammed cells involves significant risks of creating large-scale genomic 
instability on the cellular level, especially when the technology is utilized to further 
generate diploid reprogrammed cells. 
Jaenisch and Young (2008) also discuss methods of culture-induced programming 
in stem cell research by the means of prolonged explantation of somatic cells in culture. 
In recent years, scientists have suggested the possibility of reprogramming to a state of 
pluripotency donor cells derived from postnatal animals. These experiments have 
indicated that cells from the germ cell lineage, e.g. spermatogonial stem cells, which are 
unipotent in-vivo, have the potential to develop into pluripotent or multipotent ES-like 
cells after prolonged in-vitro culturing. Nevertheless, most of the pluripotent cell types 
generated by the method of expansion in culture do not comply with most functional 
criteria of pluripotency. Rather, it was only ES, EG, EC, and spermatogonial stem cell-
derived maGCSs or ES-like cells that have demonstrated capacity for in vitro 
differentiation and teratoma formation. These cells have also shown an ability to form 
postnatal chimeras and potential to contribute to the germline. Presently, the method of 
isolating pluripotent cells from somatic tissues through expansion in culture doesn't seem 
to be an effective alternative, as it yet remains to be seen if somatic stem cells can indeed 
show greater plasticity in vivo and ability for transdifferentiation into other cell types and 
lineages. 
Conclusions 
Over the last ten years, the stem cell controversy has revived contentious debates 
over the moral standing of the human embryo, the role ofreligion in public life of 
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pluralistic democratic societies, and the appropriate limits to biomedical research that 
infringes on human dignity. The bioethical discourse around the embryonic stem cells has 
also extended to ethical, legal and social issues associated with human cloning, stem cell 
patents, translational stem cell research, access to stem cell transplants, and the emerging 
global bioeconomy. This chapter focused on the scientific aspects of the stem cell debate 
and examined factors external to scientific investigation that have influenced research 
efforts in stem cell studies. It also illustrated how proponents and opponents of this 
biomedical innovation have offered competing interpretations of the biological properties 
and clinical potential of embryonic and adult stem cells in their attempts to shape the 
public discourse and influence policy decisions. Most recently, the public discourse has 
shifted towards discussions about the potential of iPS cells to resolve the ethical dilemma 
in hESC research. 
Historically, the field of stem cell research became the subject of political debate 
and media hype after Dr. Thomson reported the isolation of the first hESC lines and 
discussed their potential clinical applications in an article published in the 1998 
November issue of Science. The subsequent decision of President Clinton's 
administration in early 1999 to allocate federal funds for research on stem cell lines 
derived from human embryos sparked criticism and controversy. While the early stem 
cell debate in the US reflected the existing political divisions around the abortion 
controversy causing significant mobilizations in both camps, the issue has also stirred 
public and academic debates over what type of political interventions will best serve the 
public interest in the development of regenerative medicine. Public discourses in Europe 
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have similarly framed stem cell technologies as a biomedical innovation that should be 
regulated and financially supported by both national governments and the supranational 
institutions of the EU. Collective mobilizations around the biopolitics of stem cell 
research on both sides of the Atlantic have indicated the rather complicated relationship 
between the institutions of science, regulatory bodies, the biotechnology sector, and the 
public which characterizes contemporary knowledge-dominated economies. 
It is by no means surprising that recent developments in stem cell studies have 
reflected the significant politicization of this biomedical field. Leading researchers in the 
field have actively sought for ethical alternatives to the use of human embryos for 
derivation of pluripotent stem cells that could replicate their clinical potential by using a 
variety of methods for the reprogramming of SSCs into a state of pluripotency. The 
method that received most public attention was the conversion of more differentiated 
cells into iPS cells through genetic modification by means of defined transcription factors 
(i.e., viral integration). Although the media hyped the discovery by announcing that it 
would resolve the ethical dilemma in stem cell research, scientists are still skeptical 
regarding the use of iPS cells in regenerative medicine due the direct connection between 
the process of reprogramming and tumorigenesis which causes unwanted side effects 
such as cancer in some of the animals produced with iPS cells that ESCs would not 
normally show (Belmonte et al., 2009). Moreover, there are some recent reports that 
point to significant transcriptional differences between ES and iPS cells, including the 
ones derived without viral integration, that remain unexplained. The ESC lines derived 
from human embryos are shown to be more potent than the iPS lines, and presently, there 
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is no scientific evidence that all virus-free iPS cells are qualitatively equivalent to ES 
cells (Belmonte et al., 2009). Disputes over the clinical potential of iPS cells indicate that 
there are still lots of uncertainties in stem cell science and that the innovation process in 
the field is not immune to discursive conflicts and disagreements. 
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CHAPTER3 
RELIGION AND ETHICS IN THE STEM CELL CONTROVERSY 
In the previous chapter I have argued that the issue of stem cell research has a 
multi-dimensional nature and that we should engage with the individuation of the 
different scientific, ethical and political conflicts that are intermingled in the controversy. 
This chapter continues the analytical work of determining the number and nature of 
conflicts comprising the stem cell debate. I investigate entanglements of ethics, religion, 
politics, and law that have shaped the public engagement with the biopolitics of stem 
cells in the US and the EU. I compare and contrast religious arguments on the use of 
human embryos in stem cell research and related technologies developed by major 
monotheistic religions such as Catholicism, Judaism and Islam. I also address questions 
about the validity of religious arguments in public debates over stem cell policies. Stem 
cell debates worldwide have often been framed in religious terms, especially in the 
United States, where significant political mobilization of religious constituencies around 
issues concerning the politics of life had taken place in the last few decades. Moreover, 
spokespersons of major religious traditions have given testimonies to US and EU 
advisory bodies, such as the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), the 
President Council on Bioethics (PCBE) and the European Group on Ethics of the 
European Commission, and policy decisions have been informed by ethical arguments 
derived from religious principles and beliefs (Walters, 2004). Religion has greatly 
influenced regulatory regimes not only in America, but also in many of Europe's 
predominap.tly Catholic nations such as Ireland, Italy, Poland, Austria, Lithuania, Malta 
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and Slovakia. The issue of stem cell research has therefore become inextricably linked to 
the question of the role of religion in public life, and similar to other bioethical 
controversies, e.g. euthanasia, cloning, and human genetic modification, it has provided a 
paradigmatic case to test the legitimacy of religious values in the public policy debates 
and the cultural conflicts of the post-secular society. 
The second part of the chapter provides an insight into the diverse ethics of hESC 
research by reviewing ethical and social challenges arising from its intersections with 
controversial technologies such as human cloning, assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs), and hybrid embryo (chimera) research. I focus on contentious bioethical issues 
such as philosophical defenses of the embryo's moral status, the ethics of human cloning, 
and concerns about women's reproductive rights and health in embryo donation for stem 
cell research. The discussion supports the central argument of the present inquiry into the 
biopolitics of stem cells that framings of the stem cell debate exclusively around the 
contentious issue of the embryo's moral status can impede the public understanding of its 
diverse ethical, legal and social implications. Similarly, reductionist framings of public 
discussions and deliberations around the false dichotomy of "ethics versus science" (i.e., 
the juxtaposition of the respect and protection owed to blastocysts to the moral obligation 
to conduct life-saving research) tend to simplify the overlapping controversies and 
complex realities of stem cell debates. 
The endeavor to differentiate different disputes and levels of analysis within the 
stem cell controversy has a two-fold objective. First, a close examination of the interplay 
between science, religion, societal values, and political forces in the stem cell controversy 
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can highlight the many ways in which research data and scientific knowledge could be 
used as a resource in social and political struggles. I aim to illustrate how assessments of 
rationality by proponents and opponents have informed models of political decision 
concerning stem cell research and related conflicts of socio-technical nature. Therefore, 
my analysis highlights how both sides in the controversy have laid moral claims to 
rationality in attempts to validate their arguments as rational and to dismiss the 
opponents' position as purely irrational and, therefore, irrelevant for the policy debate. 
Secondly, the analytical work of disentangling the mesh of competing epistemologies, 
intersecting ethical concerns and structural political forces in the stem cell is consistent 
with notions of "technical democracy" advanced by Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe 
(2009). Therefore, I suggest that should we strive towards a potential resolution or 
closure of the stem cell controversy by promoting a participatory decision-making model 
that involves hybrid public forums for debating, negotiating, and resolving the complex 
ELSI questions raised by this biomedical innovation. 
Religious perspectives on stem cells and embryo research 
The stem cell controversy has highlighted discrepancies between the major 
monotheistic religions on thorny bioethical issues, including the fundamental question of 
the moral status of early embryos (blastocysts) and their use in biomedical 
research. While religious perspectives have become and remain prominent in public 
debates on stem cell research, many have questioned their validity for 21st -century 
decisions in the field of science and technology. At the risk of oversimplifying, the most 
significant critiques could be grouped in the following two questions: ( 1) To what extent 
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are moral judgments derived from ancient religious texts relevant to the rapid 
advancement of scientific knowledge in embryology, genetics, molecular biology, and 
biomedicine?, and (2) Do ethical concerns that are religious in nature provide a legitimate 
basis for public policy decisions in our secular, pluralist societies? The latter question is 
especially pertinent if we consider the reluctance of many lawmakers and state 
legislatures to impose narrow religious viewpoints on the rest of society. This policy-
related concern is consistent with John Rawls's argument in Political Liberalism (1996) 
that the state should be neutral between various conceptions of the good and may not 
enact policies that ignore "the fact of reasonable pluralism," that is, the coexistence of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines in modem societies. Nevertheless, 
a certain bifurcation of opinions could be observed on the issue of whether religious 
values should count in public debates on stem cell research. On the one hand, there is a 
tendency to easily dismiss religious concerns as irrelevant in policy making, particularly 
on highly technical questions such as stem cell research, genetic engineering and other 
biomedical research. Proponents of this view have argued that there would never be a 
happy medium between religion and science and, therefore, policy decisions on stem cell 
research should be primarily guided by scientific considerations. On the other hand, 
arguments have been raised that the exclusion of religious communities from public 
deliberations is unjust, as it would only empower non-religious groups that share similar 
values and concerns. In order to discuss further these two fundamental questions raised in 
the stem cell debate, I present a brief intercultural perspective on religious arguments 
regarding the moral status of the human embryo and the ethics of stem cell research. This 
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comparative perspective will also help us highlight fundamental differences between the 
major theological traditions on issues concerning the beginning and sanctity of life. 
The Catholic Position on the Ethics of Stem Cell Research 
In framing the public discourse on hESC research, the Religious Right and social 
conservatives in America have intuitively followed the Vatican's position that human life 
begins at conception and that the embryo at all stages of development should be 
considered morally equivalent to born persons. Although the Roman Catholic Church 
does not condemn all types of stem cell research, it does strongly oppose experimentation 
with pluripotent stem cells which are derived from human embryos. There is a 
widespread misconception that the Roman Catholic Church's strong opposition stems 
from the belief that embryos are persons. In his article, "The Catholic Church and Stem 
Cell Research," Father Tadeusz Pacholczyk (2008) presents a more nuanced and detailed 
account of the Church teachings on this moral dilemma. While the Catholic doctrine 
admits that there is no definitive answer on the question of whether human being is 
present at the time when fertilization occurs and that it is false to assume that zygotes or 
early-stage embryos are persons, it nevertheless teaches that the destruction of human 
embryos is always immoral. As he points out, this position was clearly formulated in the 
following statement from the Declaration on Procured Abortion which was issued by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith in 1974: 
This declaration expressly leaves aside the question of the moment when the 
spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and 
authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates from the first instant; for 
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others it could not at least precede nidation [implantation in the uterus]. It is not 
within the competence of science to decide between these two views, because the 
existence of an immortal soul is not a question in its field. It is a philosophical 
problem from which our moral affirmation remains independent. (Qtd. in 
Pacholczyk, 2008, p. 77) 
Subsequently, the moral affirmation of the Church regarding the status of the human 
embryo prescribes that "the human embryo must be treated as if it were already ensouled, 
even if might not yet be so [ ... ] as if it were a person from the moment of conception, 
even if there exists the probability that it might not yet be so (Pacholczyk, 2008, p. 77). 
Historically, the adoption of such more nuanced view on the status of the human embryo 
from the moment of fertilization has aimed to reconcile conflicting perspectives on the 
precise timing of ensoulment/personhood within the Catholic philosophical tradition. As 
Pacholczyk (2008) points out, the prevailing view in Christian history was the doctrine of 
delayed ensoulment (Figure 10), while the notion of immediate ensoulment having 
gained popularity from the 1600s onwards (Figure 11 ). Given that we do not have a 
certainty as to when exactly God ensouls the human embryo, and we may never resolve 
this dilemma, it would make sense that the ethical stance of the Church on destruction of 
early embryos in stem cell research should not be guided by attempts to determine the 
timing of personhood. Instead, the Catholic doctrine reasons that the human zygote 
should be considered a human being from the very beginning since it is the only kind of 
entity upon which God could bestow the gift of an immortal soul. In his account, 
Pacholczyk (2008) emphasizes the Catholic belief in "the absolute primacy of the value 
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of personhood over all other considerations," as well as the imperative that "the human 
person, even in his or her most incipient and precursorial installation in the embryonic 
human being, is to be safeguarded in an absolute and unconditional way" (p. 73). 
The Vatican's present position on the use of embryos in biomedical research was 
initially outlined in a bioethical directive released on February 22, 1987 under the title of 
Donum Vitae: Instruction on Respect for Human life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation. Their latest instruction on bioethical issues by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas Personae, issued on December 28, 2008 with the approval 
of Pope Benedict XVI, reaffirms the moral imperative of treating embryos as if they were 
persons from the moment of conception, even if there was a possibility that the act of 
ensoulment has not yet taken place. A fundamental principle defended by this declaration 
is the affirmation of human dignity from the earliest stages of embryonal development. It 
is, therefore, asserted that "the human embryo has, from the very beginning, the dignity 
proper to a person" (Dignitas Personae, 2008). In outlining the Church's position on the 
most significant beginning-of-life issues, the document condemns a whole range of 
embryo technologies such as the cryopreservation of human embryos in IVF, genetic 
manipulations that could lead to inheritable genetic modification, the use of-somatic cell 
nuclear transfer for both reproductive and research purposes, hybrid embryo research 
(i.e., the creation of animal/human genetic hybrids), and a number of other biotech 
procedures dismissed as affronts to human dignity. 
Commentators have observed that the new guidelines, which reiterate the 
Vatican's condemnation of hESC research, the destruction of embryos in in-vitro 
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fertilization, and the "morning after pill," are in some respects more restrictive than 
Donum Vitae, especially on some questions that have previously remained open to 
consideration. The new take on contentious points in the Catholic moral tradition is 
succinctly summarized by John L. Allen Jr. (2008) in his analysis of Dignitas Personae. 
According to him, the new guidelines differ from Donum Vitae on the following five 
issues. First, there is a rather critical perspective on prenatal adoption of frozen embryos, 
which would permit women and couples to bring other people's unused IVF embryos to 
term. Secondly, the church has advised caution regarding the use of the so-called "altered 
nuclear transfer" (ANT) method, which scientists have proposed as a morally acceptable 
alternative for the procurement of hESCs (Hurlbut, 2005). Thirdly, there is an ambiguity 
in the Church's position on the "morning after pill" which could affect the practice in 
Catholic hospitals of offering emergency contraception to rape victims. Fourth, there 
seems to be a stronger opposition against biomedical research that involves biological 
materials obtained from aborted fetuses or human embryos. Lastly, the new regulations 
express "a more negative view of genetic interventions passed on to subsequent 
generations than was offered in a 1983 speech by John Paul II, which hinted that such 
therapy could, at least in theory, be justified" (Allen Jr., 2008, p. 2). Regardless of some 
variations in the Catholic Church's position on the afore-mentioned bioethical issues, the 
new guidelines have preserved the spirit of Donum Vitae in their focus on beginning-of-
life issues and the unconditional affirmation of the inviolable dignity of the human 
embryo from the very moment of fertilization. 
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The Catholic interpretation of the embryo's moral status is often contrasted to 
moral insight on the issue provided by other major religious traditions such as Judaism, 
Islam, and some Protestant denominations. While in Judaism and Islam the pre-
implantation embryo does have a greater moral status than other body tissues and 
collections of cells, the respect owed to pre-personal life forms by no means contradicts 
the use of its cells for goals such as healing and saving life, to which the faithful should 
be committed (Weckerly, 2005). Generally, Jewish and Islamic religious traditions and 
practices seem to be supportive of research on human embryonic stem cells since they 
place an obligation on its followers to seek out knowledge, which is believed to be an 
indispensable component of human nature as created by God. Moreover, the acquisition 
of scientific knowledge is not only regarded as a form of worship, but it is argued that its 
practical applications should be guided by the imperative to ascertain equity and justice 
for all of humanity (Al-Hayani, 2008). Below I present major theological principles that 
have influenced perspectives on hESC research within these traditions. 
Judaism and hESC Research 
In the Jewish religious tradition, most interpreters of the Talmud have established 
that the human embryo prior to forty days of gestation is not recognized as an entity with 
the same moral status as a born person. Instead, the prevailing belief is that the fetus in 
the very early stages of development lacks "humanity" (Eisenberg, 2007). This position is 
well-articulated in the testimony given by Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff to the National Bioethics 
Commission (NBAC) in 1999 on the issue of the use of spare IVF embryos in stem cell 
research. He pointed out that "genetic materials outside the uterus have no legal status in 
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Jewish law, for they are not even a part of human being until implanted in a woman's 
womb, and even then, during the first forty days of gestation, their status is 'as if they 
were simply water' (Babylonian Talmud)" (Qtd. in Ru~e & Pynes, 2003, p. 197). 
In his article "Judaism and Stem Cells," Dorff (2008) discusses four major 
principles in Jewish theology that inform our understanding of the ethics of stem cell 
research. The first principle claims that our bodies ultimately belong to God and that we 
are obligated to preserve human life and health by taking proper care of them. This belief 
further entails the moral duty to actively seek and develop new medical treatments and 
cures. The second principle in the Jewish religious tradition that should guide our 
decisions regarding the ethics of stem cell research is the acceptance of both natural and 
artificial treatments of illness. In this sense, in Judaism physicians and healers are seen as 
the God's agents in fulfilling the act of healing. The.third principle postulates that all 
humans are created in the image of God and should be valued and respected as such. The 
last principle that is used to derive an ethical perspective on stem cell research is the 
realization that humans are not omnipotent, but rather appear to be very limited creatures 
in comparison to God. What follows from this aspect of human nature is the requirement 
that our actions do not impose harm on ourselves or the world. The Jewish tradition, as 
Dorff (2008) points out, teaches a certain epistemological humility and a balanced 
approach to the pursuit of scientific knowledge and advancements in biomedicine such as 
embryonic stem cell research. 
Due to this strong emphasis on healing in Judaism, it is believed that we have a 
moral duty to conduct stem cell research on the condition that human beings are not 
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harmed in this process. This imperative to heal, once again, raises the question of the 
status of human embryos in the early stages of development according to the Jewish law. 
As Dorff (2008) has indicated in his analysis of authoritative codes and statements of the 
Oral Tradition, the Talmud determines that the embryo during the first 40 days of 
gestation is "simply water" and has not acquired the form of a human being until the 41 
day, when the gender of the child is already determined. Similarly to the Catholic 
position, Jewish religious perspectives on fetal development seek scientific evidence that 
would support Talmudic Rabbis' observations that early miscarriages looked as "merely 
water." Dorff (2008) points out that some interpretations extend the 40-day threshold to 
56 days of gestation, counted by the Rabbis from the time a woman first misses her 
menstrual cycle. This interpretation is believed to be compatible with contemporary 
knowledge of fetal development since it is now well known that the fetus does not 
develop bone structure until eight weeks of gestation when it does start to resemble a 
human being of flesh and bones. Moreover, Dorff (2008) argues that the 40-day marker 
was prominent in Catholicism, with the concept initially developed by Aristotle, and then 
adopted by Augustine and Aquinas. The notion that the zygote should be viewed as a 
person was adopted in 1869 when the Fist Vatican Council attempted to affirm the virgin 
birth of Jesus Christ by presenting him as a person immediately upon conception by the 
Holy Spirit. In fact, the change in Canon Law did not happen until 1917. 
Since Judaism defines the embryo until the fortieth day of gestation as "simply 
water," it assigns even lesser value to pre-implantation embryos (during the first 14 days 
of development) used in stem cell research. As Dorff (2008) points out, the standing of an 
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embryo situated outside the womb, which has no chance to develop into a human being 
given the current state of technology, "is at most "simply water" and, therefore, "our 
respect of such gametes and embryos outside the womb should certainly be superseded 
by our duty to seek to cure disease" (p. 82). Moreover, it is important to note that the 
argument about the embryo outside the womb being less than a person is not derived 
from the mere fact of its location· in a petri dish. In order to procure viable embryonic 
stem cells, scientists are limited to the use of embryos prior to the development of neural 
streak around the fourteenth day of gestation, after which the capacity for differentiation 
of these stem cells appears to be greatly diminished. The embryo in a petri dish, Dorff 
concludes (2008), is different from a human being not only because of its location outside 
the womb and inability for further development in vitro, but also due to "its low level of 
cell organization, the short period of time that it will remain in this state, and its 
incapacity to live without further development" (p. 83). For this reason, Judaism asserts 
that embryonic stem cell research may bring enormous health benefits without posing any 
risks to human beings. Furthermore, couples are encouraged to donate their spare IVF 
embryos to stem cell research and this is seen as a mitzvah, a commanded act. 
Muslim Perspectives on Stem Cell Research 
The only textual source in Islam that provides guidance on how questions 
concerning embryonic sanctity and all other aspects of human life should be interpreted 
and answered is the Quran. Nonetheless, it does not provide clear definitions of terms like 
"embryo" or "fetus" and there is hardly any discussion of specific questions related to 
scientific experiments. This deficiency is by no means surprising given that the scripture 
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was compiled in the years 646-650 C.E. from sources that most likely had originated at 
least 200-300 years earlier. Currently, there are disagreements among Muslim jurists and 
interpreters of the Quran about the precise moment of the fetal development in which the 
ensoulment of the fetus occurs. The tradition does not help dispel uncertainty and 
confusion since there are no Quranic passages that refer to the embryo as a living thing 
from the moment of conception. Some Islamic scholars have claimed that this lack of 
clarity regarding the moral status of fetal viability and embryonic sanctity creates 
significant ethical and legal dilemmas, especially on the contentious issue of abortion, but 
also on questions concerning assisted reproductive technologies and the use of embryos 
in biomedical research (Sachedina, 2008). If the question of determining the ethical and 
legal status of the embryo and the fetus is so hard to resolve, than how can we come up 
with a clear answer as to whether abortion is legal or illegal? Similarly, if there are no 
ethical and legal reasons to prohibit abortion in general, after what point it should become 
illegal to abort an embryo or fetus? And, more importantly, does the embryo's ethico-
legal status prohibit its use for stem cell research? 
While it remains unclear exactly when the ensoulment of the embryo takes place, 
Muslim jurists have deducted claims about the dignity and legal status of the human 
embryo from precedents in criminology dealing with destruction of fetuses in abortions 
and miscarriages (Sachedina, 2008). The prevailing legal view is that the fetus has no 
independent claim to life outside of the mother's womb and, subsequently, no 
personhood and absolute inviolability un~il it becomes separated from the uterus and 
capable of surviving on its own. Therefore, abortion rulings in Islamic jurisprudence are 
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not framed in terms of conflicting rights, that is, the right of the pregnant woman versus 
the right of the fetus. This view has led to quite liberal attitudes towards clinical abortion 
in the Muslim world and, subsequently, to the wide acceptance of the assisted human 
reproduction technologies in most Muslim countries, including a rather permissive stance 
towards biomedical research on embryonic stem cells derived from frozen supernumerary 
IVF embryos. For some commentators, the failure of traditional Muslim sources to 
address the critical questions about the sanctity of life in the early stages of embryonic 
development and the morality of clinical abortion poses additional questions regarding 
the overall value of human beings in the context of Islam tradition. Sachedina (2008) has 
argued that the reason for this lack of ethical and philosophical reflection on issues 
concerning the beginning of life in Islam is that debates in Islamic jurisprudence have 
focused exclusively on the legal implications of feticide. Moreover, Muslim jurists have 
applied the sanctity of life principle only to the embryo in the womb, thus leaving the 
question of the moral standing of embryos that are outside the womb unresolved. Finally, 
Sachedina (2008) has claimed that their failure to extend this principle to embryos used 
for the purpose of assisted human reproduction or for biomedical research is indicative of 
a "total disregard for the embryonic inviolability" in the early stages of embryonic and 
fetal development (p. 92). 
The Islamic perspective on the moral status of the human embryo is significantly 
complicated by the often conflicting rulings and opinions issued by leading Muslim 
scholars, both Sunni and Shiites. Moreover, it is rather impossible to identify a single, 
unifying position given that the Muslim world is divided into many sects and that 
87 
authoritative opinions on the issues of the embryo's moral status, abortion and stem cell 
research derived from the teachings of Quran and the Islamic Law (Shariah) sometimes 
vary. Nevertheless, as Weckerly (2005) has claimed, the fetus in the Islamic tradition has 
been perceived as human life only in the late stages of fetal development. More 
specifically, most commentators within the Sunni tradition have asserted that the 
ensoulment of the fetus does not occur until the end of fourth month of pregnancy 
(Weckerly, 2005). Similarly, Sachedina's (2008) comparative analysis of verses in both 
Shiite and Sunni compilations of the tradition clearly indicates that the event of 
ensoulment-described as the breathing of the spirit (riih) into the embryo by an Angel 
sent by God-had been recorded as taking place either on the fortieth, forty-second, or 
forty-fifth night or after 120 days of gestation. While the developmental stage when the 
fetus becomes a human being has been identified, it should be noted that the moral-legal 
implications of the ensoulment have not been addressed by these traditions since "ancient 
Muslim jurists did not emphasize the distinction between two periods of pregnancy to 
deduce decisions about the culpability and accruing penalty in the matter of induced 
abortion" (Sachedina, 2008, p. 97). Some jurists have argued that the all three early 
stages of embryonal development described in the tradition, from a coagulated drop 
(nutfa) to a blood clot ('a/aqua) to a lump of flesh (mudgha), are covered in the first forty 
days, rather than in the first 120 days of gestation as outlined in the Bukharl' s 
compilation ( d. 870) which is considered to be the most authentic collection (Sachedina, 
2008). They have also concluded that there is no spirit in the fetus until the end of the 
forty days when the Angel is sent to write the child's destiny regardless of the particular 
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stage of development. Their account of the embryo's ensoulment clearly contradicts the 
position that the fetus attains the identity of a person after the first trimester of pregnancy. 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that some Shiite traditions have suggested that the 
beginning of human life could be traced to the very moment of conception and have 
subsequently ruled out abortion as illicit, even at the earliest stages of gestation 
(Sachedina, 2008). 
The challenges faced by legal Muslim scholars in outlining a coherent ethical and 
philosophical position on scientific innovations such as embryonic stem cell research are 
by no means limited to the discrepancies in the interpretative traditions outlined above. 
There are a variety of factors that contribute to the general uncertainty on contested issues 
in biomedical ethics, with the three most important ones identified by Al-Hayani (2008) 
as: 1) the lack of a religious hierarchy and a highest religious entity in Islam that would 
undertake the task of studying and evaluating the theological validity of new discoveries 
in biomedicine; 2) the significant variance in traditional and cultural practices, and 3) the 
profound distrust of non-Islamic science within the Muslim world. Defining the Islamic 
perspective on the moral status of embryonic stem cells is further complicated by the fact 
that there are many Islamic nations that have not yet caught up with the most recent 
scientific innovations in biomedicine and human biotechnologies. These countries have 
not yet declared their position on the moral status of pre-implantation IVF embryos, the 
ethics of human embryonic stem cell research and other controversial scientific 
innovations such as somatic cell nuclear transfer, human enhancement and inheritable 
genetic modification. 
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Religious Traditions and Scientific Knowledge 
Regardless of the divergent ethical perspectives on the issue of respect owed to 
the human embryo that emanate from the major religious traditions, the stem cell 
controversy has often been framed in terms of the inevitable conflict between theology 
and modem science in our pluralistic societies. There are different considerations and 
levels of analysis employed to tackle the intricate, and undoubtedly very complicated, 
relationship between religious traditions and embryo science. While some regard value 
conflicts over stem cells and embryo science as imminent to the post-secular society, in 
which strong religious communities continue to exist in the context of ongoing 
secularization (Habermas, 2003), others have emphasized the extent to which different 
religions allow input from contemporary scientific viewpoints and are open to dialogue 
with rival traditions (Zivotovsky & Jotkowitz, 2009; Jones & Whitaker, 2009). The 
underlying assumption of these diverse approaches is that the relationship between these 
two positions should be reciprocal and that neither position should be dismissive of the 
contributions of the other. If religious traditions indeed strive to provide any meaningful 
contributions to bioethical debates surrounding reproductive technologies and stem cell 
research, they should take into consideration contemporary scientific notions and their 
ethical arguments should be informed by a scientific understanding of early embryonic 
development (Jones & Whitaker, 2009). 
In their response to the Vatican's new bioethical directives in Dignitas Personae 
from the perspective of Orthodox halakha (Jewish Law), Zivotovsky and Jotkowitz 
(2009) have pointed out that new technology and scientific knowledge often requires 
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different application of fundamental theological principles that have remained unchanged 
during the long history of these religious traditions. While the teachings of both the 
Catholic Church and Judaism strive to incorporate contemporary scientific knowledge, 
recent bioethical issues in human reproduction have indicated an ongoing conflict 
between religious authorities and modem science, especially in religious rulings based on 
erroneous science (e.g., the Vatican's ruling over the morning after pill). Zivotovsky and 
Jotkowitz (2009) have also indicated the greater openness of Orthodox halakha to modem 
scientific views on key questions such as zygotic personhood, no-conjugal procreation, 
and producing benefits through illicit means vis-a-vis the new Vatican policy. The 
divergences often stem from the different authority paradigms adopted by the two 
traditions. In contrast to the pyramidal, hierarchical structure of the Church which 
delegates uncontested authority to the Pope and the Vatican in developing a single, 
uniform position on ethical issues, Judaism has developed as a more diffusive system of 
dispersed communities around the globe, with no central authority or judicial center and 
rulings largely based on precedent of specific laws, principles, and values. Besides the 
Hebrew Bible and the Talmud, three other genres have become indispensable for the 
development of halakha-the Commentaries on the Talmud, Codes of law, and Responsa 
literature, and have often allowed for more than one acceptable position on moral 
dilemmas. As Zivotovsky & Jotkowitz (2009) have claimed, 
While all three genres are ongoing, it is this final genre that is the primary means 
of development, refinement, and clarification of halakha today and exemplifies an 
important aspect of the nature of halakha-it is dynamic yet precedent oriented. A 
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contemporary rabbi will typically examine earlier sources in search of analogous 
circumstances before deciding a point of law. No one will rule without citing the 
relevant passages from the Talmud, and usually from the early commentaries on 
the Talmud, and almost always the major codes. Many modem rabbis will often 
also heavily rely upon the responsa literature of the last few hundred years. (p. 27) 
The requirement for openness to scientific input is consistent with arguments that 
religious traditions that are based on outdated scientist concepts need to be modified and 
reaffirmed in contemporary terms (Jones & Whitaker, 2009). In many ways, this is easier 
said than done. In the case of Judaism, the adaptation is greatly facilitated by their 
fundamental theological tenet that personhood does not begin until the 40 day after 
conception which does not contradict contemporary scientific assessments. It is unlikely, 
however, that most Christians will ever dispense with the notion of the inviolability of the 
human embryo and the need to protect embryonic life. Moreover, the assertion that all 
human life is sacred from conception is so central to their belief systems that any 
scientifically derived reassessment of embryonic status would be interpreted as an assault 
on the dignity of human life (Jones & Whitaker, 2009). The dialogue between science 
and religion, therefore, seems to be contingent on how compatible modem scientific 
views are with the major theological principles of the respective religious tradition. 
Questions about the conditions under which religious persons may participate in 
science policy debates have become central to the stem cell controversy. If there is such 
an intractable and irresolvable conflict between moral discourse derived from religious 
traditions and scientific claims about embryonic development, how are people of faith to 
92 
engage in the bioethical debates of our secular, pluralistic societies which assume a 
certain distance from tradition and theology? Therefore, stem cell proponents have often 
questioned the legitimacy of religious arguments in the policy debate and have dismissed 
beliefs in the ontological status of the human embryo as narrow, highly contested 
religious worldviews that stand at odds with the society's public political culture. This 
position is well supported by analyses that have shown significant variations between 
different cultures and religions on the moral respect and legal protection that should be 
accorded to prenatal human life-forms and, respectively, the types of embryo research 
that should be deemed ethical (Ruse and Pynes, 2003; Waters & Cole-Turner, 2003). 
Most ethical and philosophical debates on the moral status of the blastocyst (the pre-
implantation human embryo) have come to an impasse and the issue is presently 
considered irresolvable. As Finlay (2004) points out in his article on stem cells and 
cloning, "in a postmodern society there are no knock-down arguments by which 
Christians can compel others to adopt their ethical positions" given that their ethical 
perspective is not derived by "rationally defensible proposition, but from the stories by 
which we are formed" (p. 21 ). Similarly, Dworkin (2000) argues in his book Sovereign 
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality that the issue of respect and protection owed 
embryonic life is a question of detached not derivative value, and that "opinions of such 
values are notoriously varied, even within a particular democratic culture, in large part 
because they are sensitive to the very different religious convictions that coexist in such 
cultures" (p. 431 ). While some believe that the embryo is a human person even in the 
very early stages of development and should be granted legal protection, others see it 
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simply as a collection of cells which is yet to develop human potential. Nevertheless, 
beliefs in the ontological value of human embryos are not only grounded in religious 
faith, but are also supported by Kantian deontological ethics. Sandel (2005) claims in his 
analysis of the ethical implications of human cloning that our reluctance to objectify the 
blastocysts used in hESC research has much to do with "the Kantian assumption that the 
moral universe is divided in binary terms: everything is either a person, worthy of 
respect, or a thing, open to use" (p. 245). Even opponents of stem cell and embryo 
research have admitted that the debate on the human status of the early embryo is 
complicated by fundamental differences in our theological traditions which cannot be 
resolved with rational arguments (Lawler, 2007). Intercultural perspectives on the ethics 
of hESC research have clearly illustrated that, while religious traditions are, in most 
cases, deeply concerned with questions of life, they significantly differ on the issue of 
respect and legal protection owed to pre-natal human life. 
The prominence of religious arguments in stem cell debates in North America and 
Europe is by no means accidental; rather, it is indicative of the increasing influence of 
religious orthodoxies in contemporary pluralistic democracies. The continuous existence 
of strong religious communities in the secular West is becoming particularly visible in 
the post-secular society and its value conflicts on scientific and social issues such as 
abortion, voluntary euthanasia, genetic engineering, reproductive medicine, animal 
protection, and environmental activism (Habermas, 2008b ). The acknowledgement that 
there are still highly ambivalent feelings towards secularization, not only worldwide, but 
also in the Western world, has incited critical assessments of the secularization paradigm 
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and self-reflection on the unfinished dialectic of our own occidental secularization 
(Habermas, 2003). In a secular society, religious communities are required to undertake 
the arduous task of accepting and adapting to religious pluralism, the authority of 
scientific knowledge, and the secular values of the liberal state. Habermas (2003) has 
suggested that the post-secular society demands a similar effort from secular citizens who 
are yet to conform to the ethical expectations of democratic citizenship. This need to 
accept the input of religious traditions in the informal public sphere, provided that their 
contributions are translated into generally accessible terms consistent with the principles 
of democratic political culture (i.e., the "institutional translation proviso"), is arising from 
the secular society's overreliance on the crude naturalism of science. Furthermore, he 
indicates that secular epistemologies and scientific doctrines often undermine our self-
understanding as moral persons by abstracting nature from the social frame of reference 
of persons freely engaged in communicative interactions in the public sphere. 
In response to contrasting evaluations of secularization, Habermas (2003) has 
developed as a critique of the replacement and expropriation models in secularization 
theory. Both perspectives have construed the process as a zero-sum game which entails 
the inevitable clash between religious and scientific worldviews. While the former asserts 
progressivist interpretations in the context of "disenchanted modernity" which have 
envisioned the replacement of religious ways of life and thinking by the rational, the 
latter proposes a theory of decline in the context of "unsheltered modernity" in which 
modem ways of life and thinking are discredited as illegitimately appropriated goods. 
Although Habermas (2003) advocates a distance from both strong religious traditions and 
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comprehensive doctrines, such as naturalism, he attempts to avoid narrow, secularist 
perspectives on the political role of religion developed within political liberalism. In an 
article published in the European Journal of Philosophy, Habermas (2006) considers two 
critical questions: (1) Is all religious discourse just a pre-modem residue?, and (2) Do 
secular citizens also have a duty to rise above their narrowly secularist consciousness in 
order to engage with religion in terms of "reasonably expected disagreement"?. In some 
sense, it may seem that his revised concept of citizenship in the post-secular society may 
have posed an asymmetrical cognitive burden on religious communities to develop 
specific epistemic attitudes and stances towards: ( 1) other religions and world views, (2) 
the independence of secular epistemologies from religious knowledge, and (3) the 
priority of secular reasons in the public arena. Nevertheless, he argues that such arduous 
work of hermeneutic self-reflection should also be undertaken by secular citizens who are 
presently expected to engage in reflexive self-understanding and a meaningful dialogue 
with religious persons. This act of cognitive adaptation is different from mere tolerance 
and respect for the existential value that religion may have for some persons; rather, it 
constitutes "a self-reflective transcending of a secularist self-understanding of 
Modernity" (Habermas, 2006, p. 15). Essentially, what he suggests is a change of 
epistemic attitudes in the secularized Western societies that would simultaneously 
accelerate the process of modernization and the adaptation of religious consciousness to 
the ethics of citizenship and help out secular citizens become epistemically adjusted to 
the continued existence of religious communities. This would require that in their 
conflicts with religious traditions secular citizens do not deny any cognitive substance to 
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religious arguments from the onset, but rather perceive these differences as reasonably 
expected disagreements. In this sense, religious perspectives on moral issues can greatly 
enrich the public discourse but only if citizens in the constitutional state are willing to 
change their epistemic attitudes and embark on "complimentary learning processes," as a 
result of which the religious consciousness will becomes reflexive and the secular 
consciousness will transcend its limitations. 
This philosophical justification of the need for and right of religious discourse in 
public life is further extended by Habermas (2008a) in his book Between Naturalism and 
Religion which offers a revision of his invariable critique of the validity of religiously 
informed moral arguments in the public sphere. Religion, he argues, does not necessarily 
stand in the way of science and, therefore, religious reasoning should not be considered 
adversarial to the secular rationality of modem life. More importantly, religious traditions 
can help people articulate moral intuitions pertaining to vulnerable communal forms of 
life and encourage those who are not religious believers to engage in reflection on deep 
moral issues. The effort to understand their contributions seems worthwhile in the context 
of a prevailing naturalist worldview which establishes modem science as an autonomous 
practice with its own criteria of verification and as a measurement of all truths and 
falsehoods. The dangers of such naturalism are discernible in recent advances in genetic 
engineering, the reproductive technologies and the neurosciences which threaten to 
subsume moral persons under scientific descriptions and thus encroach on our normative 
self-understanding. In this case, the question of how science is related to religious 
doctrines seems to be implicated in the overarching philosophical concern about the 
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genealogy of Modernity's self-understanding and the recognition that modem science is a 
practice that is by no means separated from a history of reason that includes the world 
religious traditions (Habermas, 2008a). 
Philosophical and political debates on the relationship between faith and 
knowledge have become implicated in the stem cell controversy, especially when the 
issue was debated beyond narrow bioethical concerns about the status of embryonic stem 
cell lines or technical questions concerning public funding. Rather than adopting a 
simplistic "science versus religion" framework of analysis, it is worth considering the 
relevance of Habermas's concept of ethical citizenship in post-secular societies to the 
public discourse on stem cells and set out specific limitations for religious arguments in 
deliberations over contested scientific issues in both the informal public sphere and the 
institutional arena of decision-making in contemporary pluralistic societies. I examine 
these questions in greater detail in chapter five which contrasts and compares specific 
modes and principles of deliberations adopted at the institutional level of bioethical 
advisory bodies and government commissions in the U.S. and the E.U. 
The Diverse Ethics of Stem Cell Research 
There are a number of different ethical, social and legal controversies that are 
blended in the stem cell controversy. In the United States, efforts by religious and right-
wing interest groups to frame the public discourse on stem cell research in terms of the 
contentious issue of abortion rights have significantly influenced the major ethical 
considerations raised in the national debate. Within the field of bioethics, critics of the 
President Council of Bioethics (PCBE) have often laid the charge of embryo-centrism to 
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criticize the Bush administration's misguided attempts to develop an ethical framework 
for policy decisions regarding biomedical research and human biotechnologies (Annas & 
Elias, 2004; Turner, 2004). Moreover, some PCBE members have expressed concerns 
that the focus on contentious embryo politics came at the expense of ignoring the best 
possible scientific information which was either not incorporated or not communicated 
clearly in the Council's report on stem cell research (Blackburn, 2004). In the 
introductory chapter, I have suggested that public deliberations on the governance of 
stem cell technologies that are narrowly focused on the embryo's contested moral status 
inevitably tend to overlook the range of social and ethical issues related to the stem cell 
controversy that have been articulated elsewhere. In the following pages, I aim to provide 
insight into the diverse ethics of hESC research by looking closely at three major 
bioethical issues that have become prominent in public policy debates: ( l) secular 
defenses of the embryo's moral status, (2) the ethics of human cloning, and (3) concerns 
about women's reproductive rights and health in embryo donation. I also examine 
specific framings of the stem cell controversy in the context of these ethical 
considerations. Ethical issues that arise from experimentation with hES cells are by no 
means limited to these three clusters of policy-related concerns. Rather, the bioethical 
discourse on stem cells currently extends to ELSI issues associated with stem cell patents, 
access to stem cell therapies, clinical challenges in translational stem cell research, and 
stem_ cell tourism. These are highly specialized bioethical debates that have not yet 
received significant public attention. I examine such supplementary ethical considerations 
in greater detail in the remaining chapters of the dissertation. 
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Bioethical Debates on the Moral Status of the Embryo 
While the embryo's moral status remains highly contested, scholars have strived 
to develop a coherent philosophical defense of the full moral respect and protection owed 
to the embryo from the very moment of fertilization which is not grounded on theological 
assumptions and religious reasoning. These perspectives (George & Gomez-Lobo, 2005; 
George & Tollefsen, 2008; among others) advance the argument that the differing 
capabilities of early embryos to develop into human beings does not necessarily translate 
into a different moral status and, respectively, a different degree of protection owed to 
these entities. One of the most consistent attempts to assert the moral equivalence 
between pre-implantation embryos and persons is George and Tollefsen's book Embryo: 
A Defense of Human Life (2008) which provides a comprehensive overview of competing 
conceptualizations of the pre-implantation embryos' moral status that have been 
articulated in the stem cell controversy. The authors argue that the equal moral standing 
of the human embryo can be defended with secular arguments drawn from moral 
philosophy and the science of human embryology. They offer four major arguments in 
defense of this proposition. First, the underlying assumption of the book is consistent 
with what is known in moral philosophy as the "equal moral status view," that is, that 
"human embryos are, from the very beginning, human beings, sharing an identity with, 
though younger than, the older human beings they will grow up to become" (George & 
Tollefsen, 2008, p. 3). Secondly, the authors review some facts of embryology to extend 
the concept of moral personhood to human embryos at all stages of development. They 
argue that "the embryonic, fetal, child, and adolescent are just stages-stages in the 
100 
development of a determinate and enduring entity-a human being-who comes into 
existence as a single-celled organism (a zygote) and develops, if all goes well, into 
adulthood many years later" (George & Tollefsen, 2008, p. 51 ). Arguments about a 
human being present from the very moment of conception are grounded on their critique 
of the metaphysical notion of body-self dualism. This form of dualism is characterized as 
"inherently irrational," as a doctrine that is premised on problematic metaphysical claims 
about the organic and the personal substances in the human, and, finally, as "a lost 
philosophical cause, although it is perennially attractive" (George & Tollefsen, 2008, p. 
69). Instead, the authors adopt a philosophical principle asserted by Thomas Aquinas that 
the soul constitutes not only the organizational life-principle of the human body, but it is 
also the vehicle that enables the human being to think and will. Body and consciousness, 
they claim, are parts of one unified entity, an animal organism bearing a rational nature, 
and that entity is present from the very moment of fertilization of the human zygote. 
The third major argument in support of the "equal moral status view" is that full 
moral respect and protection is owed not only to persons, but also to human life forms in 
the pre-personal and post-personal stages of development. Embryos are, therefore, 
considered to be intrinsically valuable by the virtue of what they are, and not because of 
what they will become in the latter stages. Finally, George and Tollefsen (2008) address 
the moral dualism of philosophical perspectives that accord different status, rights and 
attributes to embryos and persons, and criticize developmental theories (Sandel 2007) and 
attribution views (Green 2001; Strong 1997) of moral personhood. Both theories, George 
and Tollefsen (2008) believe, are arbitrary in their assessment of when moral status 
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should be bestowed upon human beings, and fail to provide convincing arguments that 
"each human being throughout his or her life has inherent dignity and is the subject of 
moral rights and deserving of moral respect" (p. 132). 
The philosophical arguments of Embryo will seem questionable to anyone who 
does not share the underlying assumptions of its authors about extending the concept of 
personhood to the embryo from the moment of conception and treating embryos in the 
pre-personal stages of development as full members of the moral community of persons. 
Not less problematic is the imperative that human embryo ethics should be no different 
from the ethical treatment of minorities or dependents. Despite the authors' well-rounded 
critiques of some shortcomings of moral theories and philosophies in addressing the 
ethics of scientific research, their argumentation in debating the moral status of the 
human embryo is dismissive of the role of deeply embedded cultural values and religious 
convictions that underlie our understanding of embryo science, embryo ethics and 
embryo technologies. While George and Tollefsen (2008) assert that their analysis is 
informed by the best scientific knowledge in embryology, it is worth asking the question 
whether their conclusion that full potential for personhood originates with the formation 
of a new diploid genome in the fertilized oocyte (zygote) is indeed supported by robust 
~cience, rather than based on certain theological assumptions and moral intuitions. It may 
be right to assume that the fusion of spermatozoon and ova is the point of origin of a new, 
genomic identity. It is problematic to assert, however, that the point of origin of a new 
individual identity with full potential for personhood can be traced to the moment of 
formation of a new genome in the zygote. It is well known that the zygote's haploid 
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genome may develop into more than one unique entity due to the possibility of 
monozygotic twinning, i.e. when a single embryo splits into two, in the early weeks of 
development. Given this possibility, it is widely believed that the conditions for 
personhood are clearly present around the 14th day, when there is a genetically complete 
individual entity and appearance of a primitive streak, a crumpled, rod-shaped thickening 
in the middle embryonic disc which indicates the beginning of neural tissues and the 
mesoderm. Based on this particular understanding of human embryonic development, 
policy makers in Britain have enforced the rule that all embryos used for stem cell 
derivation and other types of biomedical research are destroyed after the 14th day. 
Nonetheless, not all supporters of stem cell research are satisfied with the 
twinning argument and the time of formation of a primitive streak as an indication for full 
human potential. In his book The Morality of Embryo Use, Guenin (2008) claims that 
monozygotic twinning by itself does not disqualify an embryo from being a person "nor 
does there obtain any reason to deny that an early embryo satisfies any condition of 
human individuality requisite for personhood" (p. 98). Rather, he believes that the 
threshold to personhood is intrauterine implantation. Therefore, the case for embryo 
research is argued strictly in relation to embryos (usually created and stored at IVF 
clinics) that will never be implanted in either a woman or in an artificial uterus because 
no more transfers are requested by the mother and they had already been donated by their 
progenitors for research purposes. This category of embryos is defined as an 
epidosembryo (from the Greek word epidosis meaning "for a beneficence to the common 
weal" or for the common good). In cases when the patients have already decided against 
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the transfer of these embryos, their developmental potential "fails of enablement." As 
Guenin (2008) points out, 
Thus one cannot accomplish anything, for anyone, by asserting that an embryo, as 
to which progenitors refuse intrauterine transfer, and that they wish to give to 
medicine, is a person for purposes of the duty not to harm or not to kill. Once 
progenitors have barred an embryo from the womb, its developmental potential is 
bounded such that the foregoing situation will not change. (p. 46) 
This "developmentalist" perspective clearly indicates the event of intrauterine 
implantation as the crucial moment when the case for moral status can be made, and can 
be contrasted to attempts to establish the personhood of human zygote or conceptus 
through a rather metaphysical notion of potentiality based on the genetic evidence. 
Instead of asserting zygotic personhood and its deontic consequences, Guenin (2008) 
justifies the destruction of pre-implantation embryos for the humanitarian purpose of 
developing life-saving treatments with the argument that "permissibility of epidosembryo 
use follows from the embryo's presently bounded developmental potential and the end to 
be served by using the embryo (p. 53). 
Furthermore, George and Tollefsen's claim that the zygote's full human status can 
be determined with references to scientific facts and a purely philosophical reasoning 
stands at odds with their emotionally-laden rhetoric and politically expedient arguments. 
Throughout the book, hESC research is consistently labeled as "embryo-killing for 
research," "embryo-destructive research," and as "wrongful killings" comparable to the 
murder of retarded children in order to obtain their organs, whereas blastocysts are 
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characterized as "embryonic human beings," "embryonic persons," "the youngest and 
most vulnerable members of the human family." In their critiques of hESC research, 
conservative members of the PCBE have often resorted to similar rhetorics and emotional 
appeals to provide ethical justification for the Bush administration's highly unpopular 
stem cell policy. As over the last ten years both sides in the contentious debate have 
become deeply entrenched, stem cell proponents have easily dismissed the "equal moral 
status view" as a religious doctrine that falls beyond the scope of a legitimate public 
debate on science policy (Silver, 2006). Therefore, conservative bioethicists and 
philosophers have undertaken the task of conjuring up sound epistemological and moral 
arguments that would count as acceptable ethical defenses of pre-personal life. In this 
sense, George and Tollefsen's (2008) philosophical defense of embryonic life and 
critique of hESC research resonates with conservative analyses of embryo ethics such as 
Sullivan (2001), Ponnuru (2004), and George and Lee (2005). 
Some scholars have advocated a middle ground position between the notion of the 
pre-implantation embryo's full human status and arguments that such embryos have no 
particular moral status and could be used in stem cell research (Fukuyama, 2003, 2005; 
Sandel, 2005). In his article "Human Biomedicine and the Problem of Governance," 
Fukuyama (2005) has claimed that, contrary to the common belief that the PCBE has 
served a conservative, pro-life agenda, its deliberations have demonstrated a "healthy 
balance of views on the tortured "moral status of the embryo" question" (p. 195). Caught 
in-between the two extremes, several Council's members have defended the position that 
human embryos have an intermediary moral status. Fukuyama (2005) supports the view 
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that human beings develop full moral status gradually during the prenatal development 
and that this gradual acquisition continues during the postnatal development of the 
human. This proposition is illustrated by the fact that full political rights are granted only 
to adults, and not to children. While the intermediate status of the human embryo justifies 
its instrumental use for serious scientific research (e.g. the use of pre-implantation 
embryos as a source of stem cell tissue), it also entails a certain level of respect owed to 
these entities and social control to ensure their ethical treatment. Fukuyama (2005) also 
argues that we need to develop an appropriate regulatory system that would distinguish 
the legitimate use of embryos in stem cell research from their unethical use (e.g., the 
implantation of cloned embryos to produce children). 
A similar perspective is provided by Sandel (2005) in his article on the ethical 
implications of human cloning. He claims that we cannot simply regard the human 
embryo as a mere thing that is open to all kind of use and interventions. At the same time, 
we do not necessarily need to assume that it is a full human being in order to assert the 
significance of nascent human life. The major problem with attributing full personhood to 
the human embryo is that the "equal moral status" view has certain far-reaching 
implications that render it implausible. For example, proponents of this view have 
maintained that the extraction of stem cells from six-day-old blastocysts is as morally 
wrong as the harvesting organs from babies. This proposition, Sandel claims (2005), 
seems very problematic in the context of the proposed U.S. anti-cloning legislation which 
imposes the penalty of a $1 million dollar fine and 10 years in prison, a hardly adequate 
punishment for such a gruesome act. If the destruction of pre-implantation embryos were 
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indeed equal to the murder of babies, then the legislation should have provided a more 
severe form of punishment for the scientists extracting stem cells from embryos, such as 
life imprisonment or the death penalty. Another problem for the equal moral status view 
is the high rate of embryo loss in natural pregnancies, with more than half of the embryos 
failing to implant. The way people respond to the natural loss of embryos (which often 
goes unnoticed) and early miscarriages indicates that they do not perceive embryos as 
morally equivalent to children. If the equal moral view holds validity, Sandel (2005) ~sks, 
wouldn't it make sense to carry out the same burial rituals for each lost pre-implantation 
embryo that we observe for the death of children? In other words, this perspective clearly 
stands at odds with people's moral intuitions about the significance of pre-personal 
human life and its implications defy the established legal and socio-cultural practices in 
pluralistic societies. Sandel (2005) suggests that we should be wary of an ethical doctrine 
which "risks turning every moral question into a battle over the bounds of personhood'' 
and advocates a middle ground approach that will help us better "cultivate a more 
expansive appreciation of life as a gift that commands our reverence and restricts our 
use" (p. 246). Similarly to the position defended by Fukuyama, Sandel attempts to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of embryos in biomedical research. 
While he believes that the use of cloning technology for the creation of designer babies is 
"the ultimate expression of the hubris that marks the loss of reverence for life," he 
commends embryonic stem cell research, including the use of cloned blastocysts in it, as 
"a noble exercise of our human ingenuity to promote healing and to play our part in 
repairing the given world" (p. 246). 
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The Ethics of Human Cloning 
The framing of hESC research as a moral issue closely related to the regulation of 
human cloning has become a major factor in sustaining the public controversy on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In the early years of hESC research, public fears were fueled by 
news stories about cloned human babies. The most publicized announcement came from 
the U.S. based company Clonaid established in 1997 by the Raelian cult. The Raelians, 
which believe that people are the result of a genetic engineering project run by highly 
intelligent extra-terrestrials, claimed that their scientists have produced the world's first 
cloned baby, who was allegedly born by Caesarean section on 26 December 2002 to a 31-
year-old U.S. mother. Most scientists dismissed Clonaid's claims as groundless given that 
at the time even most technologically advanced labs had not succeeded in producing a 
viable cloned human embryo. Media investigations also supported suspicions that the 
cloning claim was hoax, as Clonaid's executives consistently refused to provide any 
evidence of cloning the baby, nicknamed Eve, or even of her existence. Despite Clonaid 
and other human cloning advocates' claims, the birth of Eve and cloned human babies 
has never been verified independently. 
While some techno-utopians and cloning advocates believe that reproductive 
cloning has the potential to improve the vitality of the population by maximizing 
biologically determined behavior and intelligence, it is universally rejected on ethical 
grounds since "reproductive cloning would amount to a procedure in which people were 
the experiment, the outcome of which could not be known until they were shown to 
posses the capacity of producing normal children" (Finlay, 2004, p. 15). Regardless of 
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such general agreement that human reproductive cloning is morally reprehensible and 
should be banned, scientists, politicians, bioethicists, and the public still greatly disagree 
on the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer in hESC research. In America, Christian 
activists and anti-cloning advocacy groups have spread misconceptions that therapeu,tic 
cloning means making cloned human babies rather than innovative stem cell therapies. 
Religious leaders have also made appeals for an anti-cloning ban by representing all 
types of cloning as a giant step toward turning human procreation into manufacture. 
Around the time ACT announced they had cloned human embryos for stem cell research, 
a U.S. Orthodox Church leader compared cloning experiments with "crimes against 
humanity of a Nazi brand" and claimed that "the so-called therapeutic cloning is nothing 
other than the worst instrumentalization of a human being, sacrificed for the benefit of 
others" (News release by zenith.org, 27 November 2001). Public statements and media 
releases by opponents of hESC research have not only blurred the differences between 
cloning for reproductive purposes and therapeutic cloning, but also questioned the latter's 
viability for the production of stem cell therapies. The founding statement of Americans 
to Ban Cloning, posted on their website, exemplifies the efforts to make cloning for stem 
cell research redundant: 
A ban on cloning as a means of producing live born human beings will 
prove to be unenforceable unless it also ~ans cloning for any other 
purpose-including the use of cloning to produce human embryos as 
sources of stem cells or for other experimentation. Referring to this latter 
use of cloning as "therapeutic cloning" is prejudicial and misleading, since 
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it has not been shown that cloning is necessary for or useful in the 
production of human therapies.( http://www.cloninginformation.org) 
Similar concerns about the use of cloning technology in biomedical research were voiced 
by Christian bioethicists on the PCBE such as Mary Ann Glendon and Gilbert 
Meilaender, as well as by neoconservatives with little experience in academic bioethics 
like Francis Fukuyama and Charles Krauthammer. The conservative minority on the 
Council has strongly advocated a nationwide ban on both reproductive and therapeutic 
cloning. In his invariable critique of genetic engineering and biomedicine, Leon Kass, 
chairman of the Council from 2002 to 2005, has repeatedly referred to the dystopian 
themes of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932) to characterize advances in human 
biotechnologies as an assault to human dignity. His essay "Preventing a Brave New 
World," published in The New Republic in June 2001, utilized a similar rhetoric to 
diminish the effectiveness of cloning technology in developing new hESC-based 
therapies: 
The technology of cloning is discrete and well defined, and it requires 
considerable technical know-how and dexterity; we can therefore know by 
name many of the likely practitioners. Nothing scientifically or medically 
important would be lost by banning clonal reproduction; alternative and 
non-objectionable means are available to obtain some of the most 
important medical benefits claimed for (non-reproductive) human cloning. 
The commercial interests in human cloning are, for now, quite limited; 
and the nations of the world are actively seeking to prevent it. Now may 
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be as good a chance as we will ever have to get our hands on the wheel of 
the runaway train now headed for a post-human world and to steer it 
toward a more dignified human future (Kass, 2001 ). 
By and large, opponents of hESC research in the United States have communicated their 
objections against research cloning in terms of the intersection of the two technologies, 
emphasizing that techniques developed in SCNT or CRNT (Cell Replacement through 
Nuclear Transfer) research can pave the way, scientifically and technically, for successful 
attempts at reproductive cloning. 
While Christians and anti-abortion Republicans strongly oppose therapeutic 
cloning because it leads a deliberate destruction of human embryos, some pro-choice 
liberals also felt uneasy about prospect of this technology becoming a step toward human 
reproductive cloning. There were ethical concerns that the acceptance of cloning 
technology could legitimize questionable moral practices such as the instrumentalization 
of children and new forms of genetic discrimination. The U.S. debate over human cloning 
led to some unexpected political realignments, including a peculiar alliance between 
some pro-choice feminists and anti-abortion activists in support of the so-called Weldon-
Stupak Human Cloning Prohibition Act (H.R. 2505) of July 31, 2001. 1 Many feminists 
supported the anti-cloning legislation, as they feared that the engineering of cloned 
embryos would be a yet another step toward the creation of "designer babies" and would 
tum women's eggs and wombs into commodities. The measure aimed to criminalize both 
reproductive and therapeutic cloning by establishing penalties of up to ten years in jail 
1 The full text of bill H.R. 2505 is available on http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/blhr2505.htm. 
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and a fine of not less than one million dollars for attempts to clone humans. The House 
approved H.R. 2505 by a vote of 265 to 162, while rejecting by a vote of 249 to 178 an 
amendment that would have allowed limited creation of cloned embryos for biomedical 
research. The bill never became a law since the Senate did not act upon it. 
While some stem cell advocates have emphasized the benefit of the advancement 
of knowledge and technologies associated with the cloning of human embryos by nuclear 
transfer, its potential for stem cell research remains questionable. In Great Britain, where 
therapeutic cloning was legalized in December 2000, despite strong opposition from the 
European Union, critics have questioned HFEA's decision to grant licenses for 
"performing research of a preliminary nature with cloned human embryos before 
conclusively demonstrating the superior therapeutic prowess of embryonic stem cells 
derived by nuclear transfer or validating the rationale for the proposed work in animal 
studies" (Cobbe, 2005, p. 298). As published research in the field has indicated, a very 
limited progress had been made in human cloning experiments. Similarly, a number of 
animal studies have resulted in a failure of engraftment of stem cell transplants derived 
from cloned embryos which were attacked by the natural killer cells in the recipient mice, 
although one experiment has indeed achieved successful engraftment in parkinsonian 
mice of dopaminergic neurons derived from ES cells following nuclear transfer (Cobbe, 
2005). These animal studies, however, do not seem to provide convincing evidence that 
the ES cells derived by nuclear transfer are in any way therapeutically more effective 
than other types of ES cells. Since the cloning process often results in altered patterns of 
gene expression, it is wise to remain cautious about the clinical potential of therapeutic 
112 
cloning until research "demonstrated unequivocally that such epigenetic defects would 
not be responsible for problems associated with the transplantation of stem cells derived 
from cloned embryos (possibly due to misexpression of genes affecting an immune 
response)" (Cobbe, 2005, p. 299). Subsequently, there were concerns about the possible 
misrepresentation of the clinical potential of research cloning in the UK policy debate. 
Stem Cell Research and Women's Bodies 
Scholars have argued that the ethical issues in hESC research extend beyond the 
contested moral status of the human embryo and the potential for new medical 
treatments, with some key themes missing from public discussions such as concerns 
about women as the source of embryos, potential health risks and the existing therapeutic 
gap (Kitzinger &Williams, 2005; Dickinson, 2006, King, 2007). With the debate being 
presented as a strict binary opposition, little attention has been paid to regulatory issues 
that arise from the need to protect women who supply ova for stem cell technologies and 
the process of nuclear transfer. Dickinson (2006) has argued that the new biotechnologies 
have led to the feminization of all bodies; regardless of our gender we are reduced to the , 
status of objects and both male and female tissue has equally become subject to 
commodification. Property rights in human tissue and in the human genome, she argues, 
have become the subject of a "new enclosures" movement by researchers, biotech 
corporations and governments. The ongoing commodification and objectification of 
human tissue has generated protests by patients' rights coalitions, academic 
commentators, media and the general public, but only because it affects men and women 
equally. The stem cell debate, however, has in some ways rendered the bodies of women 
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invisible. While there is almost no awareness in the mainstream media and bioethics 
literature about the commodification and objectification of female tissue, "in the stem cell 
technologies, by contrast, we see little outrage about the exploitation of female 
reproductive tissue" (Dickinson, 2006, p. 44). The fact that it is widely believed that stem 
cell research will become ethically acceptable if only scientists find ways to engineer hES 
cells without using human embryos further confirms the exclusion of women from the 
ethical equitation. 
The position outlined above has led to reconsiderations of the narrow ethical 
scope of the stem cell debate in the United Stated and elsewhere. An example of such a 
shift from contested embryo politics towards more overarching concerns about the impact 
ofrecent advances in biomedicine on women's reproductive rights and health is the , 
public debate on stem cell research in Canada, which was conducted in the context of a 
larger effort to regulate human reproductive technologies. Public bioethics in Canada 
presently stands in sharp contrast to the embryo-centrism that plagues bioethical debates 
in the United States. Rather than framing the stem cell debate around the moral status of 
the human embryo and the ontological significance of human germ line, feminist 
analyses of Bill C-6, known as the Assisted Human Reproduction Act of 2004, have 
deconstructed the dominant terms of the debate to draw the public's attention to issues 
concerning women's reproductive rights and reproductive health that are at stake with the 
development of stem cell technologies (Sullivan, 2005; King, 2007). Some Canadian 
bioethicists have also opposed the practice of donating healthy, viable embryos for stem 
cell research since it increases the possibility that women donors may afterwards have to 
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undergo additional IVF cycles in order to complete their reproductive projects (Baylis, 
McLeod, Nisker, & Sherwin, 2007). It is recognized that women's reproductive work in 
hESC research involves specific health risks. Repeated ovarian stimulations and eggs 
collection surgery, which are part of the IVF treatments, entail physical risks associated 
with the ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, including side effects such as lower 
abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, rapid weight gain, and respiratory difficulty. 
Some life-threatening complications are also possible, including renal failure, adult 
respiratory distress syndrome, hemorrhaging from ovarian rupture, and thromboembolism 
(Baylis et al., 2007). 
Women are presently the primary tissue donors in the stem cell industries. There 
is a growing demand worldwide for continuous supply of oocytes, embryos, fetal tissue 
and umbilical cord blood. The expansion of new types of biomedical research is largely 
dependent on the feminized productivity in the bioeconomy, with women in the 
developing countries being the major supplier of biological material for the stem cell and 
regenerative medicine industries (Waldby & Cooper, 2010). Concerns about the ethical 
implications of the global trade in human egg cells intensified after the British 
Parliament's decision to allow the use of cloned embryos in hESC research. Since the 
cloning process requires high volume of donated oocytes, the subsequent HFEA's 
proposal to relax rules on importing human eggs came as no surprise. Nonetheless, this 
decision was met with significant opposition by most EU countries, which resulted in a 
resolution on the trade in human egg cells passed by the European Parliament in 2005. 
The document seriously questioned the Authority's attempt to facilitate a trade of human 
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eggs from impoverish female populations in Romania. Questions about potential 
exploitation of women in developing countries have thus became implicated in the E.U. 
stem cell/cloning debate. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I illustrated how the positions of participants in public 
deliberations over stem cell policy have been shaped by their prior theological and moral 
commitments. A major concern in the stem cell debate was whether ethical arguments . 
derived from religious traditions could be reconciled with scientific perspectives on 
human embryonic development. The value conflicts of the stem cell controversy have 
reflected increasing tensions between religious and secular worldviews in the public 
sphere of contemporary liberal states. In his analysis of such recent challenges to the 
process of secularization, Habermas (2006) has suggested that the clash between science 
and religion could be offset by adopting a new concept of ethical citizenship in the post-
secular society. This position requires a certain degree of epistemic flexibility by both 
religious and secular citizens who willfully engage in complimentary learning processes 
to transcend the inherent limitations of both unreflexive religious beliefs and narrow 
secularist worldviews. My analysis of the role of religion in the stem cell controversy, 
however, indicated that the dialogue between science and religious traditions is greatly 
dependent on how compatible are scientifically derived assessments of embryonic status 
with the latter's fundamental theological tenets of the beginning of personhood. It is also 
contingent on the degree of openness of each religious tradition to scientific input. 
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The chapter concluded with an assessment of the diverse ethics of stem cell 
research by focusing on three major clusters of bioethical issues around which stem cell 
debates have been framed-the human embryo's contested moral status, the ethics of 
human cloning technology, and concerns about the exploitation of women who have 
become the major tissue donors in the global stem cell bioeconomy. Perspectives on the 
moral standing of pre-implantation embryos used in stem cell research have varied 
between ethical defenses of its full human status and claims that at this stage of 
development the embryo has no particular moral status. In an attempt to balance these 
two conflicting positions, some have suggested that embryos have an intermediary moral 
status which justifies their instrumental use for life-saving biomedical research but only 
under conditions that ensure their ethical treatment. This middle ground approach 
represents a way to assert the moral significance of early embryos as potential human life 
without accepting some far-reaching implications of the equal moral status view that 
render it implausible. The stem cell policy debate became deeply entangled with the 
cloning debate when scientists discovered that cloning techniques could be potentially 
utilized in the production of hESC therapies that would be compatible with a patient's 
immune system. Stem cell proponents have attempted to appease public anxieties by 
setting up a clear dividing line between cloning for reproductive purposes and the use of 
cloning technology in stem cell research. In the US the cloning controversy has created 
some unusual political alliances in support of anti-cloning legislation and also led to a 
proposal by the PCBE for a four-year moratorium on research cloning. The legalization 
of research cloning in EU countries with strong research agenda, i.e. Britain, raised 
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concerns among critics about the public misrepresentation of its clinical potential in 
hESC research. The strong focus on embryos in the public discourse on hESC research 
has incited feminist critiques which have deconstructed the dominant terms of the debate 
to draw attention to issues concerning women's reproductive rights and reproductive 
health that are at stake with the development of stem cell technologies. It was claimed 
that popular framings of the ethics of this biomedical innovation around questions of 
what kind of entity the embryo is and when exactly life begins had rendered the bodies of 
women invisible and excluded them from the ethical equation. Feminists have lamented 
the reluctance of the mainstream media and bioethics literature to address concerns about 
the commodification and objectification of female reproductive tissue in stem cell 
research and, more specifically, the potential exploitation of women donors in developing 
countries. 
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CHAPTER4 
STEM CELLS, MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The mass media have played a significant role in shaping the public 
understanding of the ethics and politics of stem cell research. Both proponents and 
opponents of embryo research have used the media as a resource to mobilize public 
support for their position and to frame the public discourse according to their preferred 
policy outcomes. At the same time, the news and print media have followed their own 
economic and political agenda in framing the controversy. In contemporary democracies 
media themselves are political institutions that can influence the processes of public 
communication and involvement with policy making since they can "powerfully shape 
how policy issues related to science and technology controversies are defined, 
symbolized, and ultimately resolved" (Nisbet et al., 2003, p. 37). In a risk society, media 
have the resources to open up contested techno-scientific developments for public 
criticism and can provide a communicative forum for framing and negotiating uncertainty 
and public anxieties over the actual and perceived risks of the post-industrial society 
(Beck, 1994). The significance of mass media in contemporary mediated societies is 
heightened by their ability to shape the public discourse on ethico-political matters, 
influence political behaviors and set the agenda for public participation in the decision-
making process. In the light of these considerations, this chapter aims to examine the role 
of mass media in setting the public agenda on stem cell research in a comparative US-EU 
context. My analysis emphasizes the active role of media in shaping and constructing 
public discourses on the ethics and biopolitics of stem cells against the conventional 
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understanding that media coverage of controversies in the field of science and technology 
is rather limited to reporting new scientific discoveries and technological developments. I 
look at how the news and print media represent an important site of struggle for different 
interest groups in their lobbying efforts to sway the public opinion in favor of specific 
policy outcomes. While both proponents and opponents of hESC research have competed 
for press and television coverage, mass media have also followed their own agenda in 
sensationalizing ELSI issues related to stem cell technologies and their applications in 
regenerative medicine. The chapter begins with an overview of perspectives in science 
communication that explore the role various media outlets play in the public 
communication of controversies in science and technology (Friedman, Dunwoody, & 
Rogers, 1999; Marks et al., 2007; Mazur, 1981; Weingart, 1998). These analyses 
emphasize the central position of mass media in framing scientific uncertainty and 
providing legitimacy to knowledge claims, moral values, and political interests and, 
therefore, provide a useful framework to consider specific media framings of the stem 
cell debate. I then contrast and compare frames and narratives about the societal 
implications of the stem cell technologies validated by news media in the US and EU 
member states such as Britain, France and Poland. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the role of mass media in advancing notions of stem cell research 
exceptionalism which considers two normative models for public discourse on scientific 
controversies outlined by Gerhards and Schafer (2009)-the science-dominated scientific 
public sphere and the contextualized scientific public sphere. 
120 
In the earlier chapters I have discussed moral divisions in American society over 
the ontological significance of human embryos and their use as a source of stem cells. I 
have also illustrated how the framing of the stem cell controversy in terms of the 
contested politics of abortion has set the tone for a public debate along the conventional 
political and cultural divisions between left and right, liberals and conservatives, pro-
choice supporters and pro-lifers. In their book, The Promise and Politics of Stem Cell 
Research, Solo and Pressburg (2007) point out that the stem cell debate has invigorated 
the public life in the U.S., although at the expense of an extreme polarization of the 
country before any informed public debate had taken place. The advent of stem cell 
technologies and the potential of regenerative medicine to improve public health, they 
claim, have marked "a new era of public life and participation in national policy making 
from the bottom up ... [and] the promise of stem cell research has resulted in a radical and 
potentially transforming political experience for the country" (2007, p. 15). The Bush 
administration's decision to impose restrictions on federal funding for embryonic stem 
cell research in August 2001 incited strong public opposition and prompted science 
advocacy groups to wage aggressive public communication and media campaigns to 
promote the public engagement with stem cell policy and secure state and private funding 
for the development of hESC therapies. That same year, advocates for stem cell research 
formed the nation's leading pro-cure coalition-the Coalition for the Advancement of 
Medical Research (CAMR)-whose main objective was to increase opportunities for 
federal, state and private funding for biomedical research using hESCs. CAMR brought 
together nationally established patient rights' organizations, universities, scientific 
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societies, and foundations such as the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the 
Association of American Universities, the Association of American Colleges, the 
American Association for Cancer Research, the Michael J. Fox Foundation for 
Parkinson's Research, the Christopher Reeve Foundation, the Juvenile Diabetes Research 
Foundation, the Stem Cell Research Foundation, the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, WiCell Research Institute, and the American Society for Cell 
Biology, among many other organizations. Subsequently, the unprecedented level of 
public involvement and political activism on the issue of stem cell research led 
commentators to believe that research advocates had carried out the most successful 
advocacy and media campaign in the twentieth century American history (Callahan, 
2007). The pro-stem cell research coalition accomplished that goal by enlisting the help 
of leading politicians from the Republican and the Democratic parties, the biotech 
industry, prominent public intellectuals, Nobel laureates, and Hollywood celebrities such 
as the Superman actor Christopher Reeve, left paralyzed from a spinal cord injury 
following a riding accident, and actor Michael J. Fox, who was diagnosed with 
Parkinson's disease in 1991. Stem cell research activists have also succeeded in 
organizing ballot initiatives in different states and mobilizing voters to pass referendums 
securing public funding for hESC research in California and Missouri. Just a few years 
after Thomson's discovery, stem cell research became one of the central issues in 
American political and public life and the general public was led to believe that public 
investment in research on human embryonic stem cells was crucial for the advancement 
of biomedicine and the economic competitiveness of the USA. The hype around the 
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development of stem cell therapies has given rise to claims about unwarranted stem cell 
· research exceptionalism in assessing the ethical permissibility of controversial 
technologies used in stem cell studies (e.g., the generation of hESC lines by means of 
nuclear cell replacement, human-to-animal chimera experiments in stem cell research, the 
use of parthenogenetically activated oocytes for human embryonic stem cell derivation, 
as well as the creation of hES cell-derived, synthetic gametes). 
It is worth looking at whether the ethical challenges presented by hESC research 
and regenerative medicine have provoked similar responses and increased public 
participation of EU citizens in science policy making at the supranational level. Media 
coverage and parliamentary debates in most EU member states have legitimized stem cell 
research as an important political issue. Therefore, it is important to consider to what 
extent political mobilizations around the biopolitics of embryonic stem cells have become 
visible not only within national public spheres of EU member states but also in a 
European-wide, transnational public sphere. Habermas's notion of public sphere and his 
proceduralist conception of deliberative democracy have become important in current 
discussions on European integration. A transnational public sphere in Europe would 
ideally provide a common communicative space for interaction between European 
citizens and the supranational institutions and empower transnational publics to influence 
EU decision-making. Scholars in political communication have argued that the formation 
of post-national democracy in this unique supranational polity, which is neither a state, 
nor nation, is largely contingent on the emergence of such an overarching communicative 
space that functions as a public sphere and ensures the realization of popular sovereignty 
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beyond the nation-state (Eriksen, 2005; Koopmans, Neidhardt, & Pfetsch, 2000). Many 
have envisioned the development of transnational public spaces in Europe as a direct 
result of the development of strong trans-European institutions but also as the outcome of 
a gradual Europeanization of the national public spheres. Presently, it is hard to 
substantiate claims about a unified European public sphere or a common European 
identity and culture. Nonetheless, some commentators have indicated that a still closer 
Europeanization has a visible impact on the national public spheres and the rich diversity 
of national and regional cultures in Europe (Bondebjerg & Madsen, 2008). 
It is important to note that there is still widespread Euroskepticism about the true 
"transnationalization of public communicative spaces" supported by arguments about 
difficulties associated with Europeanization of "collective actors, media, and publics 
superimposed on the established national public spaces" (Koopmans et al., 2000, p. 3). 
This skepticism is largely informed by assumptions about structural democratic deficit 
inherent in the development of the EU as a supranational unity which does not possesses 
the proper characteristics and institutional structure of a federal state. More specifically, 
democratic deficiencies are associated with the weak European parliament, which many 
perceive as rather ineffective in comparison with national parliaments, the absence of 
European-wide parties, and problems concerning the lack of collective identity as a 
precondition for the development of a viable European public sphere (Scharpf, 1999). 
The lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions is also discernible in the failure 
to set in motion appropriate political communication mechanisms and policies as an 
indispensable aspect of the process of European integration and the creation of "citizens' 
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Europe" (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2008). Subsequently, communication scholars have argmed 
that there is a significant communication gap between governments and people which 
contributes to the alienation of citizens from supranational institutions and the elites that 
run them (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2008). 
Nonetheless, political communication scholars have argued that the presence of 
some shared communicative spaces in Europe indicates a possible step towards the 
development of a transnational public sphere. For example, Koopmans et al. (2000) 
emphasize the analytical distinction between mass and elite public spheres and suggest 
that the transnationalization of national political discourses may not necessarily involve 
Europeanization of national mass public spheres. Rather, they envision the formation of a 
transnational, European public sphere "on the level of political, economic, and cultural 
elites, who can act as 'translators' carrying national discourses onto the European level 
and, vice versa, may introduce European perspectives into national public spheres" 
(Koopmans et al., 2000, p. 4). By contrast, others believe that the existence of 
transnational European audio-visual spaces constitutes an important step towards the 
Europeanization of national mass public spheres. Eriksen (2005) argues that such 
transnational communicative spaces are provided by electronic media such as the 
multilingual television channel EuroNews, BBC World, ARTE, European Voice, 
Deutsche Welle (broadcasting in English); influential print media such as The Financial 
Times, International Herald Tribune, The Economist, and Le Monde Diplomatique with 
editions in most major European languages; and, obviously, the Internet. This perspective 
also emphasizes the importance of social movements and political organizations across 
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borders as vehicles in the ongoing process of Europeanization. Therefore, Eriksen (2005) 
suggests that a pan-European press and media based on English as lingua franca could 
provide a potential space for the creation of a collective European identity and, 
furthermore, for a genuine Europeanization of public debates. However, he also notes 
that "common communicative systems of mass-media facilitating real public debates 
conducive to collective will formation are to a large degree lacking at the European level" 
(Eriksen, 2005, p. 351). Similarly, a general supranational public sphere in Europe, which 
would entail free and open access to opinion formation processes, is presently more of a 
potential than a reality. 
The analytical framework I utilize to examine the role of media in European stem 
cell debates recognizes the contingency and fragmentation of the European public space, 
as well as the fact that transnational public debates in Europe currently originate within 
the EU policy networks. Although I recognize the validity of the "elite public sphere" 
perspective advanced by Koopmans et al. (2000), I also suggest that it may be worth 
exploring how issue-oriented polarization in Europe can contribute to a lively public 
debate across national borders and actualize possibilities for Europeanization of 
segmented mass publics within national public spheres on a case by case basis. This 
model presupposes the coexistence of both an integrated, transnational elite public sphere 
in Europe and thematically "Europeanized" national mass public spheres. I argue that the 
ethical controversy over hESC research presents an example of such issue-oriented, albeit 
temporal, transnationalization of public debate in Europe that can allow us to draw 
parallels with the unfolding of national stem cell debate in the American public sphere. 
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Since my focus in this chapter is on the impact of mass media on shaping science and 
society interactions on the issue, in the remaining sections, I explore, in a comparative 
perspective, how various media outlets enable the actualization of shared communicative 
spaces for public debate and negotiations over the ethical challenges presented by the 
stem cell technologies. 
Mass Media and Scientific Controversies 
In contemporary knowledge economies, the electronic and print new media have 
become the primary channel to convey scientific notions to the general public. The 
centrality of mass media in the public communication of science and technology is 
heightened by their ability to provide legitimacy to scientific issues and draw the public's 
attention by sensationalizing scientific research and discoveries. Research on mass media 
and risk communication has shown that different media outlets have the ability to frame 
controversies in science in ways that greatly influence societal attitudes and perceptions 
and could also provide a public forum for debate and negotiation between scientists, 
policy makers, interest groups and the general public (Mazur, 1981; Pellechia, 1997; 
Friedman et al., 1999). Moreover, lay people heavily rely on the media sources and media 
professionals for information and interpretation on critical scientific debates, especially 
when they attempt to understand controversial science in ways that relate to their own 
personal lives (Friedman et al, 1999). Similarly, media coverage and frames shape the 
ways in which the general public form opinions on how controversial developments in 
science and technology (e.g., fetal transplantation research, embryonic stem cell research 
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and human cloning, gene therapy, etc.) are symbolized, played out and resolved at the 
policy-making level (Nisbet et al., 2003). 
Case studies of media coverage of scientific controversies have convincingly 
demonstrated the impact of news rpedia on shaping the public understanding of scientific 
debates and citizens' participation in techno-science policy and decision-making. For 
example, Mazur's (1981) study of the impact of U.S. media on public attitudes in the 
nation-wide disputes over fluoridation and nuclear power has shown that "media 
coverage of scientific controversies may do more than define and amplify an event; it 
may have profound effects on public attitudes, the precise nature of which is difficult to 
specify" (p. 109). His analysis indicated a direct correlation between increased media 
coverage in a technical controversy and public opposition to the technology in question. 
The coverage-opposition effects were visible in the much-debated fluoridation 
controversy in the 1950s. While initially community acceptance of fluoridation was 
extremely high and there was little debate on its effectiveness, a raucous dispute was 
developed in Stevens Point, Wisconsin, where fluoridation was defeated by town 
referendum in 1950. Shortly after this conflict, public opposition to fluoride increased 
and more referendums were passed by 1952. Mazur's (1981) content analysis of popular 
U.S. magazines and journals showed a peak in media coverage on the subject in about 
1952. At the same time, public opinion polls showed that public opposition to 
fluoridation had increased between 1952 and 1953, when the press article coverage of the 
issue was also at its peak. This was followed by a decline in opposition by 1956 which 
was parallel to the decline in periodical coverage. In the 1960s media and public opinion 
128 
trends were parallel and reached peaks in the 1965. However, there was an increase in 
media coverage on the issue at the end of the decade when a growing environmental 
movement raised public awareness about fluorides as a "water pollutant," and shortly 
afterward, the revived media interest was followed by a rise in public opposition as 
indicated by opinion polls in the early 1970s. These fluctuations in the media coverage of 
disputes over the fluoridation of water convincingly support the hypothesis for 
correlation between media framing of certain issues and public opposition to 
controversial technology. Mazur ( 1981) also traces similar correspondence between 
increased media coverage of citizens' activism against nuclear power facilities in 1969 
and the subsequent peak of public opposition against nuclear power in the 1970. 
The content analysis of media coverage of the cloning controversy in the UK 
conducted by Holliman (2004) also highlights the key role of mass media in raising 
awareness of scientific and biomedical issues and their ability to define the terms for 
public debate. His study focused on print and TV news coverage of cloning experiments 
over a two-year period, from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1997, which followed the 
announcement by scientists from Roslin Institute in Scotland about the successful cloning 
of Dolly the sheep (a Finn Dorset sheep) by means of somatic cell nuclear replacement. 
Holliman's (2004) analysis of the media reporting on the issue focused on eight UK 
national daily newspapers and their Sunday equivalents. These included: four broadsheets 
(Daily Telegraph, The Times, Guardian, Independent), two mid-market tabloids (Daily 
Mail, Daily Express), and two tabloids (Sun, Daily Mirror). This representative media 
sample was extended to late evening news coverage of cloning experiments and ethical 
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debates on the issue from the four UK terrestrial television channels that were 
broadcasting throughout the two-year period covered by the study. The newspaper and 
television sample covered 300 items, 284 of which were newspaper articles, and 16 
represented television news bulletins. The results showed that media coverage during the 
sample period was initially limited to reporting the scientific announcement of Dolly's 
birth. As public discussions gradually shifted towards political and ethical issues arising 
from the cloning technology, media reports on the scientific experiments were replaced 
by a focus on the societal implications of cloning and featured commentaries and 
opinions by prominent politicians, religious leaders, and scientists. Holliman (2004) 
points out that although the media were not consistent in their evaluations of the 
mammalian cloning experiments as ethically acceptable, dangerous or desirable, they 
routinely framed the issue in terms of dystopian, science fiction visions, such as Aldous 
Huxley's novel Brave New World, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, and the film The Boys 
from Brazil. Media reports also made numerous references to historical links between 
eugenics, the political extremism of the 1930s, and the potential of cloning technologies 
to reproduce dictators. By drawing on these cultural references, media representations 
and frames greatly contributed to placing cloning in a negative light in the public eye 
during the time period analyzed in the study. 
Besides the systematic analysis of media content, Holliman (2004) also conducted 
production analysis to examine the role of media professionals and the Roslin Institute in 
producing media coverage, as well as reception analysis (focus group interviews) to 
investigate audience beliefs, attitudes and behavior. This approach is informed by "the 
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circuit of mass communication" theoretical perspective, which challenges essentialist 
views of production and interpretation of media content and moves away from a linear 
towards circular model of mass communication. Within this methodological framework, 
the three elements in the process of mass communication (production, content, and 
reception) are perceived as interconnected, while mass communication is analyzed as a 
dynamic system that involves four sets of actors (the public, media, social and political 
institutions, and decision makers) whose interactions influence media coverage in a 
variety of ways. For example, the analysis of news production conducted by Holliman 
(2004) clearly illustrated that a range of actors aided media professionals in developing 
the media template for reporting the ethical controversy created by mammalian cloning. 
Although media professionals traditionally rely on the scientific community as a major 
source of science news, media coverage on the issue of cloning was also generated by 
other actors, such as politicians and officials, other professionals and experts, and 
activists, and the news value associated with "Dolly the sheep" was renegotiated in 
response to the developing societal debate. 
Furthermore, the reception analysis aimed to test the impact of media coverage on 
the public attitudes and perceptions of cloning. The study involved twenty-one 
respondents, categorized as "scientists" and "non-scientists," who completed bulletins 
about their recollection of the media coverage of the cloning controversy and were asked 
to share their views regarding cloning. The results revealed that respondents in both 
categories tended to use references and phrases similar to those that had appeared in the 
media coverage of the ethical and political debate. Both scientists and non-scientists 
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associated the topic of cloning primarily with "Dolly the sheep" and discussed it within 
political and ethical contexts of human cloning, thus reproducing the media template for 
reporting this scientific development. In conclusion, Holliman (2004) states that although 
it is unclear whether the respondents' opinions on cloning were exclusively shaped by the 
media coverage, its significance cannot be ruled out given the similarities between the 
interviewees' frames of reference and the content of media reports. 
Like the two case studies of media coverage discussed above, Pellechia' s (1997) 
longitudinal content analysis of science articles in three major daily U.S. newspapers-· 
The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, and The Washington Post, highlights the 
impact of print news media in shaping the public knowledge on controversial scientific 
developments. Her study covered three different time periods-from 1966 to 1970, from 
1976 to 1980, and from 1986 to 1990, and aimed to investigate trends in science news 
reporting that have occurred over three decades. During that time period, newspapers 
have become a major source of science news and journalistic accounts of science have 
helped laypeople develop practical scientific literacy. The longitudinal analysis of articles 
in three major daily newspapers revealed that "newspaper coverage of science over the 
last three decades did not differ substantially in terms of the range of topics covered, as 
well as information that has been both included and omitted from science news accounts" 
(Pellechia, 1997, p. 59). Although newspapers had provided an important forum for 
communicating factual scientific information to the public, there was also ample evidence 
indicating their failure to cover scientific controversies in an accurate and non-biased 
manner. Moreover, the content analysis showed that articles in all three newspapers over 
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all time periods results had reported primarily on the findings of scientific research and 
had frequently omitted both "contextual factors and methodological details" (Pellechia, 
1997, p. 61 ). The study concluded that the lack of rigorous and comprehensive reporting 
on the process of scientific research had greatly contributed to the low levels of scientific 
literacy and had subsequently hindered informed and intelligent participation in science 
policy issues. Therefore, a more contextual approach to science communication would 
better foster meaningful dialogue between policymakers, scientists, and the general 
public. 
Recent research on media coverage of new developments in biotechnology, 
biomedicine and the biosciences has clearly shown the ability of news media to frame 
controversial science and influence, albeit indirectly, public attitudes and perceptions 
(Kitzinger & Williams, 2005; Marks et al, 2007; Haran & Kitzinger, 2009). The research 
has also indicated that risk communication to the general public has become a major issue 
in these fast-changing scientific fields. Over the last decade, applications of 
biotechnology in agriculture and medicine have received significant public attention and 
extensive media coverage. The news media have played an important part in swaying 
public opinion in favor or against different types of research and technologies in the field. 
A cross-national study of mass media coverage in the United States and the United 
Kingdom by Marks et al (2007) analyzed and compared media framing of risks and 
benefits of two sets of biotechnology applications, medical and agricultural, over a twelve 
year period, between 1989 and 2001. The researchers specifically analyzed whether the 
media have tended to emphasize potential risks over the societal benefits of these 
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technologies or vice versa. They also looked at how the media framing affected public 
attitudes towards the two sets of technologies in both nations. The content analysis of 
media coverage included three major newspapers-The London Times, The Sunday 
Times, and The Washington Post. The search generated 750 articles related to biomedical 
technologies such as human cloning, gene therapy, and xenotransplantation, and 1,251 
articles relating to agro-biotechnology coverage, with a focus on issues related to food 
and environmental safety. Although both types of applications relied on the same genetic 
engineering techniques, media narratives presented different assessments of potential 
societal, heath, and environmental benefits and risks. The longitudinal study of framing 
effects indicated that both the US and UK news media had consistently framed medical 
applications in a positive light, highlighting the benefits of these technologies to 
individuals and society as a whole. At the same time, newspaper articles about 
agricultural applications over the twelve-year period had continuously emphasized the 
perceived health and environmental risks associated with biotechnology (e.g., value, 
nutrition, safety and labeling of biotech foods, public safety, and regulatory input). The 
research data on the benefits-risks ratio was compared to results from national public 
opinion surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer from 1991 to 2002 and International 
Food Information Council in the United States. Correlations were thus established 
between the media reports and the general public's perception of the two sets of 
technology: positive for medical applications and more negative (or ambivalent) for 
agricultural biotechnology. Although these correlations do not necessarily imply 
causality, the findings have led the researchers to believe that media framing of 
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biotechnology had contributed to the formation of public opinion and perception during 
the period analyzed. 
The final argument I consider in this chapter's literature review section concerns 
the key role of media organizations and media professionals, such as journalists, 
producers and editors, in the making of modem science. In an article exploring media 
responses to the high profile case of the South Korean stem cell scientist, Dr. Hwang 
Woo Suk, Haran and Kitzinger (2009) have suggested that the news media serve not just 
as a communicator of experts' opinions, but also have the ability to endorse or disallow 
scientific knowledge claims. The scientific breakthroughs in stern cell research and 
human cloning announced by Hwang and his team were initially embraced by both the 
scientific community and the media. These discoveries received significant media 
attention in South Korea and globally in 2004 and 2005, but were subsequently 
discredited as fraudulent in scientific publications and media reports in late 2005 and 
2006. Haran and Kitzinger (2009) have also examined the rhetorical techniques employed 
by both the scientific establishment and news media to endorse, and later on repudiate, 
the work of Hwang. Their analysis utilizes the notion of scientific knowledge as produced 
through a regulated system of "witnessing," which has become central to the 
experimental contexts of early scientific discourse. This conceptual framework is greatly 
influenced by critiques of the realist epistemological paradigm in science, which has 
continuously constructed the modest scientific witness as a disembodied and disinterested 
observer (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Haraway, 1997). In particular, the work of the 
feminist critic of science, Donna Haraway, was influential in deconstructing traditional 
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notions of scientific practice as the pursuit of a disembodied, inviolable and neutral 
objectivity. Haraway (1997) questions the seminal figure of the modest witness in science 
by illustrating how women and others with dependent and embodied status had 
historically been excluded as modest witnesses or legitimate knowers. Rather, the forging 
of the modem witness through scientific discourse has facilitated efforts by men in the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries to rewrite masculinity in order to protect science 
from feminization. Furthermore, Haraway (1997) argues that the presumed modesty in 
observing scientific phenomena have enabled scientists to uphold illusory visions of a 
disembodied science and conventional assumptions about scientific discourse as a single, 
objective and truthful representation of reality. 
In order to illustrate the involvement of mass media in the process of scientific 
discovery and their role as privileged witnesses, Haran and Kitzinger (2009) employ "the 
modest witness figure as a heuristic lens through which to view the representation of 
Hwang as the principal actor in this drama, using it to trace implicit assumptions in 
contemporary representations of "good" scientists and their practices" (p. 635). The focus 
of their analysis, however, shifts from the centrality of scientific experts in the public 
communication of science towards the rhetorical work embedded in the communication 
processes and different communication contexts in which scientific knowledge is 
presented (e.g., mass media accounts, reports in scientific journals, grant proposals, 
policy documents, etc.). This conceptual framework of a rather broad spectrum of science 
communication deconstructs the strict boundary between genuine scientific knowledge 
and popular representations and can help develop a more nuanced understanding of how 
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literary and visual mediation shape the production of scientific knowledge in the public 
domain. It is also important to acknowledge the socio-political context of the stem cell 
research landscape which facilitated reception and interest in the work of the South 
Korean scientist by the research community and the general public. Hwang's discoveries 
took place at a time when the potential of the field was still questioned and results were 
much anticipated by both stem cell researchers and advocates of embryo research. The 
breakthroughs thus provided a golden opportunity for supporters of embryonic stem cell 
research to enlist continuous public support and financial investment. Subsequently, 
Hwang's announcement that his team had cloned the world's first human embryonic stem 
cell line was initially validated by the scientific establishment by being published in a 
prestigious peer-reviewed journal such as Science. His breakthroughs were also 
categorized as remarkable by the same publication and leading stem cell experts. 
Haran and Kitzinger (2009) have traced shifts in rhetoric in media reports, 
coverage of events in the leading journals Science and Nature (2004-2006), and press 
releases from relevant UK and US government or science bodies to illustrate how 
representations of the Hwang case mutated from a story about genuine scientific 
breakthroughs to a scandal about fraud. Both the scientific establishment and news media 
clearly endorsed Hwang's work as a genuine scientific achievement in the period 
between early 2004 and late 2005. The authors have observed the deployment of the 
following rhetorical techniques to validate the breakthroughs: 1) "explicit assertions of 
Hwang's status as a bona fide scientist"; 2) "a range of declarations about the virtual 
witnessing of his work"; 3) "an emphasis on his international renown and 
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collaborations"; and 4) "a body language of representation designed to invoke 
confidence" (p. 640). After the scandal occurred in late 2005, the coverage quickly 
changed to stories emphasizing the Korean scientist and his research as inauthentic. 
While the initial representations showed Hwang as a genuine and humble scientist, who 
performed well the role of "modest witness," news reports after the exposure seemed to 
highlight his media profile, arrogance and delusions of grandeur. The most common 
rhetorical strategies, which enabled the news media to recast Hwang, included: 1) 
"reframing his claims as immodest and grandiose"; 2) "expelling Hwang from the 
community of modest witnesses"; 3) "orientalizing him and South Korea"; 4) "focusing 
in on his celebrity/"rock star" reputation"; and 5) "metaphorically repositioning his 
trajectory into the fictional genre" (Haran & Kitzinger, 2009, p. 643). The change in 
rhetoric was accompanied by a retrospective acknowledgement of the role of scientists 
and journalists in the mediation of events which was missing in the initial coverage. 
Nonetheless, the recasting of Hwang re-assigned the problem to the world of celebrity 
scientists and fictional genres and narratives, thus taking the responsibility away from 
news reporting and traditional science-media relations. As Haran and Kitzinger (2009) 
have indicated, during the scandal "attention was drawn to Hwang's courtship of the 
media [and] accounts of the original breakthrough press conferences were rewritten to 
highlight Hwang's celebrity-like behavior" (p. 645). Both scientists and journalists, 
however, were more interested in re-establishing their own position as truth tellers, rather 
than acknowledging the interdependency between science and media. Ultimately, the 
media coverage of the Hwang case has demonstrated the ways in which the media 
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becomes implicated in fabricating scientific truth and falsehood, as well as how 
"scientists and science journalists routinely disavow the media's intimate involvement in 
the making of "true science," but retrospectively scapegoat the media in the fabrication of 
"false science" (Haran & Kitzinger, 2009, .p. 650). 
The review of scholarly analyses presented above convincingly supports the 
argument about the key role of mass media in the public communication of scientific 
controversies. In the following pages, I will explore specific frames utilized by print and 
news media in the US and the EU to report the stem cell debate. I aim to highlight how 
news reporting has contributed to setting the agenda for public debate and has influenced 
public responses to the ethical and societal challenges presented by the stem cell 
technologies. 
Media Framing of the Stem Cell Debate 
Frames are routinely used in news reporting to call attention to some aspects of 
reality while obscuring other elements. The concept of "framing" emphasizes that the 
presentation of specific topics, facts, controversies, actors, and assertions is always 
selective. Entman ( 1993) points out that "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text~ in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation" (p. 52). While rhetorical strategies and framing devices used by 
writers, editors, and journalists can provide a context to understand issues, they may also 
significantly influence the audiences' perceptions and limit the range of interpretations on 
the issues at stake. In their analysis of the U.S. press coverage of the early stem cell 
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debate, Nisbet et al. (2003) have indicated this ability of the news media to shape public 
opinions on a wide array of subjects by "framing" a discussion in a manner that garners 
the greatest amount of public support. They have also argued that, once an issue has been 
framed by the media in a particular light, public perception tends to remain stable over 
time. A common framing device for capturing the attention of the public is presenting 
news in dramatic storyline types of narratives. Media organizations often dramatize news 
to increase their audience share. This way of coverage usually receives the greatest 
amount of public interest, although the dramatization of events can potentially tum the 
audience's attention away from more complex and contextual information on the issue 
which enables people to make informed opinions (Nisbet at al., 2003). Similarly, 
Friedman et al. ( 1999) have shown that most scientific news reports are routinely framed 
through the use of images, concepts and vocabulary that would make the information 
"interesting, relevant and comprehensible for audiences" (p. 52). 
Media coverage of the stem cell controversy is no exception to the tendency of 
using frames and dramatic storytelling to communicate science to the general public. 
Both sides in the controversy have used dramatic narratives to frame the issue according 
to their desirable policy outcomes and in ways that would help them gamer the necessary 
public support. Nisbet et al. (2003) have indicated that opponents of hESC research in the 
U.S. have relied on media coverage to emphasize the ethically controversial nature of this 
biomedical innovation. Their descriptions of ethical implications heavily relied on 
arguments about "playing God," references to Dr. Frankenstein, Faustian bargains, and 
the Nazi human experimentations, as well as "adjectives such as evil, murderous, or 
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gruesome" (Nisbet et al., 2003, p. 44). By contrast, stem cell research activists have 
striven to portray their opponents as religious fanatics with backward, unjustified beliefs 
that were generally opposed to scientific progress. As Nisbet et al. (2003) have argued, 
"if on one side of the debate was the image of a mad scientist experimenting on human 
embryos, on the other side was the notion of a religious zealot impeding scientific and 
social progress" (p. 44). These dramatic representations have contributed to pushing stem 
cell research to the top of the U.S. media agenda. 
Framing the stem cell controversy in terms of binary oppositions and through 
dramatic narratives was by no means limited to the press and TV news coverage. Public 
and policy debates on hESC research in America have similarly focused on dramatic 
representations, emphasizing the assumed conflict and polarization between science and 
morality. The terminology, utilized by bioethicists, scientists, politicians, and advocacy 
groups in deliberations over the ethical and policy issues arising from stem cell 
technology, reflects such divisions. On the one hand, opponents have often intended to 
provoke strong emotional reactions in the public by using emotionally-laden words such 
as "embryonic human life," "embryo-killing research," "stem cells obtained by killing 
human embryos," "brave new babies," and "the unprotected subjects of biomedical 
research." On the other hand, stem cell research advocates have frequently tended to 
avoid difficult ethical questions by adopting a rather neutral scientific and technical 
jargon and using phrases such as "blastocyst," "pluripotent stem cell research," "stem 
cells derived from the inner mass of blastocyst." Moreover, as Kitzinger and Williams 
(2005) have indicated in their analysis of the UK media coverage of the stem cell debate, 
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stem cell advocates consistently used the terms "pre-embryo" and "blastocyst," rather 
than human embryo, thus questioning the human status of pre-implantation embryos used 
in stem cell research. Maienschein (2003b) has suggested that a public consensus on how 
to regulate and fund regenerative medicine in the US was hindered by this representation 
of scientific knowledge and ethics as a strict binary opposition. She has. also argued that 
policy decisions regarding stem cell research should be based on "the best available 
current science and the best moral thinking-and in the knowledge that science and 
morality are not intrinsically at odds" (2003b, p. 301 ). 
This high level of dramatization in media coverage, which was accompanied by 
an extreme polarization of public opinion over the morality of hESC research, was not a 
singular characteristic of American public discourse. Similar trends in media 
representation and public opinion were observed in most EU member states which had 
held parliamentary and public debates over the regulation and funding of stem cell 
research and regenerative medicine. A number of scholars have suggested that news 
coverage in both US and EU contexts simply mirrored the nature of the debate as it had 
unfolded in legislative and public forums (Nisbet et al., 2003; Nisbet, 2004a; Nisbet, 
2004b; Kitzinger & Williams, 2005; Shepherd et al., 2007). For instance, Nisbet (2004a) 
has shown that media coverage on the issue of stem cell research in the U.S. until 1998 
had focused exclusively on new scientific discoveries and background information. It was 
only after the summer of 200 l, when the federal ban on funding for newly created hESC 
was announced, that moral and strategic framing replaced the previous reporting in 
scientific and technical frames, and agenda-building activities significantly increased. 
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Moreover, the topic of stem cell research did not receive any substantial media attention 
prior to entering the overtly political arenas of the U.S. Congress and the White House, 
which are more open to a greater diversity of interest group inv,olvement. Debates within 
these forums draw the attention of the general public and are often resolved by appeal to 
morality, rather than instrumental or rational values. Nisbet et al. (2003) have claimed 
that the close attention given to the stem cell controversy within the overtly political 
arenas of policy making over an extended period of time has contributed to maximizing 
its potential to be framed in dramatic terms. This explains why stem cell research ranked 
so high on the overall media agenda and received unprecedented coverage when 
compared to any other controversial development in biotechnology. Deliberations over 
biomedical research protocols in the U.S. have traditionally been contained within the 
administrative policy arena, i.e. NIH, DHHS, and FDA, where the policies are decided by 
scientific and technical experts, often without input from interest groups and the general 
public. The stem cell controversy constituted an exception from this tradition of insular 
decision making on techno-scientific issues. 
Similarly, Kitzinger and Williams (2005) have argued that the UK media 
discourse addressing stem cell research had simply reflected the nature of the debate as it 
had been presented in the parliamentary arena and the lobbying process. Rather than 
being critical of the major terms in which the debate had been framed, journalists 
presented the controversy as a strict binary opposition with little room for cautious 
optimism. Their analysis covered the period between 2000 and 2001, when the so-called 
"Donaldson report" on the issue of hESC research received significant public attention 
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and became the subject of increased press and TV coverage in the United Kingdom. The 
report "Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility" was released in the 
summer of 2000 and included recommendations on stem cell research policy by an expert 
group, which was led by the chief medical officer, Liam Donaldson. These policy 
recommendations provided the basis for the HFEA (Research Purposes) Regulations of 
2001 and were passed by the House of Commons on December 19 that same year. The 
UK Parliamentary vote in favor of hESC research, however, became the subject of 
intense debates not only in the country but also in the EU and received strong criticism by 
the German government and press (Kitzinger & Williams, 2005). On December 21, the 
Daily Mail published a press release by their foreign service in Berlin which included a 
statement by the German Chancellor that the German scientific community was opposed 
to ending the ban on experiments with embryonic stem cells prior to exploring the full 
potential of adult stem cells. Drawing on the sociology of expectations, Kitzinger and 
Williams (2005) highlight and contextualize the different rhetorical techniques used by 
proponents and opponents of hESC to speculate about potential societal risks and benefits 
in the future. They claim that, although two competing visions about the future of stem 
cell research have informed the public discourse in UK, the media has validated utopian 
hopes as more credible than dystopian fears about the societal impact of biotechnology. 
On the one hand, supporters emphasized the potential of regenerative medicine to free the 
world from sickness and disease and presented this biomedical innovation as "the start of 
a medical revolution," "the dawn of a new frontier," and the "key to unlocking a new 
chapter in medicine" (Kitzinger & Williams, 2005, p. 125). On the other hand, opponents 
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of the Donaldson's report claimed that support for embryo research would only set 
dangerous precedents for demeaning human life and for reproductive cloning. Embryonic 
stem cell research was subsequently characterized as "a huge leap in the wrong direction 
for mankind" and "a dangerous and slippery path" which will "open the floodgates" 
(Kitzinger & Williams, 2005, p. 125). While the opponents consistently referred to the 
technology of cell nuclear replacement (CNR) as "human cloning" in order to invoke 
visions of full reproductive cloning in relation to stem cell research, supporters were keen 
on using the term "therapeutic cloning," which emphasized the potential clinical benefits. 
Furthermore, supporters also avoided references to CNR as "experimental medical 
research" since it did not carry the same positive connotations (Kitzinger & Williams, 
2005). 
In both UK and US stem cell debates, traditional ways of claiming legitimacy 
were combined with more emotive discourses about social and family networks, as well 
as calls for compassion for the people suffering from degenerative diseases. It was by no 
means surprising that the bulk of media and public discussions revolved around key 
terms such as hope and potential, and that the human embryo was re-inscribed in the stem 
cell debate not as an entity of its own right, but rather as "a beacon of hope for the sick" 
(Kitzinger & Williams, 2005, p. 30). The concept of hope also became central to efforts 
by stem cell proponents to validate scientific claims and mandate action. As Franklin 
(2008) has indicated, the post-IVF reproductive "revolution" has not only constructed the 
interior of the stem cell as the new frontier of scientific explora~ion, but has also led to 
"an emergent, and more collectivized, form of 'reproductive hope' directed at finding 
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cures for disease by harnessing the special reproductive power of embryonic cells" (p. 
13). Developing treatments for degenerative conditions has thus become a primary target 
of the "hope economy" (Franklin, 2003). This new hope economy has thrived on media 
representations of personalized accounts of patients. This tendency was explicit in the 
UK public discourse around the time of the Donaldson report, when supporters have 
heavily relied on such narratives to emphasize that the potential benefits of hESC for 
socially embedded "real" people vis-a-vis the ethical defenses of "abstract" embryos 
raised by their opponents (Kitzinger & Williams, 2005). The notion of stem cell research 
offering "real hope" has also become a key rhetorical strategy in American public 
discourse. Life is for the Living (2008), an award-winning documentary film about stem 
cell research, is a good example of media narratives shifting the focus away from the 
embryo's moral status by highlighting the patients' voices as central in the ethical debate. 
The storyline of the movie focuses on the personal stories of five American families, 
whose daily experiences are deeply affected by degenerative conditions such as juvenile 
diabetes, Parkinson's, and spinal cord injuries. The national debate on hESC research is 
deconstructed through the lens of three generations and their testimonies of personal 
suffering, frustration with President Bush's restrictive federal policy, and expectations 
that more funding for embryonic research will result in groundbreaking treatments for 
these fatal medical conditions. The film includes an introduction by the CBS newsman 
Mike Wallace, as well as interviews with leading stem cell researchers, political leaders, 
and advocates, emphasizing the "real" hope for curing disease brought by stem cell 
research. 
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In order to construct the "right" point of view, media accounts in the UK have 
tended to depict the stem cell controversy as a conflict between rationality and emotion, 
where factual evidence presented by scientists stands at odds with fictional 
representations utilized by opponents of embryo research (Kitzinger & Williams, 2005). 
Journalistic accounts in the U.S. have similarly framed the issue as a conflict arising from 
the inevitable clash between modem science and religious dogma. As Nancy Gibbs 
points out in her article in Time Magazine, "Stem cell research has joined global warming 
and evolution science as fields in which the very facts are put to a vote, a public spectacle 
in which data wrestles dogma" (2006, p. 28). In order to legitimize the pro-stem cell 
position, journalists have not hesitated to characterize stem cell research_, as "frontier 
science" (Gibbs, 2006). They have also implicitly supported efforts by proponents to 
monopolize rationality, realism and expertise by discrediting their opponents as 
backwards and even Luddites. As Kitzinger and Williams (2005) have argued, in the UK 
explicit references to science fiction were hardly used by critics of hESC research, 
however, Donaldson supporters have attributed such claims to their opponents in order to 
discredit their position. Furthermore, media coverage in both countries has emphasized 
the unity within the scientific community regarding the greater clinical potential of 
embryonic vis-a-vis adult stem cells and the need to aggressively pursue both alternatives 
in order to develop new therapeutic solutions for degenerative conditions. 
In Italy, however, the media have succeeded in presenting the scientific 
community as equally divided on the question of whether adult stem cells hold the same 
potential for regenerative medicine as their embryonic counterparts (Cattaneo, 2008; 
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Gorbellini, 2006). The country held a referendum in 2005 to repeal a rather conservative 
law on assisted reproductive technologies and regenerative medicine (Law 40, February 
19, 2004) which aimed to limit access of infertile couples to in-vitro fertilization 
procedures and outlawed procedures such as oocyte and sperm donation, 
cryopreservation of embryos, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), as well as 
human embryo research. Although most Italians who went to vote supported the 
repealing of the law and the legalization of research on embryonic stem cells, the 
referendum was eventually invalidated since the voters' turnout was well below the 51 % 
quorum required by the Italian constitution. The low turnout seems surprising when 
compared to the results of a 2006 Eurobarometer survey which showed that over 60% of 
Italians approve research on embryonic stem cells (Cattaneo, 2008). Advocates for 
embryonic stem cell research in Italy have largely blamed this failure on the media's 
complicity with efforts by the Catholic political milieu to misrepresent, similarly to the 
Bush administration in the U.S., the therapeutic superiority of stem cells derived from 
embryonic sources and convince the public that there was a widespread dissent within the 
scientific community on the issue (Massarenti, 2008). Political commentators have also 
explained the failure of the referendum with a current standstill or even a reversal of the 
process of secularization in Italy, which is presently one of the most religious EU 
member states (with only 6% atheists), and its political elites continue to maintain close 
ties with the Catholic Church hierarchies (Gorbellini, 2006). It is important to note that 
these analyses of the socio-political context for assisted reproductive technologies in Italy 
implicitly support the argument that media representations of the stem cell controversy in 
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most EU countries have often failed to deconstruct the dominant terms of stem cell 
debates held in legislative and public forums. 
Moreover, the cross-cultural analysis of metaphoric schematization of embryonic 
stem cell research in France and Poland, conducted by Doring and Zinken (2009), 
indicated that fundamental differences in socio-cultural contexts and regulatory 
approaches do not necessarily translate into divergent metaphorical imageries and 
discursive repertoires used to conceptualize the controversy. Their analysis included 
articles published in the major newspapers of France and Poland, Le Monde and Gazeta 
Wyborcza, during the years 1998-2000, and aimed to assess whether the press coverage 
of the issue relied on cross-culturally shared or culture-specific networks of metaphors. In 
addition, the authors looked at how the initial schematization of stem cell research has 
contributed to shaping either convergent or divergent stem cell discourses. Although it 
was initially expected that the coverage on the issue would reflect the cultural differences 
between the two countries, particularly with regard to the role of religious values in 
public debates, the analysis showed surprising similarity in metaphorical frameworks for 
hESC research that had been utilized by the Polish and French media. Doring and Zinken 
(2009) have pointed out that both national discourses reflected a salient rational 
perspective on the potential of stem cell research to develop innovative treatments for 
degenerative diseases, which "underlines the potential of SCR of increasing human 
agency in addressing the 'limited durability' of the human body" (p. 27). When 
differences between the Polish and French discourses could be be detected, they seemed 
to be the result of contextual dissimilarities, such as the reliance of French news coverage 
149 
on a previously established bioethical tradition which had been largely shaped by the 
rationalism of the 18th century Enlightenment thought vis-a-vis the more emotive frames 
of reference (i.e., references to mad scientists and Frankensteinian monsters), which 
characterized the early coverage in the Gazeta Wyborcza. Therefore, Doring and Zinken 
(2009) have concluded that there were commonalities across languages in the discursive 
matrices and metaphorical networks shaping hESC research in the EU, and that 
differences could be explained "not in the sense of national cultures, but rather of 'ethical 
cultures' based in ideologically defined groups" (p. 27). 
Science, Mass Media and the Public Sphere 
In Wes tern democracies, interests groups, advocacy organizations and social 
movements are agents of political communication and social change and social advocacy 
nowadays constitutes an essential component of democracy and civil society. As 
Rawnsley (2005) points out, developing good relationships with the media is very 
important for these groups, and therefore, many have professionalized their efforts to 
generate publicity by producing their own videos and distributing them to news 
organizations. Groups that are outsiders to the policy making and legislative process are 
dependent on the news media to appeal to public opinion and influence the policymaking 
communities. Nowadays most interest groups use the services of lobbying consultants in 
order to professionalize their PR and media campaigns. Rawnsley (2005) argues that 
professional lobbying is generally an American phenomenon, with over 16,000 lobbyists 
currently registered with Congress, compared to less than 200 in 1945. The major reasons 
for lobbyists being particularly effective in Washington are "the weak party structure of 
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the American political system, the divisions between legislative and executive, the strong 
committee system within Congress, the federal system of political organization, and the 
importance of financial contributions to Political Action Committees (PAC)" (Rawnsley, 
2005, p. 107). The direct impact of lobbyists and interest groups on individual politicians, 
however, is significantly minimized in Britain, where there is stronger party structure and 
discipline, and the executive operates from within the UK Parliament (Rawnsley, 2005). 
In his book Endless Propaganda: The Advertising of Public Goods, Rutherford 
(2000) has argued that civic advocacy, and most specifically, its television version, has 
presently become the most prominent example of propaganda practices in the affluent 
countries. The increasing marketing of 'public goods' as commodities in America and 
elsewhere undermines the rational-critical discourse of the public sphere and transforms 
contemporary mass democracies into "marketplaces of democracy." As Rutherford 
(2000) has characterized this novel type of propaganda, 
Since 1965, this type of adverting has become, increasingly and ordinarily, the 
chief mode of propaganda throughout the affluent world. The barrage of 
propaganda encompasses many different types: PSAs [public service 
1 
announcements], government ads, charity appeals, corporate image campaigns, 
issue advertising, many religious messages, social ads, political spots, counter-
ads, and cause-related publicity. Its chief sponsors are the state, the corporations, 
and voluntary associations, variously known as non-profits or non-governmental 
organizations, although in theory anyone with sufficient money-such as a Ross 
Perot-can publish or air advocacy, always assuming the compliance of the 
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media. At the bottom, the prominence of civic advocacy reflects one of the 
attributes of postmodern culture: the ubiquity of publicity. (pp. 8-9) 
The rise and further expansion of civic advocacy in the domain of political and public 
communication is considered to be essentially a postmodern phenomenon, associated 
with the "market revival" of America and the general growth in advertising expenditure 
in the aftermath of the World War II years (Rutherford, 2000). This type of political 
marketing has invaded the public sphere of the affluent countries and is currently 
instrumental in shaping our individual and collective identities. Propaganda is a term that 
does not lend itself to easy definition, as there is a whole range of cognate terms 
commonly used as substitutes, i.e. manipulative publicity, mass persuasion, public 
opinion management, etc. It is is a totalizing and essentially contested concept that has 
often been conflated with other forms of mass persuasion such as advertising and public 
relations, with which it shares common techniques. For instance, Pratkanis and Aronson 
(1991) have employed the term in a general sense to describe "the mass persuasion 
techniques that have come to characterize our postindustrial society" (p. 9), thus 
overlooking its complex political implications. By contrast, Rutherford (2000) argues that 
what makes communication different from other types of publicity is its overt political 
nature; advertising as propaganda is "both the language and the instrument of power" and 
"constitutes an intentional and sponsored message, a deliberate kind of 'symbolic 
practice' that seeks to persuade the body politic, or some significant constituency within 
the public sphere" (p. 9). Moreover, it seeks to change peoples' attitudes and behavior, 
but also to construct a model person. The effects of propaganda extend beyond setting the 
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agenda for public debate, and can also "prime discussion (determine what criteria are 
used to assess a person or issue), excite controversy (where news outlets take different 
stands), or generate support (where the media elaborate its message)," with the final 
outcome being "productive-of comment, argument, and discourse" (Rutherford, 2000, p. 
268). 
It is important to consider whether the marketing of public goods could contribute 
to promoting the public good, rather than just being a new brand of propaganda that 
effectively manipulates the public by "attaching" social and moral values to issues that 
serve private group interests. While some believe that civic advocacy advertising can 
bring numerous societal benefits, i.e., a drug-free society, social justice and equality, 
peace and prosperity, clean environment, better public health, safe neighborhoods, etc., 
there are also concerns that, similar to other types of promotional and public relations 
activities, it can deceptively manipulate individuals, control public opinion, and even 
stifle a rational critical public debate. In this sense, civic advocacy as propaganda falls 
into the category of "manipulative publicity" which Habermas (1991a) has critically 
discussed in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (first published 
in 1962). He has argued that the misuse of publicity undermines the bourgeois public 
sphere in its "pristine form" of rational-critical discourse. Furthermore, it transforms 
politics into a theatrical performance where "even arguments are transmitted into 
symbols to which again one cannot respond by arguing but only by identifying with 
themselves" (Habermas, 1991a, p. 206). In a "mass-media dominated public sphere," 
political marketing sets the public agenda, determines views, favors a "staged display," 
153 
and conveys "authorized opinions" in order to "display external unity" of political parties 
and organizations (Habermas, 199la, p. 205, 216). In his 1973 essay on the public 
sphere, Habermas ( 1991 b) has claimed that the weakening of the public sphere is in 
principle opposed by "a welfare-state transformation of the functioning of basic rights: 
the requirement of publicness is extended from the organs of the state to all organizations 
acting in a state-related fashion" (p. 404). He has suggested that the extension of this 
mandate for publicity preserves the continuity with the liberal constitutional state and 
determines to a great extent whether the public sphere of civil society would be 
dominated by a public of organized private people or a public of private people dealing 
with each other individually. Under the existing conditions of a state committed to social 
rights, civic organizations can only participate effectively in a process of public 
communication on the basis of publicness enforced for the dealings of the organizations 
with the state and with one another. In Structural Transformation, Habermas (199la) has 
indicated two competing tendencies in the transition from the liberal constitutional state 
to the social-welfare state-a "critical process of public communication through the very 
organizations which mediatize it" which counters "publicity merely staged for 
manipulative ends" (p. 232). While I will discuss the concept of the public sphere in 
greater detail in the next chapter, it is important to highlight this distinction when 
addressing the issue of how competing discourses on the societal implications of hESC 
research should be treated by the mass media. 
The question of whether the marketing of public goods is further contributing to 
the transformation the public sphere into a mere "platform for advertising" or, rather, 
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institutes a rational-critical public debate over issues of common concern is particularly 
relevant to the stem cell controversy since social advocacy has largely shaped media 
debates and influenced discussions in other public forums. As I have illustrated in the 
previous section, media coverage in both US and EU contexts has emphasized the 
perceived benefits of stem cell research, with a new economy of hope emerging around 
expectations that human embryonic stem cells constitute a tool that will unravel the 
mechanisms of disease and enable the development of novel treatments for degenerative 
conditions. In this sense, hESC research has been embraced and imagined by social 
groups (e.g. scientific organizations, patient associations, stem cell research coalitions, 
etc.) as a pure public good. By contrast, opponents of embryo research have contested 
and deconstructed contingencies and futures envisioned for regenerative medicine. Anti-
stem cell advocacy has largely focused on the marketing of social risks associated with 
the emancipation of hESC research from moral and ethical constraints. Rhetorical 
strategies have significantly varied: from "slippery slope" arguments to warnings about 
the fallacy of scientism (e.g. the notion that science is a law in itself and the search for 
scientific truth is a pure public good), from critiques of the "liberal culture of death" to 
claims about embryo research as way to legitimize abortion as a public good. A good 
example of "re-branding" hESC research as abortion is a statement by Scott Klusendorf, 
Bio-Ethics Director of Stand to Reason, an American organization which trains Christian 
ambassadors for public activism in the US, Canada and globally: 
There is evidence that ESCR (and fetal tissue harvesting in general) could 
enhance abortion's image as a moral good. At a minimum, it will convince some 
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women that killing their unborn offspring redeems a desperate situation. While 
ESCR may not dramatically increase ab01iion rates among women not inclined to 
abort (pro-life advocates must be careful to not overstate their case here), it could 
influence those who are undecided. Research shows tremendous ambivalence 
among women facing crisis pregnancy, with many suffering intense anxiety in the 
24 hours before the abortion. The prospect of "redeeming the abortion" to provide 
tissue for someone else throws a powerful motivation into a psychologically 
complex situation. (Klusendorf, 2008, ~14) 
Attempts on both sides to make and re-make the facts surrounding stem ceJl research 
have relied on the complicity of mass media in order to set the stage for public debate and 
participation and influence decision-making outcomes. 
In the field of science communication, the mass media have been increasingly 
viewed as a key factor for the legitimation of science due to their ability to facilitate and 
institutionalize communicative interactions between members of the public, scientific 
community, policymakers, interests groups, and other social actors. In their comparative 
analysis of genome sequencing in German and US media between 1999 and 2001, 
Gerhards and Schafer (2009) have identified two normative models in the scholarly 
literature that are used to conceptualize the role of science in public discourse: the 
"science-dominated scientific public sphere" and the "contextualized scientific public 
sphere" (p. 438). These two models set out different normative expectations for mass 
media as a communicator of scientific knowledge, but also as an interpreter of new and 
controversial science. The first ideal-type model, the science-dominated scientific public 
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sphere, is derived from the infamous "public understanding of science" (PUS) paradigm 
which was dominant in the 1980s. The key assumptions that underlie this "deficit model" 
of science communication are: 1) the notion of scientific knowledge as superior to other 
forms of knowledge, and 2) the perceived deficiencies in scientific literacy of the general 
public. Subsequently, there is added expectation that mass media should be improving 
scientific literacy and that their reporting of science should accurately reflect the 
scientific discourse. By contrast, the second model, which has been advanced in the 
scholarly literature, deconstructs assumptions about the special epistemological status of 
scientific knowledge and suggests a more contextual approach to the public 
communication of science. This notion of a contextualized scientific public sphere 
requires accepting that "science is only one source of knowledge among many, and the 
experiences of citizens and non-scientific actors are accepted as equally relevant" 
(Gerhards & Schafer, 2009, p. 440). Furthermore, science depends on society's 
legitimation and therefore decisions regarding policies and regulation should involve 
extended public negotiations and participation of diverse actors. While the first model 
emphasizes the role of mass media as the primary channel of science communication, the 
contextualized approach encourages debates in a variety of public forums, i.e. consensus 
conferences, workshops, roundtable discussions, etc. The two normative models of the 
scientific public sphere set out different standards for media coverage of scientific issues. 
The science-dominated approach requires that media reporting provides an abundant 
amount of information on scientific research and events, often with the unstated goal of 
educating the public. Moreover, media debate should be dominated by scientific and 
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technical experts and should exclude non-scientific interpretations on the issues at hand. 
There are expectations that science should be represented in a positive light, rather than 
through a critical lens. The contextualized model associated with the public engagement 
with science and technology (PEST) paradigm, on the other hand, establishes different 
standards for media discourse on scientific issues. First, it requires that media reporting is 
not limited to scientific events and debates that originate within the scientific community. 
Second, rather than serving as an advocate for science, mass media is expected to provide 
a critical reflection on competing perspectives within society. Finally, there is an 
expectation for a more inclusive debate that would engage diverse social actors and 
citizens' groups and achieve "an evaluation and interpretation of science which is 
similarly pluralistic and potentially controversial" (Gerhards & Schafer, 2009, p. 441 ). 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is worth using the two normative models outlined above to 
evaluate the type of media coverage that stem cell research has received in a comparative 
US-EU context. Regardless of the divergent regulatory approaches to this scientific 
innovation in these political entities, the literature review conducted in the chapter has 
clearly indicated striking similarities in framing devices and rhetorical strategies utilized 
by news organizations to report the controversy. Given that in recent years there has been 
a greater emphasis on more contextualized media coverage on controversial science, 
specifically within the context of science and technology studies (STS) and critical 
approaches to the public understanding of science, my assessment will focus on the 
standards for public communication of science set out by the contextualized normative 
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model. Therefore, I will look at whether the media coverage of hESC research has met 
the three ·major criteria for a contextualized, critical public discourse on scientific issues. 
Media discourses on stem cell research in both the US and the EU have clearly reflected 
the first condition for contextualization. As it was previously discussed, media reporting 
of the controversy was by no means limited to scientific developments and events; rather, 
the issue received significant media attention only when it reached the political, social, 
religious and moral arenas of society. Not only did media coverage of scientific facts 
related to hESC research become tightly enmeshed with popular discourses, but mass 
media also assumed an active role in the making of stem cell science in the public 
domain. In his article "The dominant view of popularization: Conceptual problems, 
political uses," Hilgartner (1990) has conceptualized this transition from the "expertise" 
of scientists towards the situatedness of scientific knowledge-making within diverse 
communication contexts and media of communication. He has argued that "when one 
looks carefully for the precise location of the boundary between genuine scientific 
knowledge and popularized representations, one runs into trouble, stemming from the 
fact that scientific knowledge is presented in many contexts" (Hilgartner, l 990, p. 524). 
Media discourses on hESC research, however, have often failed to meet 
normative expectations about the democratization of public discussions on scientific 
issues. An underlying assumption of the contextualized approach to media reporting of 
science is that "scientific actors have no privileged status in the public sphere [and] actors 
from other areas of society and citizens' representatives should be equally well 
represented" (Gerhards & Schafer, 2009, p. 442). As Haran and Kitzinger (2009) have 
159 
concluded in their analysis of media coverage of the Hwang controversy, the news media 
have failed to deconstruct traditional media-science relations and have thus become 
implicated, together with the scientific establishment, in fabricating scientific truth and 
falsehood. Moreover, scientists and science journalists have retained privileged status as 
communicators and negotiators of scientific claims in the public sphere by disallowing 
the involvement of media and other actors in the making of genuine science. 
Finally, the literature review conducted in this chapter suggests that media 
discourses addressing the stem cell controversy in both the US and the EU did not pass 
the requirement for instigating a rational-critical public debate on the issue. Rather than 
deconstructing the major terms in which the debate was framed by stem cell advocates 
and their opponents, the news media simply followed discussions in political and 
legislative arenas which had presented the controversy as a strict binary opposition. In 
addition, science reporters and other media professionals did little to encourage critical 
reflection on scientific and rhetorical claims regarding the future of stem cell research 
and regenerative medicine. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE BIOPOLITICS OF STEM CELL RESEARCH 
In his essay "Are There Metaphysical Answers to the Question: What is the 
"Good Life"?," Habermas (2003) argues that "the new technologies make a public 
discourse on the right understanding of cultural forms of life in general an urgent matter 
[and therefore] philosophers no longer have any good reasons for leaving such a dispute 
to biologists and engineers intoxicated by science fiction" (p. 15). Critical reflection is 
necessitated by the potential of biotechnology and genetic engineering to alter essential 
elements of the human situation, and thus undermine our normative self-understanding as 
moral persons. The vital questions which arise from the technologies of human genetic 
modification are not like any other moral dilemma. These are moral questions of a 
radically different nature, as they touch on the ethical self-understanding of humanity. A 
similar line of ethical reasoning is deployed by Cole-Turner (2003) in an article, titled 
"Religion Meets Research," which argues that the most recent technologies of the 
embryo, such as stem cell research and human cloning, have necessitated a 
reconsideration of religious perspectives on the meaning and ethics of the embryo. 
Advancements in reproductive technologies have allowed the creation of human embryos 
by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer, rather than through the process of fertilization, 
in which the fusion of an egg and sperm results in the creation of a novel genetic 
combination. This possibility raises ethical concerns about the capacity of these new 
types of embryos to become human life, as well as practical considerations, i.e. whether 
these entities are due the same respect we accord to the fertilized embryo. Both religious 
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and non-religious persons share the belief that human embryos are inherently valuable 
due to their potential to become actual human beings. The key question posed by Cole-
Tumer (2003) is to what extent the moral and ontological significance of nascent human 
life is defined by the particular technology used to create such life, especially when 
different methods of producing human embryos warrant different potential for further 
development. Moreover, assisted reproductive technologies have provided easy access to 
a large number of human embryos and their genetic material. The intersection of these 
embryo technologies with the techniques of inheritable genetic modification opens up the 
possibility of engineering the evolution of the human species. The question of the 
embryo's moral and legal status thus becomes inevitably intertwined with philosophical 
debates on the future of human self-modification. As Cole-Turner (2003) points out, the 
debate is not just about whether the embryo is a cluster of cells or a fully-fledged human 
being but it is "nothing less than the question of the species [since] embryo modification 
will become species modification, with the embryo as the point of access" (p. 12). 
Therefore, it is essential that we achieve a greater moral understanding of embryo 
technologies and a political capacity to regulate and guide their use. 
Regardless of how problematic the notion of a stable biological identity as a 
defining quality of the humankind may seem to transhumanists and the like, the 
overarching concern is that science has provided us with the means to modify and 
manipulate the very biological foundations of human nature. This concern is well 
articulated by Hayes (2007) who claims that "the ability to manipulate human nature-· in 
effect, to make the agent of change an object of change-destabilizes both the biological 
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and the social foundations of the human world" CiI 5). Although the creation of 
genetically modified human embryos has been technically possible for the last several 
decades, no known attempts had been made prior to 2008 when researchers at Cornell 
University in New York announced that they have altered the genes of a human embryo 
(Center for Genetics and Society, 2008). It is by no means surprising that the engineering 
of the world's first genetically modified human embryo was considered a transgression of 
ethical boundaries and reinvigorated discussions about designer babies. It also prompted 
many scientists to call for an international moratorium on the creation of GM human 
embryos until holding public consultations and policy deliberations on biotechnology 
applications that are socially dangerous (Center for Genetics and Society, 2008). 
In this chapter I explore key concepts in contemporary social and political 
thought, such as public sphere, discourse ethics, biopolitics, and risk society which can 
allow us to tackle vital political issues arising from stem cell technologies and their 
intersections with the technologies of the embryo and inheritable genetic modification 
(i.e. pre-implantation genetic diagnosis). I argue that both utopian and dystopian visions 
that have informed the public discourse on hESC research have linked this biomedical 
innovation to developments in genetic engineering and the biosciences that make possible 
the enhancement and self-modification of the human species. Moreover, policy debates 
on stem cell research worldwide have often become inextricably linked to ethical 
considerations regarding the deployment of related biotechnology applications for the 
common good. Similar to scientific controversies such as human cloning and assisted 
human reproduction, hESC research has been subjected to increased public scrutiny since 
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the issue was debated as being about defining and protecting life, and ultimately, about 
the potential of science to reshape human nature, whether for the better or worse. In order 
to achieve a better understanding of the biopolitics of hESC research, we need to 
deconstruct future-oriented discourse on the issue and examine the impact of both utopian 
bio-futurism and dystopian visions of biotechnological possibilities on the processes of 
public opinion formation in the public sphere. This chapter therefore suggests a critical 
analysis of notions ofbiopolitics, public sphere, and risk society, which can provide an 
analytical lens to examine policy debates and political mobilizations around the issue of 
embryonic stem cells in the United States and the European Union. I aim to examine how 
this biomedical innovation is embraced or contested as a public good through competing 
moral rhetorics, ethical vocabularies and political interventions. Collective mobilizations 
around the issue of hESC research undoubtedly reflect the rise ofbiopolitics as 
indispensable to modem practices of government and the profound effects of biopower as 
a modality of political control that regulates social life from its interior. At the same time, 
the unprecedented level of social activism on this biopolitical issue indicates a growing 
public awareness about the social ramifications of biopolitics. 
Foucault's writings on sovereignty, govemmentality and biopolitics, which have 
become widely influential in contemporary social and political thought, can shed light on 
the stem cell controversy since these theoretical reflections emphasize the link between 
paradigmatic shifts in the biosciences and biomedicine and the production of political 
rationalities and social practices. Post-Foucauldian scholars have suggested that "the 
theoretical urgency surrounding the question of biopolitics is both a response to, and 
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responsive to, the growing importance of the life sciences within the political and 
economic context of late capitalism" (Cooper, 2005, il 5). In his examination of 
contemporary manifestations of biopower and biopolitics, Lazzarato (2004) has argued 
that the biosciences have constituted the major terrain of experimentation for the new 
revolutions of capitalism. While in his late work on biopolitics and governmentality, and 
more specifically, the seminars delivered at the College de France in the l 970's, Foucault 
(2003, 2007, 2008) examined in a systematic way the practices and theories of the life 
sciences and their cognate disciplines, more recent philosophers of biopolitics have 
tended to overlook this problematic. Articulating such links between political power and 
the biological was central to Foucault's project to write a history of the present, as well as 
to his critique of "the biopolitical state" of the twentieth century. Therefore, Cooper 
(2005) has concluded that revisiting the original conceptualization of biopolitics 
"necessitates paying more sustained attention to the transformations at work in the 
practices and paradigms of contemporary biology" (~ 5). 
Habermas 's normative notion of the public sphere as part of social life, where 
public opinion on issues of common political concern can be formed, provides an 
analytical framework to consider whether regulatory responses to human embryonic stem 
cell research have reflected a consensus on the ethical dilemmas achieved through a 
rational-critical, public debate. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1989) has developed a model of deliberative democracy in which the public good is 
contested and negotiated through institutionalized practices of rational-critical discourse 
on political matters. I deploy the notions of the public sphere and discourse ethics to 
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develop a normative view on divergent public discourses on the public interest in the 
development of stem cell technologies which have simultaneously competed for policy 
initiative. I argue that the multidimensional ethical and political controversy around 
hESC research shows limitations in Habermas' s model of universalistic justification of 
norms in practical discourse as a normative ideal of rational will formation and collective 
decision-making in the democratic public sphere. 
I also aim to examine, in a critical light, the more recent concept of "the ethics of 
the species" which Habermas (2003) has developed in his book The Future of Human 
Nature as an ethical and philosophical response to advances in genetic engineering and 
reproductive and stem cell technologies. Although his critique focuses primarily on the 
issue of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (POD) and its non-therapeutics applications, 
such as optimization of desirable genetic make up to produce "designer babies," he also 
tackles the issue of stem cell research. For Habermas (2003), normalizing the creation 
and destruction of embryos for medical research would only pave the way for further 
self-instrumentalization and self-optimization of the biological foundations of human 
existence, and therefore, POD and stem cell research are part of the same context. His 
major ethical objection to the so-called "liberal eugenics," which leaves the selection of 
genetic modifications to individuals participating in a market economy, is that even 
favorable genetic enhancements will infringe on the autonomy and "natural mode of 
person's physical embodiment" by foreclosing her right to an open future (Habermas, 
2003, p. 21 ). Nonetheless, he admits that the dispute over the morality of hESC research 
and other controversial human biotechnologies cannot be resolved by giving the pre-
166 
implantation embryo full human dignity and elevating its status to that of a subject of 
human rights. This position recognizes the existence of strong legal and philosophical 
arguments against extending human rights considerations to pre-personal forms of human 
life such as blastocysts, embryos and fetuses. Yet, Habermas (2003) claims that 
embryonic life has moral worth of its own which requires that we do not weigh its value 
against other high-ranking collective goods, i.e. the development of innovative medical 
treatments or freedom of research. While stem cell research and therapeutic applications 
of PGD are commonly defined as proactive medical care, and have been sanctioned with 
references to the "logic of healing," it is still unacceptable to instrumentalize human 
embryos to produce medical benefits for others, as this way of reasoning poses challenges 
to the ethical self-understanding of the species and will ultimately lead to the 
normalization of questionable eugenic practices. I will scrutinize the philosophical 
premises of "the ethics of the species" in greater detail in the remaining sections of the 
chapter. The concept itself is very problematic since its philosophical defense is based on 
a substantivist ethical position which represents a departure from Habermas's continuous 
philosophical defense of a deontological approach to moral questions. Although he 
claims that a retreat from a post-metaphysical, proceduralist standpoint to an ethical 
perspective committed to substantive values is both legitimate and necessary in order to 
prevent the self-instrumentalization of our species, theoretical perspectives such as "the 
ethics of the species" clearly stand at odds with the very notion of communicative 
freedom which had been central to Habermas's life-long philosophical project ofrescuing 
the modem public sphere. 
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The concluding sections of this chapter examine approaches to ethical reasoning 
and methods of deliberation employed by the two U.S. national bioethics advisory bodies 
to develop policy recommendations on stem cell research and related technologies-the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), appointed by the President Clinton in 
1995, and its successor under the two administrations of President Bush, the President's 
Council on Bioethics (PCBE). Rather than elaborating on the validity of conflicting 
ethical positions on embryo research presented in the two reports on stem cell research, I 
intend to compare and contrast the types of public deliberations adopted by these 
bioethics panels. I also aim to evaluate whether their efforts to develop policy 
recommendations regarding hESC research have sought a wide public consensus 
according to the underlying principles of a democratic polity. In her analysis of the two 
U.S. national bioethics commissions, Cohen (2005) points out that the NBAC stem cell 
report and policy recommendations sought a consensus-oriented approach to public 
deliberation to incorporate Rawls's "the fact of reasonable pluralism" and thus 
acknowledge inevitable limitations in appeasing strong moral and policy disagreements. 
By contrast, PCBE did not initially endorse public deliberations oriented towards a wide 
public consensus, but rather emphasized the need to achieve a better understanding of 
ethical and social issues arising from controversial biomedical research. When this 
approach failed, the Council utilized an approach to deliberation that was more consistent 
with the shared fundamental values of a pluralistic democratic society (Cohen, 2005). As 
there is a growing public concern over the ethical and social implications of the new 
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biomedical revolutions, policymakers are faced with the urgent dilemma of what methods 
of reasoning and moral principles should inform the decision-making process. 
Finally, I emphasize the adoption of deliberative democracy principles in 
developing public policies on stem cell research and other controversial biomedical 
technologies. Dryzek (2000) defines deliberation as a form of public communication, as 
well as a social process, which involves persuasion and consensus, rather than coercion 
and manipulation. The underlying assumption of this type of negotiations is that 
participants in public forums are open to changing their views on the issues at hand. 
Although contemporary democratic theory is dominated by a deliberative approach, there 
are different conceptions of what constitutes authentic deliberation and some theorists 
have attempted to impose limits to the legitimate plurality of views in the political 
domain (Dryzek, 2000). For instance, Rawls (1993) has proposed the distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable conceptions of the good to determine types of 
argumentation that count in public policy deliberations. He also claimed that the 
outcomes of these debates should be consistent with widely shared values in pluralistic 
societies. Even proceduralist conceptions of deliberative democracy, such as Habermas's 
strong, consensus-oriented model of public reason, often come with implicit assumptions 
of procedure-independent standards for good outcomes. For instance, his strong epistemic 
model of democracy is predicated on the abstract ideal of communicative reason as a 
prior condition ensuring the fairness of proposed (ideal) procedures (Habermas, 1996). 
Scholars have indicated weaknesses in the normative concept of democracy, endorsed by 
Habermas, and have attempted to develop a weaker model of public reason that better 
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acknowledges profound disagreements existing at the level of basic moral principles and 
fundamental procedures (Bohman & Rehg, 1997). 
By contrast, poststructuralists and scholars influenced by Foucault have been 
critical of deliberative democratic models of politics and have emphasized the conflictual 
nature of the political. Their disbelief in consensus-oriented approaches comes from 
inherent distrust for all dominant discourses, which are viewed as oppressive, rather than 
liberatory, power mechanisms of subjugating individuals by constituting them as 
subjects. This criticism is informed by Foucault's theory of governmentality which calls 
attention to how subjects are constituted in ways that make them amenable to government 
(Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991 ). Ultimately, the suspicion towards deliberation as a 
· process of social change is consistent with the assumption that social and political control 
are exercised through shared assumptions about politics that people dutifully accept, 
rather than through overt coercion and violence. In his work on risk society, Beck (1992) 
has developed a similar critique of the dominant discourses of risks in advanced 
technological societies, which appear to be instrumentalist and reductionist, rather than 
truly critical and pluralistic. The field of risk communication, shaped by the underlying 
premises of liberal pluralism, only creates the illusion of critical reflection on the techno-
scientific dangers of modernity. Instead, such expert-dominated discourses are shaped by 
the culture of scientism and represent a strong defense against reflexivity. Since these 
discourses are constructed in relation with identities imposed on social actors by social 
institutions and their ideologies, Beck (1992) has advocated a democratization of societal 
critique on techno-scientific matters. 
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Biopower and Biopolitics 
Foucault's thesis in the first volume of The History of Sexuality (l 976) that the 
object of politics in modernity has become human life itself and we now live in a 
"biopolitical" age has provoked a continuous theoretical debate on how biopower and 
biopolitics have redrawn and redefined, in novel ways, the boundaries and the nature of 
the social and the political (Agamben, 1998; Lazzarato, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 2001; 
Rose and Rabinow 2003). In the chapter entitled "Right of death and power over life," he 
claimed that sovereign power initially had the right to decide life and death, although the 
sovereign exercised such seemingly unconditional power in a limited way and only when 
his own existence was threatened. Formulated in classical political philosophy as "power 
of life and death," this juridical form of sovereign power was exercised as a deduction 
and constituted "a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it 
culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it" (Foucault, 1984, p. 
259). Since the seventeenth century, the Western countries have witnessed transformation 
of these mechanisms of power and the ancient right to take life was supplemented with 
the right of the social body to ensure and foster its life. Political power has become a life-
administering power-biopower located and exercised at the level of life, the species, the 
race, and the entire population. Moreover, this new organization of power over life was 
exercised in two specific forms: as an anatomo-politics of the human body and as a bio-
politics of the population. Originally, biopower worked to discipline and regulate the 
capacities of the individual body and, later on, was extended to the level of the species 
body as a series of regulatory controls pertaining to the management of population: its 
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propagation, rates of births and mortality, morbidity, level of health and vitality. Not 
incidentally, biopolitics was intricately related to the rise of clinical medicine, the life 
sciences and biotechnology, to the emergence of a whole series of institutions, 
techniques, procedures and analyses that facilitated the managing of a population through 
the optimization of life. Foucault's lecture on governmentality further elaborated such 
notion of "a government of population" in terms of the government-population-political 
economy relationship to reveal "the deep historical link between the movement that 
overturns the constants of sovereignty in consequence of the problem of choices of 
government, the movement that brings about the emergence of population as a datum, as 
a field of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques, and the process 
which isolates the economy as a specific sector of reality, and political economy as the 
science and the technique of intervention of the government in that field of reality" 
(1991, p. 102). Furthermore, Foucault (1984) claimed that biopolitics as a form of 
government was indispensable for the expansion of capitalism since it constituted a 
configuration of social control which made possible the integration of individual bodies 
in the machinery of commodity production, as well as the management of the 
population's vitality in accordance with economic processes and cycles. 
The concepts of biopower and biopolitics extended the critique of the political 
theory of sovereignty Foucault initiated with the notion of disciplines. In Discipline and 
Punish (first published in 1975), Foucault (1979) explored a historical shift in workings 
of power; a movement from the judicial power of sovereign right to a regime of 
disciplinary techniques constituting the individual and his body as a locus of power 
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practices. The notion of biopolitics brought a new element in the analytics of power-
biopower was exercised at the level of population and led to the emergence of a social 
body as the object of government. Each of these approaches defined three types of 
targeted bodies in modernity: the body of the sovereign, the docile body of the individual 
subject, and the regulated body of the population. Although Foucault was not precise in 
the use of these two terms, others have indicated conceptual differences and have 
suggested more precise definitions. Rose and Rabin ow (2003) have argued that the 
concept of biopower designated "more or less rationalized attempts to intervene upon the 
vital characteristics of human existence-human beings, individually and collectively, as 
living creatures who are born, mature, inhabit a body that can be trained and augmented, 
and then sicken and die and as collectivities or populations composed of such living 
beings," whereas biopolitics involved "the specific strategies and contestations over 
problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality, over the forms of 
knowledge, regimes of authority, and practices of intervention that are desirable, 
legitimate and efficacious" (p. 2). Recent shifts in the technologies and stratification of 
biopower extend biopolitical interventions beyond the anatomo-politics of human bodies 
and the economy of population to include regulatory control on the micro level of human 
tissues and cells in the forms of molecular biopolitics (Rose, 2001, 2007a). The 
application of stem cell technologies in regenerative medicine exemplify such changes in 
stratification of biopower that redefine the boundaries of what is considered to be human 
or non-human, living or re-animated. Studies of politics through the analytics of 
govemmentality and biopolitics demonstrate that the space of government "is always 
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intersected by other discourses, notably the veridical discourses of science and changing 
moral rhetorics and ethical vocabularies, which have their own histories, apparatuses and 
problem spaces, and whose relations to the problematics of government is not expression 
or causation but translation" (Rose, 1996, p. 22). 
Changes in the forms of organization and technologies of the contemporary life 
sciences have not only led to the molecularization of biopolitics, but have also generated 
technologies of biopower in the form of risk politics. As Rose (2001) has pointed out, 
scientific disciplines such as molecular biology and genomics have opened up life at the 
molecular level for a variety of interventions, including the manipulation and engineering 
of the cellular processes in the human body. Contemporary biopolitics has therefore 
become the "politics of life itself." The purpose of these highly contested developments 
in the biosciences and biomedicine is not Limited to the management of illness or the 
maximization of health, but rather extends to the management of human vitality itself. At 
present, technologies are emerging that will make possible the modification and 
transformation of all biological aspects of human life. These novel types of biopolitical 
interventions and practices of control are "fuelled not merely by the commercial interests 
of biotech companies, but also by parental desires for a perfect child in an age of 
manipulated consumerism and reproductive choice" (Rose, 2001, p. 2). Yet, many 
individuals and social groups are distrustful of the transformative power of the genetic 
life sciences as they fear that it could lead to the normalization of genetic discrimination 
and, subsequently, to the resurgence of scientific racism and the emergence of "new 
eugenics" as a system of mass control of the population. Rose (2007b ), however, 
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dismisses sociological analyses predicting the rise of a new genetic and biological 
determinism, as well as bioethical discourse about the forthcoming "post-human" future, 
as rather fatalistic and reductionist assumptions about the potential of biosciences to 
control, engineer, and modify the capacities of human beings. He is reluctant to accept 
exaggerated expectations about therapeutic advances and revolutions in biomedicine. 
Instead, he claims that rather than being on the brink of an epochal change, we inhabit 
some sort of an "emergent form of life." At the same time, Rose (2007b) argues that 
regardless of the visible continuity in the mutations of contemporary biopolitics, i.e. 
molecularization, optimization, subjectivation, somatic expertise, and economies of 
vitality, each one of these new trajectories indicates a significant break with the past, the 
crossing of a new threshold. Rather than a dystopian future of geneticism, he envisions 
the emergence of a "novel somatic ethics," a future-oriented discourse which is placing 
specific demands upon the present. The new bioeconomy, which is thriving on the 
molecularization of biopolitics and the extraction of biovalue made possible by the 
biosciences, has also empowered individuals by providing them with new means to 
control biological forces on all levels and intervene upon themselves. At the same time, 
new trajectories of biopolitics are shaping a novel type of corporeal, neurochemical 
selves oriented towards a greater choice, prudence and responsibility in ethical actions, 
social practices, and political decisions. These personalities have developed a different 
sense of ethical choices and desires for self-optimization embodied in the practices of 
contemporary biomedicine. Bioethical discourse has occupied a central place in the 
biopolitics of the present, Rose (2007b) claims, due to "the problems of governing 
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biomedicine in an age of choice and self-maximization in which the body and its 
capacities have become central to technologies of selfhood {p. 8). 
In. his analysis, Rose (2007b) has repeatedly emphasized the novelty of 
contemporary biopolitics which stems from the dramatic increase in our capacities to 
understand, manipulate and engineer human life at the molecular level. Moreover, these 
possibilities to intervene into human vitality on all levels of developmental, biochemical, 
molecular and neurological processes have indicated an epistemic threshold and the 
emergence of new discourses of biomedical knowledge, political rationalities and 
technologies of government. Nonetheless, his analysis of the politics of life in our 
advanced liberal democracies is rather dismissive of the sense of urgency inherent in 
critical sociological and bioethical discourses on new developments in biomedicine and 
the biosciences. Instead, Rose (2007b) categorizes such deliberations and regulatory 
attempts to establish normative limits to biomedical interventions as simple effects of the 
apparatus of government and its biomedical technologies of the self which produce novel 
biological and neurochemical selves oriented towards somatic ethics and individual 
responsibility. When applied to the stem cell controversy, this analytical framework is 
counterproductive as it emphasizes the submission of discourse participants to scientism 
and rationality and generally overlooks the possibility for a reflexive societal critique. 
Public Sphere and Discourse Ethics 
Public debates on stem cell research around the globe have highlighted profound 
differences in value orientation, conflicting ethical positions on the moral status of the 
human embryo and disagreements on how to regulate and fund research. This raises 
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questions about the real effectiveness of a delibe~ative approach to techno-science policy 
and decision making, but also about the conditions under which fair outcomes could be 
achieved. For instance, a strong consensus-oriented model, such as Habermas's 
normative theory of the public reason, is premised on the assumption that the resolution 
of societal conflicts on ethico-political matters is largely dependent on how effectively 
power differentials between participants in deliberations are neutralized and their value 
disagreements are ultimately appeased. In the light of the stem cell controversy, I propose 
to examine the validity of this model for negotiating and resolving scientific 
controversies with heavy political and ethical overlays. Some of the key questions 
regarding the ethics and politics of hESC research I will explore in the following sections 
were previously addressed by Habermas (2003) in The Future of Human Nature. 
Nonetheless, I strive to provide a critical reflection on his ethical and political responses 
to the challenges presented by stem cell research, PGD and other contested innovations in 
the biosciences. I aim to elaborate in greater detail Habermas 's concept of the democratic 
public sphere, as well as his theory of discourse ethics and communicative rationality 
which defends universal norms in the sphere of morality, by focusing on the following 
questions: "Is it possible to transcend interest-oriented and value-based perspectives on 
the ethics of embryo research in a search for the common interest in a practical discourse 
of justification? Can we find "universally accepted needs" and "a moral standpoint" that 
will enable a rationally-motivated consensus on the issue of hESC research and 
ultimately appease divergent ethical principles and competing policy initiatives? As stem-
cell research and the cluster of technologies surrounding its applications in regenerative 
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medicine have reached the top of political agendas of national governments and have 
became enmeshed in powerful economic interests, is it legitimate to claim that these new 
developments have "acquired a dynamic which threatens to steamroll the inherently 
slow-paced processes of an ethico-political opinion and will formation in the public 
sphere" (Habermas, 2003, p. 18)?" 
The notion of "public sphere" emphasizes that political participation is essential 
to any democratic society. It is central to Habermas's philosophical project to establish 
the foundations for a post-religious and post-metaphysical general theory of society and 
democratic politics. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, which was first 
published in 1962, elaborated the normative ideals and historical evolution of the 
bourgeois public sphere from the seventeenth century until its decline in the mid-
twentieth century mass welfare-states. The concept of public sphere was proposed by 
Habermas (1991a) to describe the realm of political communication and social interaction 
in the public life of European Modernity which made possible the rationalization of 
political authority in the medium of public discussions. The early bourgeois societies 
provided the ideal conditions for the institutionalization of rational-critical debates within 
public spaces which were open and accessible to everyone. The public sphere originated 
around 1700 as a pristine realm of public communication where no citizen was expected 
to enter the public discourse with an advantage over another. The "public" in this 
conceptualization of European social life and politics was perceived as a spontaneously 
formed collective of private persons who acted as citizens and engaged in rational-critical 
debate over issues of common interest. As Habetmas (199 la) puts it, 
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The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated 
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in debates 
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. (p. 27) 
The emergent public sphere, as Calhoun (1992) has noted in the Introduction to his edited 
collection Habermas and the Public Sphere, represented "an institutional location for 
practical reason in public affairs and for the accompanying valid, if often deceptive, 
claims of formal democracy" (p. 1 ). In bourgeois society, private persons acted as 
citizens when they engaged in rational discussions and negotiated fair agreements on 
societal issues without coercion and manipulation (Habermas, 1991a). The public sphere 
became an essential component of bourgeois society since it mediated between the state 
and society and legitimized political authority as a "rational" authority that served the 
public interest. 
Habermas (l 991a) envisioned possibilities for the realization of a public sphere in 
the liberal democracies from the early stages of capitalism in relation to actual physical 
spaces which allowed social interaction between citizens and deliberations on matters of 
general concern. In particular, he emphasized that public discussions about practices of 
the state were a common practice in the 1 i 11 and 18th century French salons and British 
coffee houses, as well as in Germany, where the learned table societies 
(Tischgesellschaften ), the literary societies (Sprachgesellschaften ), and the national 
societies (Deutsche Gesellschaften) became the first institutions of the rising public 
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sphere. These face-to-face societal debates on political issues received coverage and were 
continued in the eighteenth century journals of art and literary criticism. At that time, the 
media (mainly small-scale presses) increased the exchange of reasoned opinions and 
made positive contribution to the rational-critical debate over matters of general interest, 
although participation in the emerging public sphere was undoubtedly restricted to the 
literate. Nevertheless, the historical rise of a politically active and informed public in the 
eighteenth century Western European bourgeois states-the analysis suggested in 
Structural Transformation generalized from developments in Britain, France and 
Germany in the late 18th and 19th centuries-was followed by a gradual decline of the 
active, participatory bourgeois public sphere. Therefore, Habermas (1991a) extends the 
discussion of the historical genesis of the public sphere to a critical analysis of the 
evolving role of the public and its eventual transformation into a mass, especially in the 
twentieth century social welfare states, where public opinion was often manufactured by 
mass media under the political and economic pressure of competing private interests. The 
transformation of the bourgeois public sphere was parallel to a deeper transformation in 
the structure of society. Structural changes in the bureaucratic industrial society which led 
to the "refeudalization" of the public sphere were noticeable as early as the late 19th century. 
On the one hand, the public sphere was stifled by private economic interests that 
overshadowed the public political power and ensured the control of powerful corporations 
over the government apparatus and the media. On the other hand, the state's role and place 
in the civil society was changing and increased state interferences in the private sphere and 
everyday life gradually eroded the distinction between public and private realms. The 
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weakening of the public sphere entailed a decline in democratic participation; citizens 
became more interested in pursuing private interests than in negotiating societal concerns in 
public deliberations. The advance of capitalism and communication technologies thus 
weakened the liberal democracy of bourgeois society, whose success largely depended on 
a relatively small sphere of public authority. This waning of the public sphere as a 
political domain mediating the state with the needs of society resulted in a situation 
where public opinion was formed by the mass under the influence of the media and 
cultural industry and the citizens of contemporary democracies became passive 
consumers and media spectators. 
It is worth pointing out that the distinction between a public and a mass society is 
essential to Habermas's concept of the public sphere. Structural Transformation 
emphasized the significant impact of nascent communication media (newspapers and 
journals) in sustaining critical public debate over matters of general interest. Habermas 
(199la) claimed that rational-critical, face-to-face debates in bourgeois society were 
greatly facilitated by the forms of public communication, which at the time were limited 
to the small scale, independent presses. The nature of the public debate changed 
significantly when the potential of media production to bring profit was realized and it 
became largely commercialized. Revenue from advertisements limited the amount of 
criticism newspapers were willing to level at objectionable practices carried out by the 
advertisers. In time, economic and financial interests prevailed over the rational critical 
arguments which characterized the public debates of bourgeois revolutionary period and 
the commercial mass media gradually turned the critical and politically active public of 
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bourgeois society into a passive consumer public. With the advent of mass 
communication, the public sphere of modem constitutional democracies changed into a 
platform of political advertising which was serving the private interests of large-scale 
organizations and lobby groups. The influx of a staged, manufactured form of publicity 
contributed to the further erosion of the public sphere since it transformed rational-critical 
discourse into a form of public relations hiding secret policies of interest groups. For 
Habermas (l 991 b ), the realization of a public sphere, which once was structurally 
embedded in society, is possible in the social welfare state only on a case-by-case basis 
and involves "a welfare-state transformation of the functioning of basic rights" in which 
"the requirement of publicness is extended by state organs to all organizations acting in 
relation to the state" (p. 404). Nonetheless, the promise of the public sphere is largely 
contingent on the ability of the state to restrain irrational relations of social power and 
political domination. Therefore, as Habermas (1991b) has concluded in his analysis, "the 
outcome of a struggle between a critical publicity and one that is merely staged for 
manipulative purposes remains open [and] the ascendancy of publicity regarding the 
exercise and balance of political power mandated by the social welfare state over 
publicity merely staged for the purpose of acclamation is by no means certain" (p. 235). 
Scholars in the fields of cultural studies, literature, philosophy and politics have 
deconstructed the public-mass juxtaposition, which is central to the conceptual 
framework of Structural Transformation. For instance, both Ku (2000) and Polan (1993) 
have argued that Habermas's thesis of the decline of the public sphere after mid 
eighteenth century is a direct result of the integration of the dichotomy of public-mass 
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into his idealized notion of the bourgeois public sphere as a pristine realm of rational 
discourse on the common good, i.e. the juxtaposition between an educated bourgeoisie 
interested in critical discussions on cultural matters and a contemporary sphere 
dominated by mass media and mass culture. Polan (1993) has noted that Habermas's 
argument is reductionist since it conceptualizes "culture" as a type of media and thus 
overlooks the multifaceted nature of cultural production. Moreover, his analysis of the 
public sphere is informed by perspectives on media and political economy of 
communication that fail to consider the cultural meanings and counter-meanings 
communicated and transmitted by the public discourse. Furthermore, Structural 
Transformation does not suggest an analysis of the public as a shifting and contested 
category. For this reason, it is difficult to sustain the argument about the public sphere as 
a public space instituted in the private domain of civil society. It is important, as Ku (200) 
has rightly indicated, to define the notion of "public" in relation to its ties with both state 
and civil society, especially in the present when both entities are so intricately related that 
they "interact with each other in shaping the political and moral boundary of public life 
and that they are simultaneously subjects to a common cultural field that constitutes and 
regulates public life" (p. 221). Subsequently, it is necessary to redefine the notion of 
public towards the realities of contemporary politics and develop a more adequate 
category that would allow us to conceptualize questions of legitimacy, public culture and 
citizenship practice. 
Critics have also claimed that Habermas 's emphasis on rational discourse as the 
model for public communication and his rather idealized portrayal of the bourgeois 
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public sphere as a predefined realm of properly political activity does not provide an 
adequate conceptual map to understand the contemporary public discourse which is 
essentially permeated by power relations, large corporate interests, and privately owned 
media organizations. For instance, Fraser (1992) has suggested Habermas's model should 
be revised to offer a "category capable of theorizing the limits of actually existing 
democracy" (p. 111 ). Even Habermas himself had acknowledged that over the years the 
term has acquired more general meanings compared to his original conceptualization of 
the public sphere as a product of the immense economic and societal transformations in 
European societies between the Late Middle Ages and the eighteenth century. While 
critiquing Habermas's overdrawn emphasis on the rational aspects of public 
communication in the early liberal public sphere, Eley (2002) has defended the general 
notion of public sphere by emphasizing Habermas's revised conceptualization, which 
includes an expanded notion of the political as a structured space of contestation and 
negotiation over matters of common concern. He points out that the original meanings of 
the concept have shifted and presently designate "the general questing for democratic 
agency in an era of declining electoral participation, compromised sovereignties, and 
frustrated or disappointed citizenship" (Eley, 2002, p. 224). The new conceptualization 
envisions the formation of a public sphere as a space between state and society where 
"political action occurs with real effectiveness, whether in terms of the local effects, in 
building a sense of political agency or in behaving ethically in one's social relations and 
allowing some notion of collective goods to be posed, and thereby contributing to wider 
processes of political mobilization" (Eley, 2002, p. 231 ). 
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It is important to clarify that Habermas has continuously revised the original 
normative notion developed in Structural Transformation, and most recently, has 
emphasized the discursive constitution of the public sphere, but also internal relations 
between the informal and formal decision-making processes in contemporary states. In 
"Further Reflections on the Public Sphere" he notes that his conceptualization of 
democratic politics has evolved to include the distinction between "lifeworld" and 
"system" [the essay was included in the collection edited by Calhoun (1992)]. The 
concept of lifeworld is essential to a revised notion of the public sphere since it 
designates the immediate, everyday social and cultural realities of the individual actor 
vis-a-vis the system which is comprised by the market economy and the state apparatus. 
As an extension of the lifeworld, the public sphere constitutes an independent space for 
negotiating political power that offsets the colonizing encroachment of system on all 
aspects of the lifeworld. In Between the Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996) has further 
shifted the focus of his analysis from the public sphere as the fundamental locus of a 
sustainable democratic polity toward issues of constitution building and public law. 
Furthermore, in this book Habermas aims to link the informal processes of public opinion 
formation in the public sphere with formal decision making institutions in contemporary 
democratic societies that ensure the effective rule of law. Rather than being a purely 
cognitive exercise, political discourse mobilizes reasons and arguments that are derived 
from citizens' interests, values and identities. Habermas ( 1996) points out that such 
democratic processes of informal public opinion-formation in the public sphere generate 
communicative power that "has a real impact on the formal decision making and action 
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that represent the final institutional expression of political "will" (p. xxviii). He 
emphasizes that the constitutional state and its legal institutions provide mechanisms that 
allow the transformation of the communicative power generated through the public 
discourse into relevant administrative activity which generates social change. Therefore, 
law constitutes the major vehicle for the conversion of communicative power into 
administrative power and the attention is shifted to the functioning of particular legal 
systems in constitutional states, their major principles, goals and institutions that 
influence judicial decision-making. Regardless of the significant revisions Habermas has 
made to the concept over the last forty years, scholars have noted that the notion of public 
sphere still provides an important thematic perspective from which we could approach 
the problem of democracy in the contemporary world (Garnham, 2007). 
When applying a public sphere perspective to the stem cell controversy, it is also 
necessary to examine the premises of Habermas's deontological, cognitivist and 
universalist discourse ethics and his emphasis on practical discourse of justification as a 
way of resolving ethical and political controversies in democratic societies. McCarthy 
(1992) has pointed out that Habermas's continuing effort to rethink the foundations of 
democratic theory has led him to develop a multidimensional model of discourse in the 
democratic public sphere. Such a multifaceted notion of discourse, outlined in Habermas' 
more recent works on law, politics and morality, presupposes the pursuit of collective 
goals through different types of "rational collective will formation" in which the power 
differentials attached to conflicting interest positions are neutralized. The 
multidimensional model is centered on practical discourses which sanction laws and 
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policies in term of the general interest, and involves an effectively institutionalized mesh 
of public communication, including "deliberations in which general norms are applied to 
particular situations, ethical-political discussions concerning basic value and collective 
identities, the negotiation of compromises under fair bargaining conditions, and 
pragmatic discourses concerning the means of implementing policies and attaining goals" 
(McCarthy, l 992, p. 62). Habermas has maintained that the institutionalization of 
practical discourses of justification is indispensable for the contemporary democratic 
public sphere. While practical discourses make it possible to negotiate conditions under 
which fair compromises could be achieved, their institutionalization guarantees not only 
the impartial application of general laws but also that the law themselves have passed 
discursive justification. Pragmatic discourses about methods and procedures allow for 
intersubjective understanding and the pursuit of shared goals beyond the value 
differences that result from particular ethical positions. Nonetheless, questions arise 
whether practical discourse indeed constitutes a realistic normative ideal for discourse in 
the public sphere. Unlike Habermas's previous emphasis on the democratization of 
governmentally relevant and publicly influential organizations, this new normative ideal 
of democratic politics situates "rational collective will-formation" outside of any formal 
organizations. The democratic public sphere is therefore actualized through a wide-
ranging multiplicity of spontaneously formed publics engaged in informal discussions of 
issues of public interest. Central to this "web of informal communication" are voluntary 
associations and social movements that "concentrate on generating and disseminating 
practical convictions, that is, on discovering themes of relevance to society as a whole, 
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contributing to the possible solution of problems, interpreting values, providing good 
reasons and discrediting others" (McCarthy, 1992, p. 63). These citizens' associations are 
effective and influence formal decision-making, albeit in an indirect manner, i.e. by 
changing societal attitudes and values. The revised model of the public sphere, which 
incorporates the premises of discourse ethics, heavily relies on the articulation and · 
adoption of a moral point of view shared by all participants in practical discourse who 
will be willing to transcend their interest-oriented and value-based perspectives. In the 
political discourse of pluralistic societies, however, rational agreement on practical-
political matters is not always achievable, especially when there are fundamental 
divergences in value orientation between discourse participants. As the very normative 
standards of the debate are called into question, differences in identities, situations and 
experience become easily translated into value disagreements, and rational agreement on 
cultural values may not be an attainable goal. Moreover, the multiple value-perspectives 
of our pluralistic and individualistic culture are reflected in the voluntary associations, 
social movements and spontaneous publics, which Habermas views as agents of 
democraticization in the public sphere. As McCarthy (1992) has summarized the tensions 
in this model of discourse in the public sphere, 
If judgments of the relative cogency of reasons that cite needs, interests, feelings, 
sentiments and the like vary with interpretive and evaluative standpoints, and if 
there is no common measure by which to assess the relative weights of reasons 
articulated in different evaluative languages, then the distinction between 
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argument and rhetoric, between convincing and persuading becomes less sharp 
than the discourse model allows. (p. 65) 
A similar critique of Habermas's strongly consensus-oriented model of public reason is 
articulated by Bohman and Rehg ( 1997) who have indicated that his emphasis on 
"constitutional patriotism" in Between the Facts and Norms fails to acknowledge the 
impact of political values and cultural norms. As an alternative to this strong epistemic 
model of democracy,.they propose a weaker model of public reason that reflects Rawls' 
notion of "reasonable pluralism" and acknowledges that conflicts and disagreements exist 
even at the level of moral principles and fundamental procedures. 
In the light of above considerations, I argue that hESC research appears to be yet 
another ethical and political controversy that indicates limitations in Habermas 's model 
of "universalistic justification of norms" in practical discourse. Such moral controversies 
also raise questions regarding the validity of Habermas's strong epistemic model as a 
normative ideal of rational will formation and collective decision-making in the 
democratic public sphere. Public communication campaigns and parliamentary debates 
on the issue worldwide have reflected a variety of divergent ethical views on the status of 
human embryo and its experimental use in research settings. Attempts to achieve an inter-
subjectively shared "we" -perspective on the biopolitics of hESC research, which would 
enable all participants to bracket off interpretive and evaluative standpoints and agree on 
generally accepted moral norms and their applicability in this case, have commonly 
resulted in an impasse. Rather, policy deliberations on how stem cell technologies should 
be funded and regulated in both the United States and the European Union have 
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highlighted profound disagreements over conflicting ethical goals and have often failed 
to achieve outcomes that would be morally acceptable to the principals in the 
controversy. I will explore in greater detail the issue of justifying a closure policy 
regarding hESC research in the concluding section of the chapter. In the next section, I 
will provide a critical reflection on Habermas 's philosophical response to the ethical and 
societal challenges arising from stem cell technology. and other developments in human 
biotechnologies. I will address the question of whether the possibility for engineering 
human nature and novel forms of life indeed necessitates the abandonment of a 
proceduralist conception of reason as embedded in historical contexts of praxis and 
tradition in favor of a substantivist ethical position. 
The Embryo and the Self-Modification of the Species 
In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas (2003) has developed a philosophical 
critique of scientific innovations such as stem cell research, pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis and other technologies for embryo manipulation and has outlined a normative 
theory based on the notion of the ethics of the species. His major ethical objection to the 
so-called positive or liberal eugenics is that even favorable genetic enhancements might 
negatively affect the autonomy of future persons by limiting their life choices to a life 
course set by others and thus foreclosing their right to an open future. This concern is 
particularly relevant in the light of emerging embryo technologies such as PGD, SCNT, 
human genome research, and bioinformatics which make possible the selection or 
modification of specific human traits through manipulation of the hereditary factors 
responsible for their expression. Arguments in favor of human enhancement technologies 
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are well summarized by Agar (2004) who has outlined two competing visions of human 
enhancement: authoritarian and liberal eugenics. The notion of authoritarian eugenics 
first originated in the nineteenth century in the writings of Francis Galton, who advocated 
a social system that would support natural selection and improve human beings. 
According to this doctrine, the state takes a leading role in determining what counts as 
good human life, and subsequently, state authorities implement programs in pursuit of a 
particular racial ideal that discriminate against racial and ethnic groups that are deemed 
inferior. By contrast, the idea of liberal eugenics shifts the emphasis from "races and 
classes of humans" to "individuals" and "individual choice." Philosophical justifications 
of this second type of eugenic practices are derived from liberal individualism which 
asserts that there are different, often incompatible conceptions of what constitutes the 
good life in liberal societies. Liberal eugenics is also consistent with beliefs in 
"procreative beneficence," that is, the notion that parents have a moral duty to maximize 
the life prospects of their children. Therefore, proponents have advocated freedom of 
individual eugenic choices, especially when advances in reproductive and genetic 
technologies are currently transforming human procreation from a "genetic lottery" into a 
"genetic supermarket" (Agar, 2004; Buchanan et al., 2000). 
Habermas (2003) argues against the normalization of practices that would pave 
the way to liberal eugenics, and subsequently, to the instrumentalization of human life. 
Rather than seeing the technologies of human enhancement as a way to increase 
prospects for more fulfilled and meaningful individual lives, he claims that designing 
babies would only infringe on the individual's right to an open future and curtail the 
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processes of anticipatory socialization which ensure symmetrical relationships and 
mutual recognition between communicatively active persons in the public sphere. In 
order to justify normative restrictions on research involving the destruction of embryos 
and genetic modifications of humans, Habermas (2003) adopts an ethical standpoint that 
assigns an inherent value to human nature as the pre-condition for the development of 
ethical self-understanding and equal membership in the moral community of persons. 
Moreover, he suggests that this move toward substantivist ethics will prevent the 
forthcoming self-instrumentalization of human species which poses a threat to both our 
anthropological and normative self-understanding. 
Habermas (2003) acknowledges that disputes over the ethic~ of hESC research are 
more complex and cannot be resolved with the simple argument that the embryo 
possesses human dignity and should be accorded the status of a subject of human rights at 
all stages of development. From both legal and philosophical standpoints, it is highly 
problematic to extend the argument of human rights to protect pre-personal forms of life. 
Nonetheless, he believes that the existing legal distinction recognizing the unconditional 
human dignity of persons vis-a-vis the rather provisional protection granted to embryos 
and fetuses does not necessarily reduce the controversy to an ethical calculus of weighing 
conflicting public goods, i.e., freedom of research and the healing imperative against the 
respect owed to embryos. In other words, the value of pre-personal forms of life cannot 
be principally weighed against other rights and ethical goals. Instead, the way we treat 
human embryos has profound implications for our self-understanding as members of the 
species, and according to Habermas (2003 ), such ethical reflection is intricately related to 
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our self-understanding as moral persons. Regardless of its promise, hESC research 
contributes to the instrumentalization of human life to produce medical benefits for others 
and thus indirectly undermines the ethical self-understanding of the species which 
determines whether we perceive ourselves as beings committed to moral judgments and 
actions. As in this case procedural justification of moral norms may not result in an 
alternative to the open-end weighing of competing goods, Habermas (2003) proposes that 
our political responses to the challenges of biotechnology are ultimately guided by the 
ethics of the species. For him, the only way to avoid measuring the value of pre-personal 
life in comparison to other high-ranking collective goods (i.e., the development of novel 
medical treatments for debilitating diseases) is to accord embryos some moral value of 
their own. This philosophical move is justified since the new biomedical and 
biotechnological revolutions destabilize the very conditions that render morality possible: 
our capacity of being ourselves and ability to perceive others as persons of equal birth. 
The technology of human genetic modification threatens to violate what is given to us by 
nature, namely, the integrity of our bodies. This threat to our bodily integrity further 
extends to our moral identity and personal autonomy. Habermas (2003) concludes that 
we now face the possibilities of a dystopian future in which humans treat other human 
beings as means, and not as ends, and thus foreclose their right to an open future. 
Therefore, it is our duty and personal responsibility to future generations to respond to 
these challenges by exercising proper moral self-restraint. 
Habermas 's philosophical reflection on the controversies over hESC research and 
PGD stands at odds with the invariable defense of a deontological approach to moral 
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questions in his previous work on politics, law and morality. Prior to The Future of 
Human Nature, the greatest strength of his conception of deliberative democracy was the 
abstract character of his procedural ism which presupposes that the political process is not 
shaped by any particular conception of the public good. While his model of deliberative 
politics reflects a commitment to a deontological conception of political fairness, it also 
emphasizes the constitutive role of actual democratic process in giving content to 
"unsaturated scheme of rights" (Habermas, 1996, p. 450). It is centered on the abstract 
ideal of communicative freedom as a prior condition to any set of procedures that may be 
identified and that secure fairness and equal opportunity. Furthermore, reasonable or fair 
democratic procedures are derived through reflection on the presuppositions of 
communicative reason and action. By contrast, his analysis in The Future of Human 
Nature suggests that a move away from the post-metaphysical, proceduralist standpoint 
towards an ethical perspective grounded on substantive values is both legitimate and 
necessary if we are to develop a proper ethical response to the moral collapse opened by 
biotechnology and genetic engineering. Moreover, Habermas (2003) claims that the 
normalization of liberal eugenic practices will subtly undermine the very project of 
European political modernity and will eventually lead to the self-instrumentalization of 
humanity. Nonetheless, his attempt to derive an ethical response to the societal challenges 
of the biotechnological revolution from "the ethics of the species" is problematic, 
especially in the context of the pluralistic public discourses of our democratic societies 
which have been largely shaped by a proceduralist and cognitivist post-conventional 
morality. Not less dubious is the assumption of a fixed biological identity as defining 
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aspect of what makes us human beings. Therefore, critics have perceived The Future of 
Human Nature as a betrayal of a proceduralist, post-ethnocentric conception of post-
metaphysical reason which allows for a plurality of definitions about what makes us 
distinctively human and different from other species (Mendieta, 2003; Malmqvist, 2007). 
As Mendieta (2003) has summarized such criticisms of the substantivist ethical doctrine 
on human nature, defended by Habermas, 
The argument for the acceptance of an ethics of species masks the imposition of a 
Western understanding of what is essential to be human. There is no need to 
rehash here plurality of cultural perspectives on what makes human distinctive, or 
non-distinctive, from other species. It truly would be disastrous in an age of 
dialogical cosmopolitanism, or what Walter Mignolo has called "critical 
cosmopolitanism" to smuggle under the mantle of an ethical imperative an 
ethnocentric blackmail: either you are moral, by accepting our ethnic values, and 
rejecting genetic engineering, or you are not, because you reject our ethical value, 
and thus are doubly written off from the moral register. Such ultimatums and 
threats to be blacklisted are redolent of the worst forms of Eurocentrism. (p. 136) 
Moreover, Habermas's ethical perspective on human nature overlooks some fundamental 
legal and political issues arising from innovations in biomedicine and the biosciences, 
such as the question about the negative rights of citizens to decide their own "correct 
life." While it is important to develop a critical ethical reflection on these challenges, we 
should not ignore emancipatory possibilities brought by medical advancements, including 
therapeutic uses of PGD and stem cell research, which can enhance a person's right to 
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life. In the pluralistic democracies, this right to life clearly has precedence over the right 
to make decisions regarding the correct forms of life. In this context, we cannot 
predetermine, prescribe or control how life should be lived and the forms that life takes; 
we can only make sure that the right to life is ensured and protected for all members of 
the human community. Mendieta (2003) has argued that contemporary pluralistic culture 
·owes much to this "self-constrained, and abstemious power of political modernity" which 
has also allowed "the simultaneous acceptance of the culture of self-optimization with the 
culture of disability," as well as conflicting perspectives on whether the technologies of 
human genetic modification will ultimately lead to a dystopian future or help "nurture 
life not marked as diseased, but as challenged and requiring of our care and solicitude" 
(p.137). Therefore, Habermas's philosophical critique of PGD and hESC research from 
the perspective of "an ethics of the species" clearly stands at odds with the very aspects 
of communicative freedom that are central to the political project of modernity. 
Bioethics and Public Deliberations 
In their attempts to resolve the stem cell controversy in a manner acceptable to all 
constituencies, bioethics panels and advisory bodies have endorsed different methods of 
reasoning and approaches to public deliberations. In this section I analyze the methods of 
deliberation employed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), 
appointed by the President Clinton in 1995, and its successor during the two presidencies 
of George W. Bush, the President' Council on Bioethics (PCBE). I aim to evaluate to 
what extent their efforts to develop policy recommendations regarding hESC research 
have sought a wide public consensus and outcomes in accordance with the underlying 
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principles of a democratic polity. I offer a comparative analysis of the stem cell reports 
published by these national bioethics commissions (NBAC, 1999; PBCE, 2004) in order 
to reconstruct the competing perspectives they have endorsed regarding what principles 
and procedures in public deliberations are adequate for resolving societal conflicts on 
ethically controversial developments in biomedicine. 
In the early years of the U.S. stem cell debate, President Clinton's National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission ("the Clinton Commission") recognized that 
withholding federal funding for research that could lead to groundbreaking medical 
treatments would be unjust and unreasonable. After giving a proper consideration to 
diverse ethical perspectives and legal frameworks for stem cell research, the policy 
advisors concluded that federal funding should be provided for experimentation on hES 
cells from both cadaveric fetal material and supernumerary embryos from infertility 
treatments. The NBAC report Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research ( 1999) 
indicated that the 1995 congressional ban on federally sponsored embryo research (an 
appropriation bill rider, known as "the Dickey-Wicker Amendment") had created serious 
ethical and policy concerns among constituencies with differing perspectives on the 
morality of embryo research. In Chapter 5 of the Report, "Conclusions and 
Recommendations," this prohibition was characterized as controversial because "the ban 
contradicts several of the ethical goals of medicine, especially healing, prevention, and 
research-goals that are rightly characterized by the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence, jointly encouraging the pursuit of each social benefit and avoiding or 
ameliorating potential harm" (NBAC, 1999, p. 69). The Clinton Commission argued that 
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public policy deliberations balancing difficult issues, such as stem cell research, should 
give proper consideration to diverse moral standpoints, the most current scientific and 
medical developments, as well as various legal, political, social and cultural factors. They 
insisted that their recommendations reflected such a diversity of perspectives on the 
ethical, scientific and legal aspects of the topic: 
We did not come to our conclusions simply by balancing potential medical 
benefits against the potential harms, because the possibility of social benefits, by 
itself, is not a sufficient reason for federal support of such controversial research, 
particularly given the interest in stem cell research in the private sector. Nor did 
we approach this issue based simply upon an interpretation of the existing legal 
environment. Instead, we combined, as thoughtfully as we could, a number of 
different perspectives on and approaches to this topic (p. 3). 
The underlying principle of these deliberations was a thorough examination of shared 
medical, ethical and scientific considerations that are amenable to balancing, particularly 
on the much contested issue of the moral standing of human embryos. Moreover, the 
Clinton Commission pointed out that there were "the diverse and strongly held views" on 
the issue of stem cell research in American society, and therefore, their approach aimed 
to "develop policies that demonstrate respect for all reasonable alternative points of view 
and that focus, when possible, on the shared fundamental values that these divergent 
opinions, in their own ways, seek to affirm" (p. 67). 
Cohen (2005) has indicated that, although the Clinton Commission did not 
explicitly define the deliberative strategies and methods of reasoning used to develop 
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their recommendations, their approach to public deliberations could be reconstructed 
from references to scholarship in different chapters of the report. Overall, the goal was to 
establish a common ground for a societal consensus on hESC research that would reflect 
shared societal values and beliefs. Their method of reasoning was largely derived from 
"rights-based" liberal theory, and more specifically, from John Rawls' analysis of the 
character and limits of "public reason" which he had outlined in Political Liberalism 
(1993). This account emphasizes that a democratic polity is characterized by the 
existence of a set of generally accepted common sense beliefs and ways of reasoning, as 
well as some shared perspectives regarding basic principles of justice. Although 
reasonable disagreements over moral issues and practices in such societies are 
unavoidable, citizens have a "duty of civility" to formulate the public policies they 
advocate in terms of the values of the public reason, rather than in accordance with any 
comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrine. When deliberating on the 
issue of what shared views can be built in public policy recommendations, the Clinton 
Commission utilized Rawls' distinction between reasonable and unreasonable 
conceptions of the good which provides a useful tool for policy makers to establish limits 
to the legitimate plurality of views in the political domain. In addition, they defended a 
consensus-based approach to the issue of stem cell research with references to the work 
of political theorists such as Nagel (1995) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996), who have 
emphasized the importance of the democratic process as a constitutive element in a 
conception of political rightness. As indicated in the report on stem cell research, the 
deliberations of the Clinton Commission were mainly shaped by: (1) Nagel's argument 
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that procedures of decision should strive to achieve outcomes that would be considered 
legitimate by the vast majority of people, and (2) Gutmann and Thompson's claim that 
the development of public policy on morally controversial issues should seek significant 
points of convergence between conflicting interpretations and beliefs on the topic under 
consideration. Therefore, rather than assuming that they were in a position to resolve the 
controversy, the NBAC members attempted to "to develop public policy 
recommendations regarding research involving the derivation and use of ES cells that are 
formulated in terms that people who hold differing views on the status of the embryo can 
accept" (p. 51 ). 
The Clinton Commission's argumentation on the moral standing of the human 
embryo was strongly influenced by Dworkin's analysis of the abortion debate in Life's 
Dominion (l 994) which was characterized as "an illustration of the complex middle 
ground" approach (NBAC, 1999, p.52). Dworkin has claimed there is a shared 
understanding in American society that the fetus is not equal to a human person. Despite 
the high rhetoric of the abortion debate, most conservatives do not actually believe that 
the fetus has a right to life and often implicitly agree with liberals that embryonic forms 
of life can be sacrificed to save people's lives. This widely shared understanding on the 
moral status of the fetus becomes clear when one considers the willingness of pro-lifers 
to allow exceptions to their proposed prohibitions on abortion, i.e. in cases when 
pregnancy results from rape or incest. As Dworkin (1994) has pointed out, these 
exceptions have indicated that it is "contradictory to insist that a fetus has a right to live 
that is strong enough to justify prohibiting abortion even when childbirth would ruin a 
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mother's or a family's life, but that ceases to exist when the pregnancy is the result of a 
sexual crime of which the fetus is, of course, wholly innocent" (Qtd. in NBAC, 1999, p. 
52). 
By contrast, the President's Council on Bioethics ("the Council"), which replaced 
the Clinton Commission in 2001, endorsed an approach to public deliberation in the two 
reports on human cloning and stem cell research (PCBE, 2002, 2004) that followed 
practical wisdom and tradition (Cohen, 2005). In accordance with the directives of 
President George W. Bush, the Council, under the leadership of its original chair, Leon 
Kass, did not express an overriding concern to seek a large societal consensus. Instead, 
their intentions were to achieve a deep understanding of moral and ethical issues arising 
from developments in biomedicine and the biosciences. Similarly, there was little 
concern about development of procedures that would guarantee a diversity of 
perspectives. Therefore, the Council did not include representatives from the larger 
community in their deliberations. Eighteen members were appointed to the Council, who 
were mainly academics selected from diverse fields, ~uch as science, medicine, law, 
government, philosophy, theology, as well as other areas of the social sciences and the 
humanities. In the first report Human Cloning and Human Dignity, released by the 
Council in 2002, a majority of its members formally recommended a four-year 
moratorium on therapeutic cloning in both the public and private sectors, although a 
different majority had earlier supported the use of cloning for biomedical research 
(PCBE, 2002). Initially, ten of the Council's seventeen members (one had resigned) 
voted against recommending a ban on research cloning. A last-minute change in the 
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voting procedure, however, resulted in a majority of ten in favor of a four-year 
moratorium, which was an option that the Council had not previously discussed in 
meetings. The first majority of the PCBE members that supported human cloning for 
biomedical research had argued that human embryos are not morally equivalent to people 
and claimed that they have either developing and intermediate moral worth or no special 
moral status. They engaged in balancing the moral respect owed to early human embryos 
against the benefits of research cloning that may help develop innovative cures and 
alleviate suffering. The Council's majority then declared that objections to human 
cloning for biomedical research "are outweighed by the good that can be done for current 
and future individuals who suffer" and that "the moral balance lies on the side of 
endorsing and encouraging this activity" (PCBE, 2002, p. 128). The 2004 report on stem 
cell research, however, did not develop any specific policy recommendations. The 
justification for this decision stated that the field of stem cell research was too recent and 
underdeveloped to necessitate any comprehensive policy (PCBE, 2004). Rather than 
engaging in a utilitarian calculus of cost and benefits or a rights-based approach on the 
issue of hESC research, the Council, as stated by its Chairman Leon Kass in the report on 
human cloning, decided to ground their reflection on bioethical issues on "the broader 
plane of human procreation and human healing, with their deeper meanings" (PBCE, 
2002, p. ix). In addition, Kass insisted that the goal of these deliberations was to present 
clear arguments on the issues, rather than seeking consensus within the Council, as he 
presumed that such approach may lead to suppression of the genuine opinions of the 
members on the issues at hand. 
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Cohen (2005) argues that this initial method of deliberation, influenced by the 
work of the political philosopher Leo Strauss, who advocated a return to a classical view 
of nature and natural law, was eventually abandoned. Instead, in the human cloning 
report, the PBCE members briefly resorted to the procedures and methods of reasoning 
utilized by their predecessor, the Clinton Commission, which were more consistent with 
the shared fundamental values of a well-ordered democratic society. The change in the 
method of deliberation was noticeable in the last section of the 2002 report, which 
contains the Council's recommendations for a four-year moratorium on research cloning 
developed by the second majority. The proposal for a moratorium was justified with the 
need for further democratic deliberations and the achievement of societal consensus on 
whether this type of research should be allowed to proceed. This time, the Council 
members claimed that more time was needed for reflection on the moral and practical 
issues arising from the use of cloning technology in biomedical research and suggested 
that a national consensus in the U.S. should be achieved on all research that involves 
human embryos. The moratorium was perceived as an acceptable compromise 
"warranted by the state of public opinion and justified by the supreme values in our 
democracy of informed and deliberate decision in matter of great moment" (PCBE, 2002, 
p. 214). In a similar fashion, the subsequent report on stem cell research referred to on the 
issue of public deliberations in accordance with an "appropriate democratic process," 
however, as Cohen (2005) has indicated, the Council "does not pursue this observation 
and does not refer back to a theory of public deliberation that it had begun to develop in 
its research cloning report" (p. 280). By and large, there was not rigorous effort to 
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develop an explicit method of public deliberation to guide the Council's decisions. 
Rather, the vision for this advisory body, which was significantly influenced by its 
chairman Leon Kass, was to provide an in-depth analysis of fundamental ethical and 
philosophical questions arising from revolutions in biomedicine, rather than developing 
weak arguments that are based on consensus and compromise. The conservative 
bioethical orientation pursued by Kass was significantly shaped by the thought of Hans 
Jonas, who promoted a "heuristics of fear" to hinder advances in biomedical research and 
claimed that bioethicists ought to employ horrific imagery and metaphors from sci-fi 
horror stories to depict the potential negative impacts of scientific advances. In his 
academic publications and contributions to the Council's reports, Kass has consistently 
referred to a particular strain in dystopian thinking, and more specifically, C.S. Lewis's 
The Abolition of Man and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, to portray a frightening 
future of pharmacological hedonism, "hatcheries" and genetic under-classes as a result of 
advances in assisted reproductive technologies, human cloning and other areas of 
biomedical research (Kass, 2001, 2002, 2003; PBCE, 2002, 2003). Moreover, he has 
consistently criticized contemporary perspectives on justifiable methods of ethical 
deliberations and has defended methods that are substantive rather than procedural. As 
Cohen (2005) has indicated, the expectation set out by Kass was that the Council "would 
develop a method of public deliberation that provided deep and rich insights into the 
good for humankind. It would take account of tradition, the heir of generations of 
practical wisdom, hoping that what the neo-conservative thinker Leo Strauss has termed 
"the intrinsically high" would prevail." (p. 283). Although the Council included the best 
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available philosophical thinkers, it failed to accomplish this task. The PBCE members 
could not resolve the ethical dilemmas presented by hESC research and human cloning 
and did not achieve an agreement on policy recommendations. Neither could these 
thinkers.agree on substantive insights and ideas regarding the challenges of advances in 
biomedical technology since "the Council members could not -embrace a common 
understanding of human good in relation to embryo research" (Cohen, 2005, p. 284). 
Discussions regarding the appropriate type of diversity that should be sought by 
national bioethics commissions intensified during the controversy surrounding the 
decision of President Bush not to re-appoint two of the eighteenth members of the 
original Kass Commission. The members dismissed after two years of service were two 
vocal dissenters from the cloning report William F. May, renowned religious ethicist 
from Southern Methodist University, and Elizabeth Blackbum, well-known scientist in 
cellular biology from the University of California, San Francisco. Another PCBE 
member, the Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter, had submitted his resignation at an 
earlier date. The mid-course change in personnel thus involved the addition of three new 
members to the Council. All three new members that were appointed, Peter Lawler, a 
conservative Catholic political philosopher, Diana Schaub, a former student of Kass, and 
Benjamin Carson, a director of pediatric neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins, favored the 
conservative views of the President and opposed the use of cloning technology in 
biomedical research. The change in membership raised significant concern about the 
conservative bias in the construction of this national bioethics advisory commission. 
Elizabeth Blackbum, in a commentary published in The New England Journal of 
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Medicine, claimed that political decisions had led to the infusion of conservative political 
values in the work of the Council and a general loss of balance, both professionally and 
philosophically (Blackbum 2004). She argued that since its establishment the Council's 
deliberations had been shaped by the conservative views of the Pres_ident and the PCBE 
Chair. As a result, all three reports on human cloning, biotechnology and anti-aging 
therapies, and stem cell research, exhibited a conservative bias and tended to devalue 
hESC research, overstate the therapeutic utility of adult stem cells, and sensationalize 
concerns associated with anti-aging therapies and the possibility for significant 
prolongation of life. 
In her comparative analysis of the NBAC and PCBE reports on human cloning, 
Kaveny (2006) has argued that the most appropriate approach national bioethics 
commissions should utilize in public deliberations is deliberative diversity which "is 
outlined in the Thomistic (and ultimately, of course, Aristotelian) practice of taking 
counsel as a key requirement of practical reason" (p. 314). Rather than pursuing political 
diversity which would generally guarantee a broad political legitimacy of their 
recommendations, a presidential ethics commission should strive to facilitate the 
President's process of taking counsel. Both the Clinton Commission and the Bioethics 
Council have failed to in~orporate an adequate· degree of deliberative diversity in their 
reports on the issue of human cloning. Instead, these two policy advisory bodies have 
sought different approaches to diversity. The Clinton Commission's deliberations were 
characterized by the so-called "forensic diversity," which is the type of diversity between 
contesting parties in legal cases, and the human cloning report of the Kass Council 
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exemplified an academic type of diversity found in a medieval disputatio. Kaveny (2006) 
has pointed out that, although the presidential directives given to these advisory 
commissions significantly differed, "the primary responsibility of both bodies was to 
identify and resolve the factual, moral, and jurisprudential complexities necessary to 
forge a coherent national policy with respect to human cloning" (p. 313). The most 
appropriate type of diversity for this task is epistemic diversity, that is, diversity in 
membership that provides the commission with the necessary knowledge and expertise to 
complete the assigned task. The general category of epistemic diversity includes all three 
types-forensic, academic and deliberative diversity. The Clinton Commission's report 
on the cloning controversy showed an orientation toward epistemic diversity based on the 
dominant model in the legal system. As Kaveny (2006) characterizes their approach to 
public deliberation, 
Most strikingly, the members of the Clinton Commission presented themselves 
very much like a neutral fact-finder does in a legal case. The individual 
personalities of the particular members are virtually invisible in the Report; 
virtually no trace appears of the ultimate normative commitments of any member, 
or even of the framework they advocate for approaching bioethical questions. (p. 
316) 
The adoption of this position towards decision making is by no means surprising given 
that most NBAC members came from the academic discipline of bioethics, which was 
established as a professional field dedicated to procedural resolution of moral 
controversies in biomedicine, rather than emphasizing ethical perspectives grounded on 
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substantive values. Subsequently, the recommendations developed by the Clinton 
Commission did not endorse any particular moral stance or legal perspective on the issue 
of cloning. Forensic diversity was demonstrated by the structure of the report, as well as 
the fact that the Commission functioned as a judge in a trial. They heard significant 
amount of testimony from diverse experts and community representatives and included 
verbatim excerpts from these opinions in the report without follow up commentaries and 
evaluations. The report, however, did not indicate if there were discussions between the 
NBAC members and the witnesses and if some intermediate assessment on the matters 
under consideration took place during the investigation. The Clinton Commission 
approached the task as an adjudicator between two conflicting views on cloning humans, 
and mainly aimed to resolve narrow, pressing questions. Therefore, instead of addressing 
the far-reaching implications of cloning technology for humanity, their deliberations 
focused on the immediate concern of whether it would be legitimate to produce children 
by somatic cell nuclear transfer at that time. 
By contrast, the PCBE cloning report presented a significant departure from the 
forensic approach of its predecessor. Its emphasis on academic diversity resembled the 
medieval practice of disputation, a form of theological and philosophical speculation 
common for the European Universities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Solemn 
public disputations during this historical period were attended by the entire university 
community and were initiated by a master who formulated the question and was 
responsible for the organization of the event. Kaveny (2006) has indicated that this 
individual "distributed the various responsibilities, presided over the sessions, determined 
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the question, answered the objections, and finally, organized all the material in a written 
form" (p. 319). The PCBE report clearly endorsed this medieval practice of disputatio 
since it presented a moral vision of human cloning which was consistent with the moral 
and philosophical stance on the issue upheld by the Council Chair. Moreover, President 
Bush's preliminary directive was that Kass should provide moral and intellectual 
leadership to the Council, a mandate which stood at odds with the method of deliberation 
adopted by the Clinton commission, whose chair Harold Shapiro perceived his role as 
limited to providing procedural and organizational leadership. In the "Executive 
Summary" of cloning report, rather than adopting a method of operation suitable for 
procedural adjudication of moral controversies, the Kass Commission sought to establish 
a solid moral framework for analysis and develop appropriate vocabulary that would 
facilitate and situate their inquiry on the topic within a common philosophical and 
cultural tradition. This strategy shows close resemblance to the medieval practice of 
disputatio in which deliberations were situated within a well-established tradition in the 
academic discipline in which the question arose. Masters in disputations demonstrated 
full knowledge of the general field of inquiry in which the students serving as opponents 
or responders were trained over the years. 
When the two approaches to diversity in deliberations are compared, it is 
noticeable that the forensic approach used by the Clinton Commission is not effective in 
developing creative solutions or a compromise on the issues. Instead, it becomes clear 
that there was "very little effort on the part of the Clinton Commission to minimize, 
mediate, or partially synthesize the conflicting testimony presented by the various 
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witnesses brought before it" (Kaveny, 2006, p. 317). On the other hand, the PCBE report 
demonstrates certain strengths such as the presence of a clear normative vision endorsed 
by Kass and the majority, as well as the critical consideration given to alternative 
perspectives on the ethical implications of human cloning. The Council also aimed to 
introduce readers to key texts by compiling a reader with a wide range of 
interdisciplinary scholarship that illuminates diverse aspects of the issue. Nonetheless, 
there are also some weaknesses to this model of diversity that diminish its effectiveness 
in resolving controversial moral issues. The report was primarily focused on the analysis 
of complex moral issues raised by human cloning and barely engaged with jurisprudential 
concerns relevant to the topic of human cloning. For instance, the Council did not address 
the question about the relationship between law and morality in a pluralistic society. In 
fact, the chapters on law and public policy do not provide a systematic analysis of the 
legal context and further implications of the proposed ban on different applications of 
SCNT. The major disadvantage, however, was that the fundamental moral stance 
endorsed by the Council did not show proper respect for diverse opinions, as their model 
of diversity based on disputatio did not incorporate a notion of diversity as equality. In 
this sense, the forensic model, which gives equal opportunity to opposing positions to 
present their respective cases in their own terms, appears to be more consistent with 
American political culture. 
Based on the shortcomings of both epistemic models discussed above, Kaveny 
(2006) has proposed that advisory bodies such as NBAC and PCBE should adopt a model 
of deliberative diversity. This perspective is derived from "Aquinas's account of practical 
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reason and its attendant virtues" and, in particular, "his recognition of the need to take 
counsel before acting" which allows for diversity in perspective (Kaveny, 2006, p. 325). 
Aquinas has identified three virtues that guide all integral parts of the process of practical 
deliberation: ( 1) euboulia represents "the disposition to take good counsel;" (2) synesis is 
defined as "the disposition of good judgment about particular practical matters;" and (3) 
gnome is "the virtue of being able to recognize when one has a truly exceptional situation 
on one's hands" (Kaveny, 2006, p. 325). He has claimed that the best way to achieve a 
given end is to take counsel about the best means and has insisted that this fundamental 
principle remains constant when people engage in deliberations. Furthermore, the process 
of taking council frequently entails consulting other persons. Drawing on Aquinas's 
theory of prudence, Kaveny (2006) has suggested that the diversity sought by presidential 
commissions on bioethics should be gauged by the principles of deliberative diversity. 
The President plays a key role in this process since he is the major "deliberating agent" 
who requests counsel from the committee members of such advisory body: 
The diversity in membership required depends upon the particular question about 
which the President seeks advice. Seeking certain types of diversity would be 
highly inappropriate. As I noted above, it would be counterproductive to the 
deliberative process for the President to seek counsel from someone who doubted 
the worthwhileness of the end that serves as a basic principle of his deliberations. 
It would also not be productive for him to appoint someone who called into 
question his basic principles of morality, including political morality, or common 
sense truths about the nature of things. (p. 327) 
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Kaveny (2006) recognizes that such notion of deliberative diversity may seem 
incompatible with the values of representative democracy since there is an implicit 
assumption that participation in deliberations will be limited to those who share the basic 
views of the President. Nonetheless, she claims that the practical wisdom justifies the use 
of such method of deliberation since it is unrealistic to expect that the President will seek 
council from individuals who are fundamentally opposed to his worldviews. The method 
appears more efficient when the diversity of relevant expertise, practical solutions and 
theoretical approaches do not conflict with the mandate and moral parameters of the 
commission set out by the person seeking council, the President. 
It is not clear, however, how exactly the underlying principles of the epistemic 
model of diversity proposed by Kaveny (2006) differ from the disputatio method utilized 
by the Kass Council, given that both methods presuppose that the decision-making 
process on controversial bioethical issues is shaped by one person's worldview on 
morality and law, either that of the master or of the deliberative agent, the President. The 
similarities are especially visible when one considers particular policy outcomes on 
bioethical issues that are produced by these methods of deliberation. In the cloning 
report, the Kass Council resorted to moral values derived from a conservative 
philosophical tradition of skepticism toward Post-Enlightenment philosophical 
perspectives on nature and law in order to recommend a ban on all human cloning that 
was not necessarily consistent with the existing legal framework and societal values. The 
deliberative diversity model, which has not been tested in actual policy deliberations yet, 
relies heavily on the practical wisdom of the person in charge of a particular institution in 
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the executive branch of government, the Presidency. It is unlikely, therefore, that policy 
recommendations of presidential commissions appointed by this principle will challenge 
the President's initial position on the issues at hand. The fundamental question which 
remains is how to ensure a broad political legitimacy of policy recommendations 
achieved by means of these two epistemic models of diversity, a goal which may not 
achievable by endorsing a comprehensive moral view incompatible with the shared 
values of democratic polity or by assuming that the President's actions as a deliberative 
agent will be essentially, and in all cases, guided by the principles of the public reason. 
Finally, it is worth considering, in the context of the stem cell controversy, 
arguments that public policy outcomes on controversial moral issues should abide by an 
overarching moral principle. This position was endorsed by conservative PCBE members 
in the report on human cloning, and later on, during the Council's deliberations on the 
issue of stem cell research. Proponents of this mode of deliberation indicated that the 
controversy over the use of human embryos "should be resolved on the basis of a moral 
rule, not by shiftable tally on a balance sheet of benefits" (PCBE, 2002, p. 57). This mode 
of reasoning stood at stark contrast with the position of the Clinton Commission which 
deliberately refused to engage in moral analysis for its own sake on any of the bioethical 
issues under consideration. However, some PCBE members (i.e., the Chairman Leon 
Kass, Gilbert Meilaender, a professor of Christian ethics at Valparaiso University, Robert 
P. George, Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, among others) 
aggressively advocated a deontological position in bioethical decision-making that 
postulates the absolute validity and non-contingency of moral rules in protection of early 
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embryonic life (Meilaender, 2001; George & Tollefsen, 2008). This moral absolutism 
rests on the assumption that the blastocyst is a locus of absolute dignity which 
necessitates the protection of its integrity at all cost. Subsequently, this position perceives 
the embryo at all developmental stages as morally equivalent to born people and 
advocates that pre-personal forms of life should be granted equal status in the moral 
community of persons. It is necessary to specify that this is only one strain of 
deontological thought since deontologists who support the developmental view of 
personhood insist that the blastocyst does not have the status of a human person. Unlike 
consequentialist moral theories that maintain that the rightness or wrongness of an action 
depends on its consequences, deontologists invariably believe that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action should be gauged in accordance with pre-existing, fundamental 
moral rules. The deontological approach to moral issues is commonly exemplified in 
reference to Kant's categorical imperative, and more specifically, the principle that 
persons must be treated as ends rather than as means. This principle translates into the 
notion of persons having inalienable rights and the moral imperative that under no 
circumstances can person's life be sacrificed to achieve some greater good. Under the 
categorical imperative, human life has an intrinsic value and cannot be treated 
instrumentally, that is, as means to achieve the common good. For those who advocate a 
deontological approach to the issue of stem cell research, the fundamental dilemma then 
becomes whether the categorical imperative applies to the blastocysts that are destroyed 
in the process of creation of hESC lines. Furthermore, is it legitimate to treat early 
embryos as persons that have inalienable rights? Should we take seriously arguments 
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against hESC research based on the assumption that the embryo, from the moment of 
conception, has full rights of personhood? 
An intriguing deontological perspective on the issue of stem cell research was 
elaborated by the PCBE member Gilbert Meilaender in his article "The Point of a Ban or, 
How to Think about Stem Cell Research" (2001). In order to defend the federal ban on 
funding for hESC research, Meilaender (2001) has used the analogy of the ethics of 
warfare, and more specifically, Michael Walzer's theory of just war in which he 
distinguishes two kind of moral judgments: about when it is permissible to go to war (the 
theory of aggression) and about what it is permissible to do in war (the war convention) 
While endorsing a deontological approach to moral issues, Walzer has proposed the 
concept of supreme emergency as an ethical justification for the just war. The underlying 
assumption is that, even in the conditions of war, the moral limits set by deontology, i.e. 
the inviolable human rights of civilians, should always remain in place. These limits can 
be transgressed only in the most extreme cases of moral and strategic necessity. When 
such situations occur, the moral norms are temporary overridden; however, they can 
never be simply set aside. Although the limits set out by deontology are temporarily 
suspended for the reason of a just war, they must be promptly put back in place, or 
otherwise, the transgressors will bear a burden of criminality. In other words, while 
asserting the absolute validity of fundamental moral principles, Walzer has recognized 
that certain situations warrant a provisional adoption of a "utilitarianism of extremity," a 
position which is well-expressed by his maxim: "Do justice unless the heavens are 
(really) about to fall" (p. 231, Qtd. in Meilaender, 200 I, p. l 0). Meilaender (2001) draws 
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on the Walzer' s theory and the notion of supreme emergency to refute arguments by the 
bioethicists McGee and Caplan that a deontological position, which grants personhood 
and human rights to the embryo, does not rule out the possibility for an ethical 
justification for the destruction of blastocysts in hESC research. In their article, McGee 
and Caplan ( 1999) have emphasized the urgency of supporting biomedical research that 
has the potential to alleviate tremendous suffering and save numerous lives. They have 
also suggested that presently there is a supreme moral necessity of eradicating the worst 
degenerative diseases which can overrule fundamental moral principles protecting 
embryonic life. In contemporary societies where the lives of millions of people are 
threatened by fatal ailments, they claim, "the moral imperative of compassion[ ... ] 
compels stem cell research" (McGee & Caplan, 1999, p. 153). Even if we accept the 
validity of deontological arguments about the embryo's equal moral status, the 
development of hESC research constitutes an ethical case of supreme emergency which 
justifies the killing of embryos in the interest of saving the community of human persons. 
The moral dilemma in stem cell research thus appears similar to "the dilemmas of war" 
faced by those whose cause is just and who cannot win unless they violate the war 
convention. 
Nonetheless, Meilaender (2001) disagrees with this justification of sacrificing 
embryos in research and points out that it is hard to sustain claims about the development 
of medical treatments through stem cell research as an ethical case of supreme 
emergency, which can override the moral limits demarcated by deontology. In his view, 
relieving human suffering is a real concern; however, it does not constitute a supreme 
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imperative that necessitates resorting to a utilitarianism of extremity. He explains his 
position on stem cell research in reference to what Walzer has defined as a "sliding 
scale." In order to preserve the genuine dualism in just war theory (the two types of moral 
judgments), Walzer has warned that the moral urgency of winning a just war can make us 
impatient with moral prohibitions on means to achieve such victory. Subsequently, we 
may become tempted to violate moral rules that should never be violated and commit acts 
of war that are always wrong, even they are pursued for a good cause (i.e. actions that 
lead to destruction disproportionate to the good they would bring). The sliding scale is 
simply a way to erode the just war theory's distinction between the two kinds of moral 
judgments by resorting to utilitarian calculus on moral limits in war actions. Walzer 
emphasizes the need to resist a sliding scale by accepting that the rules of war are 
unconditional moral prohibitions that can never be violated even in order to defeat 
aggression. This approach is suggestive of a type of moral absolutism, "deontology with 
teeth" that preserves the important distinction between reasoning about how to fight and 
how to win a just war (Meilaender, 2001, p. 10). As Meilaender (2001) points out, 
although prohibitions on fighting in just war can make it more difficult to achieve the 
good ends, this does not warrant arguments against such prohibitions: 
The morality of warfare involves both judgments about values to be realized and 
rights to be upheld. When important values cannot be realized without violating 
rights, it would be peculiar simply to note this fact as an argument in favor of 
violating rights-as if a ban on such violation were out of the question. It might be 
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that we should do justice even if the heavens will fall, even if those values cannot 
then be realized or must be pursued in some slower, less certain, manner. (p. 10) 
Nonetheless, Walzer is reluctant to commit to such moral absolutism and adopts an 
alternative approach which allows for the "utilitarianism of extremity." By contrast, 
Meilaender (2001) commits to a "deontology with teeth" approach and suggests that in 
the case of stem cell research we should be "doing justice even if the heavens are about to 
fall" (p. 15). Ultimately, he warns that lifting the federal ban on funding for hESC 
research would not only temporary override inviolable moral norms, but will eventually 
become a permanent condition that will normalize such morally questionable practices. 
There is a real danger that the goal to alleviate human suffering and eradicate would 
never be simply perceived as case of supreme emergency and would instead commit us to 
a utilitarian calculus in terms of a sliding scale. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I reviewed contestations around the biopolitics of hESC research 
and related embryo technologies that can allow us to select the persons that will be 
brought into existence (Cole-Turner, 2003; Habermas, 2003; Rose, 2007b; PCBE, 2002). 
These perspectives alert us to societal challenges presented by molecular revolutions and 
predict a dystopian future in which human dignity and equality will be imperiled unless 
we develop political measures and moral guidance to prevent the self-instrumentalization 
of humanity. Although both reproductive and stem cell technologies are still considered 
controversial due to differing positions on the moral status of the human embryo, most 
urgent concern has arisen around intersections of these embryo technologies with the 
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techniques of inheritable genetic modification which have opened up the possibility for 
designing persons. One of these technologies, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 
has made possible the detection of a range of monogenetic disorders and chromosomal 
abnormalities in IVF embryos and its applications could enable prospective parents to 
select embryos for implantation that are free from specific diseases. Nonetheless, its non-
therapeutic uses, such as sex selection and phenotype modifications in humans, remain 
highly contested, particularly as some regulatory environments have normalized the 
creation of designer babies. Over the last decade, stem cell research and related embryo 
technologies have increasingly attracted substantial investments by biotech companies 
and national governments. These new biomedical technologies are presently an integral 
part of the emerging global bioeconomy that thrives on permissive regulatory 
environments around the world. Therefore, it is by no means surprising that scholars 
across academic disciplines have strived to develop critical responses to new 
developments in biomedicine that could infringe on personal autonomy and alter essential 
aspects of the human situation. In The Future of Human Nature, which outlines a 
philosophical critique of liberal eugenics, Habermas (2003) has suggested that the vital 
questions arising from the technologies of human genetic modification are moral 
questions of radically different nature, as they touch on the ethical self-understanding of 
humanity. Furthermore, he has endorsed a departure from a proceduralist resolution of° 
moral controversies towards a substantivist ethical doctrine of human nature based on the 
notion of "the ethics of the species." While his concern is understandable in context of 
societal challenges posed by PGD and stem cell research, it is problematic to assert that a 
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substantivist ethical perspective on human nature constitutes the pre-condition for the 
development of correct ethical self-understanding since such a philosophical position 
inevitably defies the proceduralist and cognitivist post-conventional morality at the heart 
. of contemporary pluralistic discourse. Habermas's ethical perspective on new biomedical 
technologies has therefore renounced the abstract character of his proceduralism which 
presupposes that the political process is not shaped by any particular conception of the 
public good. 
The chapter also provided a critical reflection on different theoretical frameworks 
that could be used to conceptualize the vital political issues arising from stem cell 
research and its intersection with other technologies of the embryo. I argued that 
sociological analyses influenced by Foucault's late work on biopolitics and 
govemmentality tend to either overlook or simply dismiss the sense of urgency 
surrounding bioethical discourses on new developments in biomedicine and the 
biosciences. Scholars whose work is shaped by "the history of the present" paradigm 
view collective mobilizations in the field of biotechnology and regulatory attempts to 
establish normative limits to biomedical interventions as simple effects of the apparatus 
of government and the new trajectories of biopolitics which are producing a novel type of 
corporeal, neurochemical selves oriented towards a greater choice, prudence and 
responsibility in ethical actions, social practices, and political decisions. When applied to 
the stem cell controversy, the analytics of govemmentality and biopolitics is 
counterproductive, as it emphasizes the submission of discourse participants to scientism 
and rationality and fails to recognize possibilities for a reflexive societal critique and 
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social change by means of consensus-oriented approaches. Therefore, I have suggested 
that the normative notion of public sphere as part of social life, where public opinion on 
issues of common political concern can be formed through rational-critical discourse, 
constitutes a more relevant analytical framework to examine scientific controversies with 
heavy political and ethical overlays, such as stem cell research and human cloning. 
Habermas' s model of deliberative democracy and his notion of discourse ethics provide 
useful analytical lens to examine whether regulatory responses to hESC research have 
reflected a wide public consensus on the ethical dilemmas. Yet, I have argued that there 
are certain limitations in Habermas' s model of universalistic justification of norms in 
practical discourse, as a normative ideal of rational will formation and collective 
decision-making in the democratic public sphere, which are reflected in public debates on 
the issue of stem cell research. Over the years, he has continually revised his original 
conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere as a pristine realm of rational-critical 
discourse to incorporate the principles of discourse ethics and, later on, emphasize 
constitutional patriotism. Nonetheless, his strong consensus-oriented model of pubic 
reason requires that all participants in practical discourse of justification transcend 
interest-oriented and value-based positions in order to arrive at a shared understanding in 
accordance with universal moral norms. In our pluralistic societies, however, rational 
agreement on practical-political matters is not always an attainable goal, especially on 
highly contested moral issues, such as stem cell research, whose resolution requires that 
fundamental value differences between discourse participants are neutralized. Policy 
deliberations on such controversies, however, often lead to procedural disagreements 
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over the normative standards of debate, and subsequently, differences in identities, 
situations and experience between participants are amplified and become irreconcilable 
value disagreements. Therefore, critics have pointed out that Habermas's strong 
epistemic model needs to be revised to acknowledge that conflicts and disagreements 
exist even at the level of moral principles and fundamental procedures (Bohman and 
Rehg, 1997; McCarthy, 1992). Furthermore, we need to acknowledge the essentially 
conflicting nature of political discourse and the inevitable limitations in appeasing strong 
moral and policy disagreements in contemporary pluralistic societies. 
Finally, the chapter examined methods of public deliberation, endorsed by the two 
U.S. national bioethics commissions in their reports on stem cell research and human 
cloning. The Clinton commission sought a consensus-oriented approach to public 
deliberation in accordance with the "reasonable pluralism" of philosophical, religious and 
other comprehensive doctrines or worldviews in contemporary democratic societies. The 
NBAC members recognized the diverse and strongly held moral views on the issue of 
stem cell research and emphasized the need to establish a common ground that would be 
acceptable to the vast majority of people regardless of their conflicting views on the 
moral standing of the human embryo. The Commission engaged in the balancing act of 
developing stem cell policies which would show respect for all reasonable positions on 
the issues at hand while, at the same time, emphasize fundamental values affirmed by 
these conflicting views. By contrast, its successor, the Bioethics Council appointed by 
President Bush did not initially endorse a method of reasoning oriented towards 
overlapping consensus, but rather sought to achieve a deeper understanding of the moral 
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dilemmas opened up by controversial biomedical research. The Council primarily aimed 
to develop substantive insights and arguments on the challenges presented by advances in 
biomedical technology, and therefore, its members showed little interest in outlining 
procedures that would guarantee diversity of perspectives. Neither did the Council 
members achieve a common understanding of what type of policies regarding embryo 
research would best serve the common good. Nonetheless, when this approach failed to 
produce adequate policy recommendations on the issue of research cloning, the Council 
resorted to the consensus approach endorsed by the Clinton Commission, which was 
more consistent with the shared political culture and underlying values of a pluralistic 
democratic society. 
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CHAPTER6 
TWO POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
This chapter offers a comparative perspective on the US and the EU stem cell 
policies. It examines different cultural, political and social factors that have contributed to 
collective mobilizations around the issue of hESC research and have influenced policy 
outcomes in these two political entities. In the US societal controversies over the morality 
of research involving human embryos and fetuses have their own complex histories that 
have uniquely shaped the public responses to stem cell research. The stem cell 
controversy quickly became implicated in America's relentless "culture wars" as 
opinions on the issue were formed along the existing political divisions between liberals 
and conservatives. It constituted yet another chapter in a long-term science policy debate 
which originated with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade in 1973. This was a 
much-contested decision that legalized abortion nationwide, but also had some far-
reaching social and political implications, as it placed women and their fetuses at the 
center of some of the most heated debates in contemporary American history. The 
landmark ruling that the fetus is not a person within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, 
and therefore does not have the constitutionally protected rights of a person, quickly 
raised concerns among social conservatives and anti-abortion activists about the use of 
aborted fetuses in biomedical research. As many women celebrated the affirmation of 
their right to choose, others imagined the possibility of horrific experimentations 
conducted on fetuses from terminated pregnancies. Subsequently, conflicts on the 
questions of fetal personhood and abortion became intertwined with discussions about 
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scientific research which uses embryos and fetuses. Some pro-life advocates in America 
had even perceived the use of neutral clinical terms such as "embryo" and "fetus" as 
nothing more than a dehumanizing tactic by their pro-choice opponents. Therefore, it is 
by no means surprising that in America opposition to abortion and opposition to 
biomedical research that involves embryo destruction go hand in hand. 
The contentious public debate, which unfolded after the isolation of the first 
hESC lines in 1998, has revived some salient political themes of the earlier ethical 
controversies over abortion and fetal transplantation research. In the early 1990' s clinical 
trials with human fetal tissue were conducted on patients with Parkinson's disease, 
aplastic anemia, thalassemia, insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, the DiGeorge 
syndrome, Gaucher's disease, severe combined immunodeficiency, acute myelogenous 
leukemia, Fabry's disease, and the Hurler syndrome. Scientists and patients' rights 
organizations expected that a considerable number of patients with other conditions could 
also benefit from fetal tissue transplants. Based on the enormous therapeutic promise of 
fetal tissue transplantation, the Clinton administration did not hesitate to overturn the 
existing ban on federal funding. Under the directive of the previous Republican 
administration of George Bush, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
had suspended financial support for fetal transplantation research. With the lifting of the 
funding restrictions, the controversy over fetal tissue transplantation quickly revived old 
concerns regarding the morality of abortion, but also raised some novel bioethical issues: 
"Will the demand for fetal tissue donation encourage elective abortions? Should pregnant 
women have the right to designate recipients of fetal transplants? Is fetal transplantation 
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indeed effective and necessary? Is informed consent required for the use of fetal tissue for 
transplantation?" Arguments for the morality of abortion entered the controversy since 
fetal tissue transplants could be obtained through induced abortions only. Moreover, the 
issue mobilized different interests groups which presented competing arguments 
regarding the therapeutic benefits of fetal transplants. Knowledge claims by proponents 
and opponents were often supported with references to privately funded studies, which 
raised additional concerns about the impact of public and private funding on scientific 
innovation. The multi-dimensional controversy over fetal transplantation research in the 
1990's was not amenable to an easy closure or resolution, since it was not possible to 
constrain the arena of negotiation narrowly within any specific domain, such as science, 
ethics, law, or politics. 
The initial cycles of development in the stem cell policy debate have closely 
followed patterns of conflict discernible in the controversy on fetal transplantation 
research. Convergences could be found in two interrelated questions that have become 
central to both controversies: (1) the contested moral status of human embryos and 
fetuses, and (2) concerns regarding the key role of federal funding in encouraging and 
fostering scientific innovation in the biomedical field. As Robertson (201 Ob) has 
indicated in his analysis of the legal and constitutional issues pertaining to stem cell 
research, the U.S. debate over that last decade has largely focused on ethics and funding 
issues, rather than on positive law. Although several states have passed bills prohibiting 
embryo research and human cloning, much of the controversy has been about federal 
funding and administrative policy. From the very beginning, hESC research invigorated 
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the pro-life movement and the politics of abortion became implicated in policy debates 
on the issue. While the Supreme Court's abortion cases bear relevance for the stem cell 
controversy, there has never been a ruling on the constitutional status of embryos and 
most states have no law on that matter (Robertson, 201 Ob). The ruling in Roe v. Wade 
that fetuses do not have constitutionally protected rights as persons could be potentially 
extended to embryos, however, the real question is whether the federal government or 
different states would decide to protect embryos by prohibiting their creation for research 
and further destruction in research. Although the state can have legitimate interest in 
showing respect for early human life, the Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey have established that the government's actions should not curtail 
women's access to abortion. It is possible to argue that since embryos are outside the 
body, rulings regarding abortion do not apply in the case of hESC and state restrictions 
would be justifiable. Whether such a law meets a "rational basis justification" is 
important, however, we should also consider the impact of state restriction (Robertson, 
201 Ob). It is likely that laws that interfere with the creation of embryos for infertility 
treatments would be unconstitutional and would need more than just rational basis of 
justification since the interest in reproducing is constitutionally protected. Moreover, as 
Robertson (201 Ob) points out, whether decisions to restrict embryo research are 
constitutional valid "would depend on whether that research is part of a constitutionally 
protected right to research or is otherwise required as part of a negative right to obtain 
needed medical treatment" (pp. 193-194). If the restriction involves the content of ideas 
generated or knowledge produced in research, it is likely that the First Amendment will 
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be implicated, and therefore, the ban on research may turn out to be invalid. However, if 
it concerns only the methods or means used to generate knowledge, then such a method-
based restriction may be constitutional. Constitutional protection for hESC research and 
treatments will really depend on how demanding courts are in applying the rational test 
basis, e.g. if the test is "more akin to the intermediate scrutiny standard sometimes used 
in evaluating non-content based restrictions on speech, then state restrictions on embryo 
research might be struck down" (Robertson, 2010b, p. 194). Furthermore, an additional 
basis for constitutional protection for stem cell research may be found in "a fundamental 
negative right to have and use effective medical treatments as part of a person's due 
process right to life or liberty" (Robertson, 201 Ob, p. 194 ). Although the courts have not 
yet recognized a negative right to receive necessary medical treatments, Robertson 
(20 l Ob) hypothesizes that there might be a greater judicial scrutiny over hESC research 
in the future, especially when hESC therapies are established as safe and effective 
medical treatments and provided that any American state attempts to prevent their use. 
Over the last ten years, the major issue in the U.S. stem cell debate remained the 
federal funding policy. This clearly demonstrates convergences between hESC research 
and the preceding controversy on fetal transplantation research, which has also largely 
focused on funding restrictions imposed by the administration. These two ethical 
controversies are indicative of how scientific innovation is traditionally regulated and 
funded in America. The major sponsor of basic biomedical research in the U.S. is the 
federal government, which usually relegates the responsibility for allocating funds to the 
NIH, a federal agency under the umbrella of the DHHS. Although private pharmaceutical 
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and biotechnological companies are generally interested in sponsoring biomedical 
research with potential commercial applications, basic research which generates 
fundamental knowledge in the biosciences and biomedicine comprises only a small 
percentage of all private sectors investments. As indicated a report on stem cell research 
commissioned by the U.S. National Research Council in 2001, private investments in 
biomedical innovation reached not more than 14 percent in the 1990s, with 
pharmaceuticals being the main area of interests for biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies (Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine, 2002). It is rather paradoxical that, 
while the issue of federal funding became dominant in the stem cell debate, there has 
been little concern about restricting private investments in the developments of hESC 
therapies. This seems to be a peculiar characteristic of the U.S. science policy regarding 
innovations in biomedicine. Generally, regulation at the federal level is implemented 
through funding, rather than through federal or state laws, which often results in a 
regulatory vacuum (e.g., there is a regulatory discrepancy between publicly funded 
projects and research supported by privately sponsors). Therefore, my analysis of the 
U.S. federal policies on stem cell research during Clinton, Bush and Obama's 
presidencies (outlined in Table 1) will focus primarily on the debate on federal funding. 
Furthermore, the US debate on the federal funding for hESC research was 
intertwined with overarching ethical and philosophical critiques of biotechnology and 
biomedical research. Over the last ten years, bioconservatives have become leading 
voices in America's bioethical debates and have succeeded in framing the issue of hESC 
research as intricately related to the negative impacts of modem science and technology 
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on the future of humanity and American democracy (Fukuyama, 2003; Cohen, 2008; 
Levin, 2008). Science debates on a wide range of topics, such as stem cell research, 
global warming, human cloning, and evolution have reflected America's culture wars. 
The most common reference for conservative critiques of the moral premises of modem 
science has become what the PCBE Chair Leon Kass has described as "the immortality 
project." Kass (2003) believes that the inability of people in contemporary society to 
come to terms with their own mortality, and subsequently, their desire to prolong 
youthfulness by sacrificing embryonic life in biomedical research, is deeply rooted in the 
individualistic philosophy of ethical liberalism. Others, like Fukuyama (2003) and Cohen 
(2008), have expressed communitarian concerns about the devastating social and 
geopolitical consequences of increased longevity. Fukuyama (2003) has claimed that 
advances in regenerative medicine made possible by stem cell research will lead to the 
prolongation of human life span far beyond what we can imagine today. While nowadays 
the average life span is roughly 75 years for men and 80 for women, the biotech 
companies aim to extend living to 125 or even 150 years. He argues that this possibility, 
albeit only hypothetical, raises significant ethical challenges concerning the biopolitics of 
aging. The normalization of extended life spans will lead to profound demographic and 
social changes in the advanced Western countries. These aging societies will face 
enormous burdens on their social security systems, but also strategic challenges in 
national and global politics. 
Stem cell policy in the European Union is not less complicated, as it was shaped 
by diverse cultural contexts, national histories, political and religious divisions, as well as 
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by the ambitious project of European integration. While regulatory contexts for stem cell 
innovation in the member states significantly differ, science policymaking at the 
supranational level is influenced by the EU traditioJ?al consensus politics. Most research 
activities in the field of stem cell research are currently being carried out with EU 
funding for transnational research networks that involve collaborations between the 
member states. As indicated in the report the Expert Group on Science and Governance 
at the Directorate-General for Research of the European Commission, the EU' s strategic 
investment in the development of stem cell technologies and regenerative medicine has 
largely been driven by the political goal of establishing the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge based economy (Wynne et al., 2007). Currently, research across 
Europe is conducted on embryonic, iPS cells, fetal, adult and tissue-derived stem cells. 
Hovatta et al. (2010) have indicated that the field of stem cell research in Europe is so 
quickly expanding that there is a constant need to update policies both at the EU level and 
in member states that have passed laws to regulate research endeavors in regenerative 
medicine. Similarly, the ethical dilemmas are constantly shifting, as the controversy over 
hESC research is presently complicated by new ethical concerns arising from recent 
experiments with iPS cells. Hovatta et al. (2010) also point out that the European Science 
Foundation (ESF) has only recently updated the information on the stem cell policy in the 
30 ESF membership countries (although there are 27 EU member states, the ESF funds 
scientific research in 30 European countries, with the non-EU members being Turkey, 
Croatia, and Norway). Based on their data, 25 countries have adopted legislation which 
explicitly prohibits human reproductive cloning (excluding Poland, Lithuania, Ireland, 
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Croatia, and Luxembourg). Seven countries have passed laws that sanction the derivation 
of new hESC lines from supernumerary IVF embryos (Belgium, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, Spain, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Portugal). These countries also permit 
SCNT, with the exception of Finland and the Czech Republic, where the law does not 
explicitly states whether the cloning technology is prohibited or allowed. Only three 
countries, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have adopted legislation 
permitting the creation of human embryos specifically for research, although under strict 
conditions. As of 2010, seventeen countries have explicitly permitted the derivation of 
hESC from supernumerary IVF embryos, while six countries do not have specific laws 
regulating stem cell research (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Romania, and 
Turkey). 
In the following sections, I explore in greater detail how the heated U.S. national 
debate on hESC research has unfolded in the context of vigorous anti-abortion advocacy, 
the existing congressional ban (i.e., the Dickey-Wicker Amendment) on federal funding 
for research that creates or destroys human embryos, and America's relentless culture 
wars. I emphasize the differences between the stem cell policy adopted by Bush 
administration and Obama' s guidelines for federal funding for hESC research. I also 
briefly outline some recent legal challenges to the current administration's permissive 
stem cell policy. The chapter further discusses major socio-political factors and cultural 
differences between EU member states that have influenced policy decisions regarding 
the funding and development for stem cell technologies. I analyze the complicated 
regulatory environment of the EU, as well as discrepancies between national 
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governments which have adopted a variety of approaches to regulating stem cell research. 
More specifically, I discuss four policy alternatives adopted by the EU member states: 
permissive, permissive compromise, restrictive compromise, and prohibited hESC policy. 
The U.S. Debate on Federal Funding 
Robertson (201 Oa) has indicated that the science policy of a country could be 
defined as the aggregate of laws and policies that determine the direction of scientific 
development and the overall use of science. This definition, however, is rather broad as it 
may be easily confused with general descriptions of innovation policy. He further points 
out that the term is better understood when used to describe a smaller 'subset of laws that 
have a direct impact on science practice, e.g. the laws and policies that can facilitate, 
subsidize, impede, enable, or regulate scientific activities. Robertson (201 Oa) has 
suggested that analyses of science policy should engage primarily with that particular 
body of laws and polici~s which can help us see the multifaceted and often complicated 
interactions between society and science that stimulate scientific advances and their 
practical applications. In most cases, the goal of science policy is to support and advance 
science in all reasonable ways, e.g. by providing subsidies for education, training and 
research, creating favorable patent and trade policies, and removing constraints on certain 
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research activities. Sometimes, however, science policy aims to restrict certain ways in 
which science develops and limits how it is used. 
The history of the stem cell controversy in the United States illustrates this dual 
nature of science policy (Table 2). Discoveries in the field of human stern cell research 
have raised concerns about the ethical regulation of scientific practices and general 
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disagreements about how biomedical science should develop. When on November 6, 
1998 Wisconsin developmental biologist Dr. James Thomson and his team reported the 
first ever isolation of hESC lines in the prestigious journal Science, researchers, scientists 
and health administrators immediately predicted that stem cell research would lead to 
new therapies for some of the worst human diseases. The discovery took place in the 
political climate of strong pro-life activism and contentious debates over the morality of 
embryo research. It was not surprising that stem cell research was quickly implicated in a 
long-term science policy debate on the use of human embryos and fetuses in research. 
Moreover, the socio-political conditions for stem cell innovation were unfavorable since 
there was a strong opposition against any human embryo research in the Congress, which 
the Republican Party had taken back in the 1994 midterm elections. As I have previously 
indicated, basic biomedical research which generates fundamental knowledge in 
medicine and the biosciences is primarily funded by the federal government through the 
NIH, whose annual budget in 2007 was approximately $29.4 billion. Dr. Thomson's 
work on the isolation of the first hESC lines in the late 1990s was not eligible for NIH 
funding due to the 1995 congressional ban. The rider, known as the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment, was attached to the 1995 appropriation bill and prohibited public funding 
for both research that creates human embryos and research that destroys embryos and 
fetuses. Therefore, the isolation of the first hESC lines was supported by private sponsors 
like the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and the California-based biotech 
company Geron. It is worth mentioning that in America private funding for biomedical 
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research that involves the destruction of embryos has never been outlawed or regulated 
by the federal government. 
The initial disapproval of hESC research by religious groups and pro-life 
constituencies was by no means surprising; the ethical controversy constituted yet 
another chapter in an enduring public debate on the morality of research involving human 
embryos and fetal tissue. The earlier constitutional debate on abortion provided a 
background for the development of the stem cell controversy. In 1973 the abortion was 
legalized nationally with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade that the fetus is not 
considered a person as defined by the Constitution, and therefore, it does not have 
constitutionally protected rights. In the aftermath of this legal precedent, interest groups 
and some members of Congress became concerned about the potential uses of aborted 
fetuses in scientific research. In 1973 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(DHEW) established a moratorium on funding for research on live human fetuses. A year 
later, the U.S. Congress imposed a temporary moratorium on federal funding for clinical 
research which may use "a living human fetus, before or after the induced abortion of 
such fetus, unless such research is done for the purpose of assuring the survival of such 
fetus" (PCBE, 2004). The development of IVF technology by Dr. Robert Edwards and 
Patrick Steptoe and the birth of the world's first "test tube" baby, Louise Brown, on July 
25, 1978 in Manchester, England significantly contributed to the ethical controversy over 
advancements in human embryo research. Between 1975 and 1993, the U.S. federal 
government did not fund any controversial embryo research, including promising new 
technologies in the field of assisted human reproduction. Restrictions on government 
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funding for embryo research had a negative impact on the overall development of 
biomedical science as the development of IVF technologies was relegated to the largely 
unregulated private sector, where there was little interest in supporting basic research and 
its non-commercial applications. Subsequently, scientists and proponents of embryo 
research have repeatedly voiced concerns that the lack of government sponsorship in the 
biomedical field during that period had significantly impeded medical research on human 
infertility, congenital disorders, cancer, as well as the development of innovative methods 
for diagnosis of genetic diseases in embryos (Dunn 2005; Scott 2006). 
The federal science policy changed in 1993 with a historical decision of the 
Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress to allow federal funding for some types of 
human embryo and fetal research (i.e., fetal transplantation research). After his election in 
1992, President Clinton asked the newly appointed Director of NIH, Harold Vamos, to 
develop guidelines for embryo research. Two years later, the NIH Human Embryo 
Research Panel (HERP) developed recommendations to fund research on both 
supernumerary IVF embryos and embryos created for research purposes. Regardless of 
the panel's recommendations, President Clinton was cautious and approved federal 
funding only on spare embryos created specifically for infertility treatments. However, 
the policy did not last long since the GOP took control of the Congress in 1994. The 
Republican majority quickly moved forward a bill prohibiting the use of federal funds for 
any research activities in which a human embryo is either destroyed or created. The 1995 
congressional ban was attached to a bill appropriating funds for NIH, and has since been 
renewed by the Congress each year in consecutive appropriation bills. Thomson's 
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discovery showed such great promise for the advancement of biomedicine that the 
Clinton administration sought legal advice on the possibility of funding hESC research. 
In January 1999 the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) released the 
legal opinion of their top lawyer Harriet Raab that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment did 
not apply to hESC cells per se. She claimed that, although hESC lines were derived from 
human embryos, they were not living organisms and thus did not fall under the statutory 
definition of "embryo" in the Congressional ban (Dunn, 2005). Robertson (201 Ob) has 
indicated that Harriet Raab' s legal advice was the key event in the federal funding debate 
on hESC research. Given that hES cells were not themselves embryos, there were no 
obstacles to funding research on these cells with federal money. Although opponents of 
embryo research insisted that funding for hESC research still violated the spirit of the 
Congressional ban, the legal opinion of the DHHS General Counsel was not challenged 
by either Congress or President Bush. Obviously, the Clinton administration was aware 
that taxpayers' money could not be used for the actual derivation of hES cells, a process 
which inevitable involves the destruction of human embryos. However, federal funding 
could be provided for research on existing hESC lines, on the condition that the 
derivation of these cells was carried out with private funds and took place in facilities not 
funded by the NIH. In 1999 the NIH, in consultation with the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC), immediately began drafting guidelines on the types of 
hESC research eligible for federal funding. It was ready to allocate grants when the new 
administration under President Bush halted such efforts in 200 l. 
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In his presidential campaign, George W. Bush strongly opposed the decision to 
allocate federal funding for hESC research. Shortly after the 2000 presidential elections, 
stem cell research became one of the most significant political issues arising from the 
rapid development of regenerative medicine and new health technologies. Commentators 
have observed that during the first eight months of the Bush Presidency, hESC research 
was the leading domestic issue, and it was not incidental that there were federal 
legislators who sought to criminalize this promising biomedical innovation (Devitt, 
2003). What stirred many people's emotions and made the issue especially contentious 
was the technology used to derive hES cells. The first hESC lines were extracted either 
from surplus IVF embryos, which were destroyed in the process, or from fetuses, which 
had been aborted and donated for research. In America, anything that seems to justify or 
support abortion is considered moral abomination by religious groups and social 
conservatives. The stem cell debate, therefore, became inextricably linked to the abortion 
controversy and moral questions of embryonic and fetal personhood and rights. The issue 
served well a conservative political agenda as it re-energized the pro-life movement and 
the religious right. At the same time, hESC research mobilized the pro-choice 
community, but also diverse groups that were not particularly concerned about abortion 
rights, such as patients' rights advocates, scientific societies, academic associations, and 
many citizens, who rallied in support of science and freedom of research. The 
controversy intensified when the Bush administration announced a new, more restrictive 
funding policy on stem cell research. In a televised address to the nation on August 9, 
2001, President Bush expressed the moral reservations of the religious right about hESC 
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research. He used Christian and pro-life rhetorics to argue that each one of the embryos 
from which stem cells were extracted was "unique, with the unique genetic potential of 
an individual human being" (Bush, 2001, p. 12). He also emphasized the connection 
between stem cell research and human cloning by using the dystopian imagery of 
Huxley's Brave New World: "We have arrived at that brave new world that seemed so 
distant in 1932 when Aldous Huxley wrote about human beings created in test tubes in 
what he called a "hatchery." In recent weeks, we learned that scientists have created 
human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them. This is deeply troubling." 
(Bush, 2001, p. 12). The President further indicated that his decision to limit federal 
funding for research only on the already existing seventy-eight hESC lines was 
influenced by his deep ethical concern about embryonic life, as well as by the imminent 
threat posed by scientific developments to the moral foundations of society. 
Stem cell research advocates have argued that the President's deep moral concern 
for the destruction of frozen embryonic life in research was nothing more than a 
rhetorical strategy to gain the support of conservative voters. The reality is that thousands 
left-over embryos are discarded from IVF clinics around the worlds annually and treated 
as medical waste. The chances that these embryos, whose viability decreases under 
prolonged cryopreservation, will ever be adopted are practically non-existent. Stem cell 
proponents have argued that if frozen IVF embryos are anyway routinely destroyed, then 
it is unlikely that a ban on federal funding for hESC research will save their lives. Over 
the years, public opinion polls on the issue of stem cell research have shown variations 
depending on the organization conducting the survey and the phrasing of the questions 
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asked. Nonetheless, polls conducted in the summer of 2001, around the time of the 
presidential announcement of the funding restrictions, have indicated that most 
Americans supported stem cell research which uses surplus IVF embryos. For instance, a 
Harris poll conducted in July 2001, which specifically asked about stem cell derivation 
from this type of embryos, showed public support for hESC research at 61 % (Nisbett, 
2004b ). The restrictions on federal funding imposed by the Bush administration have 
prompted unprecedented level of grassroot activism on the issue. Many nationally 
established foundations, scientific societies, university associations and patients' rights 
groups have aggressively waged science education and media campaigns to promote stem 
cell research and secure private funding for the development of hESC therapies. In 2001, 
research advocates formed the nation leading pro-cure coalition, the Coalition for the 
Advancement of Medical Research (CAMR), whose main objective was to increase 
opportunities for federal funding of biomedical research on hES cells. The topic of stem 
cell research entered American pop culture when the Superman actor Christopher Reeve, 
left paralyzed from a spinal cord injury following a riding accident, and actor Michael J. 
Fox, diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 1991, became keen advocates for stem cell 
research. Furthermore, hESC research has received bipartisan support in the U.S. 
Congress. Prominent Republican Senators such as Orrin Hatch, Arlen Specter, John 
McCain, among others, have opposed the Bush administration's policy and have claimed 
that federal funding for hESC research is a necessary precondition for the development of 
regenerative medicine in an ethically responsible way. Nancy Reagan, whose husband the 
former President Ronald Reagan died on June 5, 2004 at the age of 93 after a ten-year 
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struggle with Alzheimer's disease, has played a leading role in ensuring the Republican 
support for a bill in favor of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. A bi-
partisan bill, under the name of The Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, was passed on 
May 24, 2005 in the Republican-controlled House by a 238-194 vote, with a group of 50 
Republicans in favor of it. Nonetheless, President Bush has consistently opposed 
legislation that would restore the funding stem cell policy of the Clinton administration. 
On July 18, 2006 the Senate voted 63 to 3 7 to loosen restrictions on federal funding for 
hESC research, just four votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to override a 
presidential veto. A day after the decision, President Bush vetoed the bill with the 
argument that such legislation "would support the taking of innocent human life in the 
hope of finding medical benefits for others" (CNN.com, 07/19/2006). This was the first 
time Bush used his veto power in his presidency. In 2007 legislators on Capitol Hill made 
another attempt to ease restrictions on federal funding for hESC research. In June the 
House granted final congressional approval for the Stem Cell Enhancement Act, 
however, President Bush again vetoed the bill. 
Other leading biotech countries' regulatory approaches to stem cell research, and 
related technologies, such as SCNT and hybrid embryo research, have influenced the 
U.S. science policy debate. Canada allowed hESC research using supernumerary IVF 
embryos, while prohibiting both reproductive and research cloning in 2004. That same 
year, the United Kingdom legalized the creation of hESC lines through SCNT. Its 
regulatory agency HFEA issued its first license for research cloning to a research team at 
Newcastle University's Institute of Human Genetics, which was working on the 
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development of hESC-based therapy for diabetes. The stem cell researchers were allowed 
to clone and grow human embryos for not more than 14 days for the purposes of 
extracting their stem cells (AP/CNN.com, 6/16/2004). This unprecedented decision made 
news around the world and provoked contentious debates on the global biopolitics of 
hESC research and human cloning. Some Asian countries, such as China, Japan and 
Singapore, have also regulated hESC research and legalized human cloning for research 
purposes. There is no federal legislation in the United States that regulates human cloning 
since the lawmakers could not achieve agreement on any of several drafts of cloning 
bills. Following the rejection of the Greenwood Substitute Amendment to allow the 
cloning of human embryos, the Weldon-Stupak Human Cloning Prohibition Act (H.R. 
2505) of July 31, 2001 prohibiting all types of human cloning was passed by the House 
(241-155) on February 27, 2003. This bill was strongly supported by President Bush an~ 
the National Right to Life Committee, but also received bipartisan support by some pro-
choice advocates, as many feared that the lack of regulation would lead to the 
normalization of ethically questionable practices such as the creation of "designer babies" 
and the commercialization of oocyte donation for stem cell research. The measure 
criminalized both reproductive and therapeutic cloning by establishing penalties of up to 
10 years in prison and a fine of$ l million for attempts to clone human embryos. The 
bill, however, never became a law as the Senate did not act upon it and left the matter to 
the l 08th Congress. 
In the meantime, the Biotechnology Industry Organization has effectively lobbied 
legislatures in states with large biotech industries to legalize research cloning (i.e., 
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California, New Jersey, Missouri, and Iowa). The Biotech Industry has also supported 
state initiatives and referendum measures that would secure state fun~ing for hESC 
research (Table 3). California and New Jersey were the first U.S. states that passed bills 
allowing SCNT for research purposes. Currently, fifteen states have passed laws 
prohibiting or regulating human cloning (more detailed information of these statutes is 
presented in Table 4). There seems to be a great discrepancy between state laws 
regulating human cloning. The State of California banned human reproductive cloning in 
1997. California legislature was followed by Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, New Jersey, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Virginia, which all have prohibited the reproductive cloning of humans. 
Arizona and Missouri have measures regulating the use of public funds for cloning, while 
Maryland does not allow state funds allocated for stem cell research to be used to finance 
·efforts for reproductive cloning, and possibly research cloning, depending on how one 
interprets the definition of human cloning in the statute. Louisiana also passed a bill that 
banned reproductive cloning but that law expired in July 2003. The laws of Arkansas, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, North Dakota, and South Dakota have clearly prohibited 
cloning for research purposes. By contrast, the law of Rhode Island does not explicitly 
prohibit research cloning. Ambiguities exist in Virginia's law, which generally prohibits 
human cloning, although conflicting interpretations are possible since the term "human 
being" used in the definition of human cloning is not defined by the law. Human cloning 
is defined by this law as the creation of or attempt to create a human being by transferring 
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the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into an oocyte from which the 
nucleus has been removed. 
In Chapter 3, I discussed in greater detail how the framing of hESC research as a 
moral issue closely related to the regulation of human cloning has become a major factor 
in sustaining the public controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. Presently, there is no 
global agreement over the issue of human cloning for either reproductive or therapeutic 
purposes. The human cloning controversy was fueled by the U.S. media which gave 
extended publicity to Clonaid's announcement in 2002 that their scientists had produced 
the world's first cloned baby, a girl named Eve. Most EU countries dissented from the 
UK Parliament's decision to legalize cloning for research purposes in 2000 since there 
were concerns around Europe and internationally about exaggerated expectations and 
misrepresentations of the clinical potential of research cloning (Cobbe, 2005). The 
urgency around the issue of human cloning was exemplified by the United Nations' 
failed attempt to pass a legally binding bioethical treaty which would prohibit human 
cloning internationally. The legislative process was initiated in August 2001 with a 
French-German proposal to the U.N. General Assembly for an international convention 
against the reproductive cloning of human beings which was supported by all members. 
During a session of the U.N. Legal Committee in November 2001, the Vatican insisted 
on expanding this initiative to include a prohibition on cloning for research purposes. 
This position was also supported by the U.S. and Costa Rica, and the two countries 
jointly submitted an alternative proposal for a ban on all types of cloning. In 2003 the Ad 
Hoc Committee of the U.N. Legal Committee reviewed both proposals, however, they 
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could not reach consensus on a resolution. After a two year deferral, on November 6, 
2005 the Assembly voted on the U.S.-Costa Rican proposal. The UN members could not 
decide if they should ban all human cloning, including the use of SCNT for stem cell 
derivation, or only reproductive cloning. The Unites States and 60 other countries 
supported a ban on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning, however, 24 nations 
wanted to prohibit only reproductive cloning. The treaty was not approved as the UN 
works on the basis of consensus. An international convention on human cloning was 
therefore not ratified, mainly due to the decision to conflate the issues of reproductive 
and therapeutic cloning. 
State Initiatives and Referendums 
Conflicts between national government and subnational governments over aspects 
of economic policy and social regulation often exemplify hidden tensions in federal 
systems of government. In the U.S. policy decisions of the Bush administration have 
triggered disagreements between the White House and state governments on key issues 
concerning education, welfare, homeland security, and environmental protection. The 
administration's approach to a variety of social issues, such as stem cell research, 
abortion, and gay marriage, has also prompted increasing state activism and policy 
initiatives. Stem cell policy initiatives in different states were developed in response to 
the federal government's failure to develop a comprehensive regulatory strategy for the 
advancement of regenerative medicine. Between 2001 and 2008, President Bush 
primarily aimed to appease conservative constituencies and adopted a policy of restrictive 
compromise, that is, federal funding was limited to research on the hESC lines created 
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prior to August 2001. There were no attempts to develop a national regulatory framework 
that would ensure the ethical governance of stem cell technologies and regenerative 
medicine. This approach to hESC research clearly illustrates the focus on deregulation 
and contentious embryo politics in the administration's policy decisions in the field of 
bioethics. Mintrom (2008) has argued that this lack of regulatory oversight at the national 
level had significantly undermined U.S. federalism by prompting states to assume a 
leadership role in the funding and regulation of stem cell research. 
State initiatives to regulate and fund hESC research were also a direct result of the 
unprecedented grassroot activism and awareness raised around the issue. Over the years, 
the Bush administration's decision to restrict federal funding became highly unpopular 
with the American people (Reynolds, 2008). Although in the beginning the general public 
was not familiar with the highly specialized policy debate, the voters' support for hESC 
research and legislative initiatives to restore federal funding has steadily increased after 
2004. Stem cell research became an important issue in the 2004 presidential race and then 
again in 2008. During both presidential races, the issue of federal funding was debated by 
the candidates in nationally televised presidential debates. Polls and public opinion 
research have shown that, for most Americans, the possibility of innovative medical 
treatments outweighed ethical concerns about the protection owed to embryonic life. 
According to a CBS News poll from May 24, 2005, a majority of Americans approved of 
the use of hES cells in medical research. Fifty-eight percent said they supported stem cell 
research, while 31 percent disapproved. Similarly, a July 2005 poll by Princeton Survey 
Research Associates for the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and the 
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New Forum on Religion & Public Life indicated that 57 per cent of respondents believed 
it was more important to conduct stem cell research than to avoid destroying human 
embryos. Similarly, the poll conducted by Knowledge Networks for the Genetics & 
Public Policy Center in September 2005 showed 66.6 per cent of the respondents 
approving embryonic stem cell research. Based on the survey of the Virginia 
Commonwealth University Life Sciences, conducted in September 2005, 58 per cent of 
the people favored medical research that uses stem cells from human embryos. Most polls 
indicated that public support for hESC research has continued to increase since 2005. In 
May 2006, a poll by the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research showed 73 
per cent of the Americans supporting ESC research, an increase of five points from the 
previous year. 
There has also been a growing public support for the application of cloning 
technology in stem cell research, although the issue of human cloning remains extremely 
controversial. A public opinion study on the topic, which was conducted in the summer 
of 2005 by Research/America, showed 69 per cent of the respondents in favor of the use 
of SCNT to create embryos for stem cell derivation. Yet, when a similar question was 
asked using the term "therapeutic cloning" the level of support dropped by 10 percentage 
points to 59 per cent approval. The survey also emphasizes the general public's concern 
that the United States should be a global leader in all areas of health-related research, 
with 95 per cent of the respondents thinking that global leadership is important. At the 
time, stem cell research advocates argued that the presidential veto on the Stem Cell 
Research Enhancement Act of 2005 would further weaken the global leadership of 
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America in the field of regenerative medicine. They believed that private investments and 
state initiatives in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland and New 
Jersey would not be sufficient to move forward the development of hESC-based 
therapies. The midterm congressional elections in November 2006 clearly indicated that 
the politics of stem cell research had divided the Republicans, while giving the 
Democrats a "wedge issue" to win the Congress. Democratic candidates did not hesitate 
to make hESC research a campaign issue in the congressional races around the country in 
order to increase the voters' turnout. They also hoped to take advantage of the split 
between conservatives opposing scientific innovations and those Republicans who were 
in favor of stem cell research. 
State initiatives {Table 3) in response to the restrictive federal policy started as 
early as 2004, with New Jersey becoming the first state to use taxpayers' money to 
finance hESC research. On June 25, 2004, the state legislators voted a state budget that 
allocated $9.5 million for the newly chartered Stem Cell Institute of New Jersey. On 
December 16, 2005, the State Commission on Science and Technology awarded $5 
million to research teams throughout the New Jersey. The decision of New Jersey to 
support hESC research was quickly followed by a referendum measure in California. 
California voters passed California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act (Proposition 71) 
on November 2, 2004. This ballot initiative was voted during the presidential elections 
and amended the state constitution to include a "right to conduct stem cell research" that 
would ensure legal protection and funding for this biomedical innovation. Under 
Proposition 71, the state of California was authorized to allocate 3 billion dollars for 
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hESC research over a period of l 0 years. Another response to federal funding restrictions 
put into place in 200 l came from Connecticut. On May 31, 2005 the state approved $100 
million in funding for human adult and embryonic stem cell research over a ten year 
period. On June 15, 2005 Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell signed the public act which 
allowed hESC research, while prohibiting human cloning. Similar funding initiatives took 
place in Illinois and Maryland. In Illinois, the Democratic Governor Rod Blagojevich 
decided to bypass the State Legislature and issued an executive order for the creation of a 
state funded stem cell research institute on July 13, 2005. The order stated that $10 
million from the budget of the Illinois Public Health Department should be allocated in 
funding for hESC research. A year later, Maryland implemented another stem cell 
funding initiative. On April 6, 2006 Governor Robert Ehrlich signed the Maryland Stem 
Cell Research Act which distributed $15 million in grants for hESC research. 
By the time of the midterm elections of 2006, two states were also planning 
referendum measures in support of hESC research. In June 2006 the New Jersey State 
Senate approved a bill for a referendum to approve borrowing $230 million funding for 
stem cell research. The initiative aimed to provide research grants to universities, 
academic medical institutions, and other research facilities. Although the Senate voted 
26-9 in favor of the bill proposed by Senate President Richard J. Codey and Sen. Barbara 
Buono, it was not considered by the Assembly before the August deadline and the 
referendum questions could not be included on the ballot. The ballot initiative in Missouri 
received significant media attention since the referendum was at the center of one of the 
most critical races for the U.S. Senate. In the months prior to the November elections, 
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The Missouri Coalition for Lifesaving Cures, which included patient rights' groups, 
medical organizations and ordinary citizens, had successfully mobilized voters and on 
August 8, 2006, the referendum measure was certified to be placed on the ballot as 
Amendment 2: Missouri Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. In the Senate race, the 
Democratic candidate Claire McCaskill supported a constitutional amendment to allow 
state funding for hESC research, while the Republican incumbent Jim Talent opposed it. 
A storm of media controversy developed around a campaign ad, in which Michael J. Fox 
suffering from Parkinson's disease emphasized the need for hESC research and endorsed 
McCaskill. The conservative media attacked the ad which showed the actor's body 
visibly wrecked by tremors. On the October 23 edition of his show, which reaches more 
than 13.5 million listeners each week, conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh accused 
the actor of "exaggerating the effects of the disease" and characterized his behavior as 
"shameless" and "purely an act." In an interview on CBS on October 24, Michael J. Fox 
responded that the uncontrollable shaking is caused by medications that keep Parkinson's 
patients from becoming stiff. Although Limbaugh apologized for his statements, he still 
claimed that the actor was "using his illness as a way to mislead voters into thinking that 
their vote for a single United States senator has a direct impact on stem cell research in 
Missouri." In November 2006, Amendment 2 was passed and the state constitution of 
Missouri was amended to ensure protection and funding for hESC research. 
Recent Legal Challenges 
A shift in the federal funding policy happened when the newly elected President 
Obama took office in Washington, DC. On March 9, 2009, President Obama issued 
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Executive Order 13505 Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving 
Human Stem Cells (White House Press Office, 2009). This order revoked the 
governmental policy of August 9, 2001, limiting federal funding for research involving 
hES cells, as well as President Bush's Executive Order 13435 of June 20, 2007, which 
had supplemented the August 9, 2001 presidential statement. The P.resident ordered the 
NIH to issue new guidelines for hESC research within 120 days. The executive order 
opened funding for research on spare human embryos created by in-vitro fertilization for 
reproductive purposes, although it also made NIH funds available for research on certain 
uses of human JPS cells. The NIH prepared and released funding guidelines for hESC 
research on July 7, 2009. 
The removal of the Bush administration's restrictions on federal funding for 
hESC research heightened expectations that an influx of federal funds would increase the 
rate of discoveries in stem cell science and finally move forward its much expected 
applications in clinical medicine (Robertson, 201 Ob). The decision of the Obama 
administration was timely since on January 23, 2009 the FDA had granted approval for 
the first clinical trial of a hESC-derived therapy in patients with acute spinal cord injury 
(http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01217008). Geron Corporation developed hESC-
Derived Oligodendrocytes (GRNOPC I) as a regenerative treatment for spinal cord 
injuries, although the company expects that it may have therapeutic utility for other 
central nervous system indications, such as Alzheimer's disease, stroke and multiple 
sclerosis. Geron is currently developing two other cell therapy products from 
differentiated hES cells -hESC-Derived Cardiomyocytes (GRNCMl) for treatment of 
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heart disease and hESC-Derived Islet Cells (GRNICl) which are insulin-producing cells 
(i.e. similar to pancreatic islet~ cells) derived from hESCs (Geron.com). Another biotech 
company, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), announced on April 28, 2011 that the Jules 
Stein Eye Institute at the University of California in LA has received institutional review 
board approval to conduct Phase 112 human clinical trials for Stargardt's Macular 
Dystrophy and Dry Age-Related Macular Degeneration using retinal pigment epithelial 
(RPE) cells derived from human ES cells (http://www.advancedcell.com/). 
Despite these recent advancements in clinical applications, Obama' s stem cell 
policy was unexpectedly challenged in court by two U.S. scientists, James Sherley and 
Theresa Deisher, who filed a lawsuit against the new NIH guidelines for research on hES 
cells. The scientists, whose work focuses on adult stem cells, claimed that the federal 
funding guidelines violated the Dickey-Wicker Amendment passed by the US Congress 
in 1995 and then renewed consecutively each year. This rider to a Senate appropriation 
bill prohibits the use of federal monies for research that creates or destroys human 
embryos. The plaintiffs also argued that allowing funding of hESC research would 
disadvantage scientists conducting research on adult stem cells, who would now face bias 
against their field of research, as well as harder competition for grant money. This was a 
surprising move since the NIH had already determined that allowing funding of research 
on hES cell lines, which had been previously created with private funds, would not 
constitute a violation of the 1995 congressional ban, especially since no embryos were to 
be created or destroyed in federally funded projects. Nonetheless, Judge Royce Lamberth, 
a district court judge in Washington DC, granted a preliminary injunction to stop all 
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federal funding for hESC research in August 2010, including research on previously 
established hESC lines with private funding. The federal government immediately 
appealed Lamberth's ruling. The injunction was temporarily lifted by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in September 2010. On 29 April 2011, the three-
judge panel issued its final ruling which vacated the preliminary injunction with a 2 to 1 
majority since the justices had determined that the NIH had correctly interpreted the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment. Justice Douglas Ginsburg, the chief judge of the appeals 
court, wrote for the court: "Dickey-Wicker is ambiguous and the NIH seems reasonably 
to have concluded that, although Dickey-Wicker bars funding for the destructive act of 
deriving an ESC [embryonic stem cell] from an embryo, it does not prohibit funding a 
research project in which an ESC will be used." 
(http://www.courthousenews.com/2011104/29/36224.htm). Another reason for 
overturning the preliminary injunction was that, in the opinion of the court, rather than 
protecting the funding efforts of the plaintiffs, the ban only unfairly threatens the 
government's significant investments in stem cell research projects. Judge Karen LeCraft 
Henderson, who dissented from the majority opinion, claimed that her colleagues on the 
panel had performed "linguistic jujitsu." She stated, "Breaking the simple noun 
"research" into "temporal" bits, narrowing the verb phrase "are destroyed" to an 
unintended scope, dismissing the definition section of implementing regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (in case the plain 
meaning of "research" were not plain enough), my colleagues perform linguistic jujitsu." 
(http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/04/29/36224.htm). 
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The ruling in favor of Obama stem cell policy by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, however, may not be the end of the le.gal battle. This decision referred 
the original case back to Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth of Federal District Court in 
Washington, and it is possible that the case may eventually get to the Supreme Court. 
The EU Consensus Approach 
Policy decisions regarding hESC research at the supranational level in the 
European Union reflect differences in political culture and societal conditions for the 
development of stem cell innovation throughout Europe. In contrast to the restrictive 
policy adopted by the Bush administration, the EU made public funds for hESC research 
available in 2002. Research projects in stem cell science were funded under the Sixth 
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2002-2006). 
Under this program, grants for stem cell research projects were allocated in accordance 
with strict ethical guidelines approved by the European Commission which had decided 
not to support the creation of human embryos for research purposes. Stem cell research 
on both embryonic and adult stem cells continues to be funded under the Seventh 
Framework programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013), 
regardless of the lobbying efforts of the Vatican to organize a "blocking minority" during 
the meeting of the Council of Research Ministers on July 24, 2006. At the time, some 
commentators viewed the failed attempt to block the Commission's proposal as an 
indication of the diminishing influence of the Catholic Church since the death of its 
charismatic leader, Pope John Paul II (Pichler, 2006). The political comprise on hESC 
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research achieved by the Council also exemplified the traditional EU consensus approach 
to political and social policy matters. 
The health applications of the life sciences, genomics and biotechnology were a 
major area for investment and research spending under the Sixth EU Framework 
Programme (FP6). As shown in Table 5, the overall spending for this thematic priority 
area, under which hESC research was funded between 2002 and 2006, reached 2.2 billion 
Euros. This compares with increased opportunities for research funding under the 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), which has similarly established thematic 
priorities for research funding (Table 6). The EU Member States have earmarked more 
than 6 billion Euros in research grants for projects in the thematic area of "Health," 
spending second only to the 9 billion Euro investments in "Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs ). " The primary aim of heavily funding biomedical 
and other health care related research, together with the "Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
and Biotechnology" research theme, is to build a European Knowledge Based Bio-
Economy (KEBE). In addition to defining thematic priority areas for funding, FP7 is 
structured in the following five programs: 1) Cooperation, which aims to foster 
collaboration between industry and academia in order to gain leadership in key 
technology areas; 2) Ideas, implemented by the European Research Council in support of 
basic research at the scientific frontiers; 3) People, which encourages mobility and career 
development for researchers both within and outside Europe; 4) Capacities, which aims 
to develop the capacities that Europe needs to be a thriving knowledge-based economy; 
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and, 5) Nuclear Research (the Euratom programme) which focuses on developing 
Europe's nuclear fission and fusion capabilities (FP7, 2007). 
Institutional and social dimensions of EU science and government are discussed 
in the report Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously of the Expert Group on 
Science and Governance which was appointed by the Science, Economy and Society 
Directorate at the EU Directorate General for Research (Wynne at al., 2007). This report 
was ordered by the European Commission and was released in 2007. The working group 
initially convened in July 2005 and then met five times for about two days each at 
roughly four-monthly intervals. Participants recognized that their mandate focused on 
three major concerns: 1) how to respond to the traditional public unease towards science 
in Europe, and especially, the new science-based technologies; 2) the need to improve 
public participation in European science and governance; and 3) how to address urgent 
European policy challenges that are often considered strictly scientific in nature (Wynne 
et al., 2007). The group pointed out that there are two specific ways to manage and 
encourage innovation and technological change in contemporary societies-through a 
regime of economics of techno-scientific promises (ETP) or a regime of economics and 
socio-politics of collective experimentation. The first model has become particularly 
prominent in the governance of most new and emerging techno-sciences such as 
biotechnologies, genomics, nanotechnologies, neurosciences, and ambient intelligence. 
The regime of ETP "draws on an uncertain future" and promises easy upstream solutions 
for downstream problems; it is also derived from "a strong sense of urgency" around the 
overall impact of technological development worldwide, as well as the notion that "we 
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are in a world of competition and that Europe will not be able to afford its social model if 
it is not in the race" (Wynne et al., 2007, p. 25). Subsequeptly, the role of civil society is 
declining and society is simply viewed as a group of prospective consumers. The regime 
of ETP places new demands on scientists and technologists who are now required to 
ensure protection of their intellectual property rights at the earliest stages of research. 
This way of organizing innovation and technological change establishes new 
relationships between research, academia, and industry emphasizing patenting of basic 
knowledge. Although the EU Lisbon Agenda has heavily promoted this mode of 
governance, the Expert Group on Science and Governance has argued that, while 
technological promises could be incorporated in the emerging regime of collective 
experimentation, they should not be a leading consideration. Moreover, the report 
suggested that "a vibrant European knowledge society must in the long term be built on 
collective experimentation" (Wynne et al., 2007, p. 27).The alternative regime of 
innovation governance is exemplified by democratizing approaches such as: Open-
Source Software, user-induced innovation and community-based innovation in the 
information and communication sector, the involvement of patient associations in health 
research, bottom-up innovations in low input agriculture, etc. All these examples evoke 
John Dewey's conception of policy as collective experimentation. As Wynne et al. (2007) 
have characterized this new regime, 
The experimentation is now at the technological level as well. Situations emerge 
or are created which allow to try out things and to learn from them, i.e. 
experimentation. Society becomes a laboratory ... Here, however, the 
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experimentation does not derive from promoting a particular technological 
promise, but from goals constructed around matters of concerns and that may be 
achieved at the collective level. Such goals will often be further articulated in the 
course of the experimentation. (Wynne at al., pp. 26-27) 
This model of science governance, which encourages the participation of diverse actors, 
is considered productive since the participants are concerned about the specific issue and 
are thus more motivated to engage in innovation process. Furthermore, it would require 
innovative. approaches to intellectual protection, as well as new forms of communication 
and interaction between scientists and other actors since laboratory-based science cannot 
claim authority over knowledge production. 
The Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance also addresses 
concerns about the unease of EU publics towards science which could potentially thwart 
Europe's innovation and economic ambitions, as well as policy efforts to resolve 
complex issues pertaining to health, climate or energy. Assumptions about any general 
mistrust of science, however, are not substantiated with evidence, and it is 
counterproductive to assume "public apathy over changing lifestyles to address such 
major problems as climate change, is a function of the same kind of public mistrust of 
science which has afflicted many - not by any means all - areas of innovation and 
technology" (Wynne at al., 2007, p. 17). This observation of the Expert Group is correct 
and could be supported with data from Euro barometer surveys of public opinion 
conducted on behalf of the European Commission. For example, the most current report 
on biotechnology and the life sciences "Europeans and Biotechnology in 201 O" 
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commissioned by the Directorate-General for Research has shown that Europeans have 
positive attitudes towards scientific innovation in these fields (Gaskell et al., 2010). The 
study of public opinion was carried out in February 2010 and included representative 
samples from 32 European countries. The European-wide survey showed 53% of 
respondents believing that biotechnology applications will have positive impacts on the 
future, and only 20% expected negative effects. The report, however, indicated 
inadequate knowledge of the general public about some important research areas and 
emerging technologies (Gaskell et al., 2010). For example, a majority of respondents had 
no awareness about the existence of nanotechnology (55%), biobanks (67%), and 
synthetic biology (83%). The Eurobarometer also showed an overwhelming public 
support for medical applications of biotechnology, provided that there is adequate ethical 
oversight and legal regulation. On the issue of stem cell research, 63% of respondents 
supported embryonic stem research (up from 59% approval in 2005) and 69% of the 
respondents supported non-embryonic stem cell research (up from 65%). In addition, 
17% of respondents stated that they would accept hESC research under special 
circumstances, and 15% would conditionally approve non-embryonic stem cell research. 
The UK, Spain and Denmark were the EU member states where most respondents were 
generally supportive of hESC research and other biomedical applications. 
The policy context for stem cell innovation across Europe is complicated and 
constantly evolving. Most countries have permissive policies for hESC research using 
supernumerary IVF embryos, but prohibit the cloning of human embryos for research 
purposes as shown in Table 7. However, not all EU Member States have hESC-specific 
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legislation in place as shown in Table 8, which presents data about the specific laws of 
EU and Europe-associated countries that are members of the European Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Registry (hESCreg), and Table 9, which shows human cloning 
laws in EU member states. Most research activities in the field of stem cell science and 
regenerative medicine are carried out with EU funding and involve transnational 
cooperation in major research centres throughout Europe (i.e., European Molecular 
Biology Laboratory (EMBL), an intergovernmental research organization, which 
comprises five major research centers in Heidelberg, Hinxton (near Cambridge), 
Monterotondo (near Rome), Hamburg). The EU funds research on a wide range of 
biomedical applications of hES cells, as shown in Table 10, which includes a list of hESC 
research projects funded under the FP6. Between 2002 and 2006, the EU financial 
investment in hESC projects was not particularly large and reached only €21 million, 
which was about 0.85 % of the overall €2.45 billion budget for health research within FP6. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong moral commitment of the EU and EU institutions to hESC 
research. As the Director of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) 
Fiona Watt (2008) has pointed out, EU-funded research activities have allowed stem cell 
researchers to benefit from transnational research networks and collaborations in different 
countries. She has also indicated that the EU strategic investment in research and 
technological innovation is largely driven by political goals and aims at the establishment 
of the "most dynamic competitive knowledge based economy in the world." What makes 
the EU funding model unique is the added benefit of large-scale collaborations between 
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groups of scientists, as well as the opportunity for the expansion of the EU funded 
networks into long-term collaborations that continue after the initial funding period. 
The development of stem cell research and regenerative medicine in the EU is 
considered to be a very complex issue due the significant variations in national 
regulations governing stem cell research. In term of their stem cell policy, the EU 
member states can be roughly grouped in four major categories: permissive, permissive 
compromise, restrictive compromise, and restrictive (The Hinxton Group, 2009). The 
first group includes countries with the most liberal or permissive stem cell policies, such 
as Belgium, Finland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries have 
allowed derivation ofhESCs from a variety of sources and the use of SCNT to clone 
human embryos under certain conditions. It is important to specify that under the Finish 
law regulating stem cell research, the Act on Medical Research No. 48811999, the 
biological entities generated through SCNT are not considered embryos. The law, which 
has made supernumerary IVF embryos available for hESC research, does not explicitly 
prohibit the cloning technology; therefore, there is an ill}plicit assumption that SCNT is 
permitted in this EU country. Most EU member states have adopted stem cell policies 
which constitute a "permissive compromise" (e.g., although there are legal prohibitions 
against the use of SCNT, hESC research using supernumerary IVF embryos is either 
specifically permitted or, at least, not explicitly prohibited). The countries that fall under 
this category are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. By 
contrast, the policy option of "restrictive compromise" was adopted by countries like 
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Germany and Italy. Under this policy alternative, research is only permitted on hES cell 
lines created before a certain date or which originated outside of the country. Some EU 
member states have opted for prohibitive stem cell policies. In such countries, e.g. 
Austria, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia, research using human embryos or stem cell 
lines derived from embryos is completely prohibited. In addition, there are no favorable 
conditions for the development of hESC research in Ireland, where the Catholic tradition 
is dutifully maintained and the right of life to the unborn is presently written in the Irish 
Constitution. Not all EU member states, however, have developed policies and 
regulations for the development of stem cell research and regenerative medicine. 
Conclusions 
Although there has been more than a decade after hESC research became the 
subject of contentious ethical, political and legal debates, the scientific controversy 
remains unresolved and innovation in this biomedical field continues to create policy and 
legal challenges. This chapter elucidated convergences and divergences between the US 
and the EU regulatory and funding regimes for the development of stem cell science. In 
both federal states, techno-scientific promises have been a leading consideration in the 
governance of stem cell technologies and public investment in hESC research was largely 
driven by the political goal of establishing competitive knowledge-based bioeconomies. 
In accordance with the Lisbon Agenda, EU policymakers at the supranational level have 
heavily promoted the ETP model of science and technology innovation, rather than 
alternative democratizing approaches that aim to build a vibrant European knowledge 
society based on collective experimentation. Similarly, in the US, state initiatives and 
262 
efforts by stem cell advocates to secure public and private funds for research were driven 
by concerns that funding restrictions imposed by President Bush in 2001 would diminish 
America's leading role in the global bioeconomy. Another point of convergence is the 
positive public attitudes for medical applications of biotechnology on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Despite the widely shared assumption about the public unease with science in 
the US and the EU, survey research has shown an increasing public support for hESC 
research, especially when it is conducted under strict laws and ethical oversight. In 
addition, hESC research has prompted unprecedented grassroot activism in America and 
invigorated public participation in the legislative and policymaking processes. The issue 
has also mobilized EU citizens and increased public engagement in decision-making both 
at the national and at the supranational level. 
Yet, divergences in the two approaches to stem cell innovation are clearly visible. 
A close examination of the unique trajectories of the US and EU stem cell debates reveals 
profound differences in formal politics and decision making, political culture, and social 
practices that shape the governance of science and technology. While Christian religious 
ideas became prominent in the US stem cell debate and shaped policy outcomes during 
the two-term administration of President George W. Bush, the EU institutions endorsed 
and maintained a stance on hESC research that was more consistent with fundamental 
democratic principles of secularism, religious pluralism, and freedom of scientific 
research. In America, the emerging field of hESC research was caught up in an enduring 
science policy debate on the use of human embryos and fetuses in biomedical 
experimentation and funding decisions were constrained by the congressional ban on 
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embryo research. From the very beginning, the stem cell controversy was implicated in 
the contested politics of abortion and a national public debate developed along the 
conventional political and cultural divisions between liberals and conservatives, pro-
choice supporters and pro-life activists. The Bush administration's restrictive funding 
policy between 2001 and 2009 was highly unpopular and prompted state initiatives and 
referendum measures that undermined US federalism. Although President Obama lifted 
the funding ban in March 2009, there are still uncertainties regarding the future of his 
stem cell policy due to the litigatious culture that dominates American society. In 
addition, the present administration will continue to face broader policy dilemmas 
regarding human biotechnologies-the lack of a national strategy for the ethical 
governance of hESC research and regenerative medicine, a largely unregulated biotech 
industry driven by commercial interests, as well as strong opposition against embryo 
research as one of the defining aspects of America's culture wars. 
By contrast, there is a strong moral commitment of the EU and its institutions to 
hESC research and the development of a unified platform for ethical regulation of 
regenerative medicine, although this appears to be a very complex issue due the 
significant variations in national regulations across Europe. While financial investment in 
this biomedical innovation under FP6 has not been particularly large, especially when 
compared to the overall spending for health research, the EU funding model has allowed 
stem cell scientists to benefit from large-scale transnational collaborations and to expand 
EU funded research networks into long-term collaborations that continue after the initial 
funding period. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I have argued that proper consideration should be given to the 
interplay of scientific, ethical, cultural and political issues interwoven in the controversy 
over hESC research. My arguments were based on the premise that the stem cell debate 
had never been purely scientific; rather, as I have illustrated throughout the thesis, the 
controversy surrounding the derivation of the first hESC lines was largely shaped by non-
epistemic factors (i.e., considerations other than scientific facts and empirical 
verification). This condition characterizes most scientific debates that have received 
significant attention from the general public (Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987). In the United 
States, the issue of hESC research was right from the outset framed in terms of the 
contentious politics of abortion and the policy debate revived salient political themes of 
the earlier controversy over fetal transplantation research. It was also drawn in a 
continuing political debate over the federal funding policies for human embryo research 
instigated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade inl973 which legalized abortion 
nationwide. In 2001 the Bush administration implemented a restrictive federal funding 
policy which triggered unprecedented grassroot activism, as well as state-level funding 
programs and referendum measures which eventually undermined American federalism. 
Although President Obama lifted the federal funding restrictions in March 2009, the new 
NIH funding guidelines were quickly challenged in court, and the issue of hESC 
continues to be caught up in America's culture wars over religion and morality. Concerns 
about the status of the human embryo were also paramount in Europe; however, the 
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policy debate at the EU level has followed its own unique trajectory. Efforts to develop a 
framework for the ethical governance of hESC research and its applications in 
regenerative medicine were intertwined with the issue of EU federalism, fundamental 
questions about European cultural values, and the traditional EU consensus-oriented 
politics. Subsequently, the governance of this scientific innovation was shaped by the 
economics of techno-scientific promises and was integrated into the EU strategic agenda 
for building the most competitive knowledge based bio-economy. Yet, the regulatory 
environment remains extremely complex since stem cell laws are considered a national 
competence and national governments within the EU have adopted a variety of policy 
options. Research on hES cells is funded under the EU 7th Framework Research 
Programme, however, research projects are carried out in member states with permissive 
policies and EU funds may not be used for the derivation of new hESC lines. 
Furthermore, my dissertation emphasized the embeddedness of the stem cell 
policy debates in particular national contexts and political cultures and focused on 
contextual factors that had shaped legislative efforts to regulate stem cell research. For 
instance, in countries with strong religious consciousness, i.e. the United States and EU 
member states like Austria, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland, religion has 
become a strong factor in sustaining the ethical controversy over hESC research. Stem 
cell debates in these countries have mirrored the value conflicts of the post-secular 
society in which the trend towards secularization is challenged by the power of religion to 
influence public affairs. Subsequently, attempts to resolve the stem cell controversy have 
become inextricably linked to the question of whether ethical arguments derived from 
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religious traditions could be reconciled with scientific perspectives on human embryonic 
development. I have argued that a consensus between contemporary science and religion 
on the issue of hESC research could be achieved provided that scientifically derived 
assessments of embryonic status do not contradict the respective tradition's fundamental 
theological beliefs regarding the beginning of personhood. The dialogue is also greatly 
contingent on the degree of openness of each religious tradition to scientific input. The 
role of contextual factors in regulating stem cell innovation was further exemplified by 
the contentious national debate in Germany which had revived old anxieties about 
eugenics, Nazi medicine, and the social acceptance of disabled people. By contrast, EU 
countries with leadership in biomedical research and innovation, such as the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium, have elevated the development of 
hESC therapies to the top of their national agendas by adopting liberal stem cell policies, 
including the use of SCNT under certain conditions. 
Being one of the most contested applications of medical biotechnology, hESC 
research has generated both great hopes and strong fears about the biopolitics of the 
future. On both sides of the Atlantic, proponents and opponents of embryo research have 
evoked utopian and dystopian visions to construct multiple, contested or embraced 
biopolitical futures. The print and electronic news media have played a major role in the 
public engagement with stem cell policy by framing uncertainty as to whether or not the 
clinical promise of hESC research is real and will be realized in a foreseeable future. 
While mass media have tended to sensationalize the ethical controversy over hESC 
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research, they have also become a.key site of struggle for various social groups in their 
attempts to influence the public opinion in favor of particular policy outcomes. 
The underlying premise of my comparative analysis of the stem cell controversy 
in the US and the EU was Engelhardt and Caplan's ( 1987) argument that understanding 
patterns of scientific disputes is inextricably bound up with the individuation of different 
controversies that are blended in a single scientific controversy with a heavy political and 
ethical overlay. Therefore, I have aimed to differentiate between various controversies 
intermingled in the US and the EU stem cell debates and to determine the means by 
which the controversy has been settled in divergent cultural and political contexts. In 
these concluding remarks, I categorize the outcome of two policy debates by drawing on 
theoretical perspectives on patterns of controversy and closure in science (Engelhardt & 
Caplan, 1987; Beauchamp, 1987; McMullin, 1987). Although the term "closure" is 
generally used to describe conclusion, ending, or resolution of a scientific controversy, it 
is highly ambiguous and does not allow us to make important distinctions between the 
various ways in which such disputes are terminated, i.e. whether termination occurs by 
final resolution or without achieving final resolution or truth (Engelhardt & Caplan, 
1987). It is important to establish some preliminary distinctions between the different 
means by which a dispute is brought to a conclusion: l) by negotiation and consensus; 2) 
by administrative or political procedures; and 3) by appeal to epistemic considerations, 
which is the usual method of resolving scientific disputes. Beauchamp ( 1987) has 
differentiated five modes of closure in scientific controversies. The first type is 
characterized as the sound argument closure. This way of termination occurs when 
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scientific controversies are perceived as purely rational debates, with only one rationally 
defensible position on the issues under consideration. The dispute is then ended when the 
opposing views are proved logically inconsistent or factually incorrect. It is unlikely, 
however, that controversial moral or public policy debates can ever be resolved by this 
form of closure. The second way of ending scientific controversies is through consensus 
closure. In this case, closure occurs when participants in a controversy achieve a 
consensus agreement that only one particular position is correct through means other than 
sound argument closure or some form of procedure· or negotiation. The issues central to 
the controversy are subsequently considered resolved and are no longer matter of dispute. 
Procedural closure describes the termination of a dispute by formal, procedurally 
governed efforts to end the continuing debate between the opposing sides in the 
controversy. This way of closing a debate relies on the institutional power of legislatures, 
courts, and other social institutions and seems to be more or less a temporary solution. 
The fourth sense of closure is natural death closure which occurs when a controversy has 
come to an end through a gradual natural death, but also when the issue is no longer the 
focus of sustained controversy and interest. Finally, controversies can be settled through 
negotiation closure-an intentionally arranged and morally unobjectionable resolution, 
which is acceptable to all participants in the disputes, even when it is the result of a 
compromise. While the sound argument closure requires that there is only one correct and 
best answer to the central dilemma in a controversy, here compromise regarding moral 
principles is permissible. While scientific controversies are ended through different 
modes of closure, both Beauchamp ( 1987) and McMullin ( 1987) have pointed out that 
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some scientific disputes are· never ,actu';~Y resolved. Closure and resolution thus 
constitute two different ways of ending a controversy. In cases when it is not possible to 
achieve resolution, non-epistemic factors may eventually lead to the termination of a 
controversy. McMullin's (1987) has argued that the term "closure" is only relevant when 
used to designate termination of a controversy in which non-epistemic factors are 
dominant and in which resolution is not eventually achieved. Therefore, in this broader 
use of the term, "closure suggests one particular sort of non-epistemic factor, namely, the 
employment of external authority to declare a controversy ended" (McMullin, 1987, p. 
78). Based on McMullin's three-part classification, termination through non-epistemic 
procedural closure differs from resolution of a controversy through appeal to epistemic 
(knowledge-based) factors or its abandonment due to participants losing interest. 
My analysis of the stem cell debates in the US and the EU has clearly illustrated 
that their policy outcomes most closely resemble non-epistemic procedural closure in the 
sense defined above. Although there has been a long-term policy and political debate in 
both cases, the ethical controversy has largely remained unresolved. Rather, efforts by 
policymakers in these two federal states to end the controversy have resulted in sealing 
off the debate through legislative efforts or administrative procedures. However, as 
Beauchamp ( 1987) has pointed out, procedural closure provides only a temporary 
solution to the dispute and, by contrast to the sound argument closure, "only rarely is 
moral controversy closed off from further discussion, even where procedures for closure 
are institutionalized" (p. 31 ). Therefore, it is by no means surprising that the issue of 
hESC research continues to generate new controversies and policy challenges. 
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Figure 1: Typology of Public Engagement Based on the Flow of Information Perspective 
(Rowe & Frewer, 2005) 
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Figure 2: Stem Cell Advertisement by the Campaign to Defend the Constitution 
(DefCon), New York Times, May 2006 
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Figure 3: Stem Cell Advertisement by the Campaign to Defend the Constitution 
(DefCon), New York Times, June 2006 
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Figure 4: Spoof Ads of President George W. Bush's position on hESC research 
Source: http://www.wrapped-in-the-flag.com/ 
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Figure 5: Differentiation of Human Tissues in the Early Embryo 
Source: http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport/chapter I .asp 
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Figure 6: Derivation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
Source: http://www.stemcellresearchfoundation.org/WhatsNew/Pluripotent.htm 
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Figure 7: Origin, Isolation and Specialization of Stem Cells 
Source: www.scq.ubc.ca/stem-cell-bioengineering/ 
•• ·totipotent stem cells 
1 
blastocyst conta.fning 
plu:ripo·t.ent stem cel!~s 
,,... .t1'1. 
... ,. -'• 
• • isolated ·pluriPQtent SC:s 
horn Inn.er ·cell mass 
l 
- .. 
ultur~d pludpot~nt SCs 
' 1 
~t.S> ~% II . ~ 
hematopoeflk S(s. nev611 $.Cs mes.erKh/'ffiilt ses 
tis~.ue-specific SCs 
278 
V) 
00 
--i 
,.....; 
u 
r:/J 
0 
~ 
~ 
(].) 
...c: p u ...... 
:....-~ r.8 
(].) .-
Cl).::: (].)-.._ 
~ ~ 
- u 
- $....; (].) ::I 
u 0 
a ~ (].) b 
...... ·-r:/J ...... 
c..,. .s 
0 /fJ 
-(].) > 
if) 0 
·- bJ a ...d 
0 ·-$....; :::::: ~ . 
Cl) 
~;::::::: 
u (].) 
·- u 
.s a 
- (].) u t) (].)::::::: 
...c: .. 
~B 
...... 
QC -:=: 
QJ (].) 
~ u 
= $....; 01) ::s 
·- 0 ~ r:/J 
Identify drug 
targets and 
test potential 
therapeutics 
Toxicity 
Testing 
The Promise of Stem Cell Research 
Understanding 
--
~~~· Study cell • prevention & differentiation treatment of birth defects 
Cultured Pluripotent 
/ Stem Cells ... ---------- ... ...... 
....... I Tissues/Cells for Transplantation 
/I \ ~ I I I I I - - - - - - - - - - _I ? 
Bone marrow 
for leukemia 
_-, .. ~--;'",_'··_,,-·~~ ~~: ·~~:,,,, .@·. 
- <t7.·: - -=". ·~ Heart muscle 
~ ~ ~-·~.~_·_o ifW: ..• 
& chemotherapy 
Nerve cells 
for Parkinsons 
& Alzhiemer's 
disease 
cells for 
heart disease 
Pancreatic 
islet cells 
for diabetes 
°" r--N 
a 
....... 
..c 
~ 
c 
u 
en 
bl) 0 
s::::-
·- 0 c c 
0 ..c 
- u u Q) 
Q) 0 
> ·---~ ] ~ 
8 ~ 0..:::::::: Q) •• 
~B 
....... 
~ ..c 
~ 0 
~ () 
= ~ OJ) ;::::j 
·- 0 ~ r/J 
nssue cell donor 
Donor supplies 
unfertilis.ed eggs 
C"; ~~) 
Eggcen 
" 
The reconstructed 
embryo grows for 
7 days <-;-{___---. 
Cloned animal is 
born with exact 
DNA as the tissue 
cell donor 
~ ~ ~ \ @ g'f"\6°'1- \' ()- ~I€J/ ul()! ..--. (---->' ~} ~u"Lf'l 
~ Nucleus fuses n-/ with empty ~gg after ehtctnc --+ ) current applied 
' _/ 
"-- -~ 
I Nu deus is removed 
Embryo's 
i111>lanted into 
surrogate mother 
0 
00 
N 
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Source: http://www.stemblog.net/?page id= 151 
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Figure 11: Four Strategies to Induce Reprogramming of Somatic Cells 
Source: Jaenisch, R., & Young, R. (2008). Stem cells, the molecular circuitry of 
pluripotency and nuclear reprogramming. Cell, 132, 569. 
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Figure 12: 13th Century Pictorial Representation of "Delayed Hominization" (Delayed 
Ensoulment of the Fetus) 
Many Christians in the medieval period shared the Aristotelian-Aquinian notion of 
"delayed hominization" or "mediate animation" which postulated that God creates a new 
human soul, i.e. a rational soul, when the foetus is sufficiently formed. 
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Fngmre 13: 15th Century Pictorial Representation of "Immediate Hominization" 
(Ensoulment of the Fetus at Conception) 
Jean Mansel, Vie de Nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, France 
Source: http://www.hps.cam.ac. uk/visibleembryos/s 1 3 .html 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES 
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Table 1. U.S. Federal Funding Policy on hESC Research 
....-----------~----.--~-~--~-----~~·~~=~~-~---
Time line Administration Stem Cell Policy 
1============2.::::::==============S=:::===============-===========·=·=·="·'~=-~-==========··=··~ 
January 1999- Clinton 
January 2001 Presidency 
February 2001- Bush 
August 2001 Presidency 
August 2001- Bush 
March 2009 Presidency 
Federal funding allowed for hESC research but 
could not be used for the procurement of hES cells 
and lines. In August 2000 the NIH issues guidelines 
for funding hESC research and starts reviewing 
proposals of research teams. 
Moratorium on federal funding for hESC research. 
President George W. Bush suspends funding for 
research projects and orders a review of the NIH 
funding guidelines. 
Federal funding limited to hESC lines created prior 
to August 9, 2001. 
President Bush announces his decision to restrict 
funding for hESC research in a televised address to the 
nation on August 9, 2001. In the period 2005-2008, the 
NIH spent $3.5 billion on stem cell research, of which 
only $260 million for hESC research. This policy 
became highly unpopular and prompted state activism 
and legislative initiatives to fund hESC research. 
~~~~~~-:-~~--~--~-ii-~~~~~~~~~~~·~~~~·~~~~~~~ 
March 2009 Obama 
Presidency 
July 7, 2009 Obama 
Presidency 
August 2010 Obama 
Presidency 
April 29, 2011 Obama 
Presidency 
Funding restrictions for hESC research removed. 
On March 9, 2009, President Obama issues Executive 
Order 13505 Removing Barriers to Responsible 
Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells. This 
order revoked both the governmental policy of August 
9, 2001, limiting federal funding for research involving 
hES cells, as well as Executive Order 13435 of June 20, 
2007, which had supplemented the August 9, 200 I 
presidential statement. The President authorizes the 
NIH to issue new guidelines for hESC research. 
Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research released 
by the NIH. 
Court grants an injunction to stop all federal funding 
for hESC research. 
The Appeals Court's final ruling overturns the 
injunction. The injunction was temporarily lifted by the 
court in September 2010. 
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Table 2. Stem Cell Research in the United States - Timeline 
1981 Embryonic stem cells first isolated in mice by two research groups led by Martin at the 
University of California, San Francisco and Evans at the University of Cambridge 
November 1998 James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin and John Gearhardt at Johns Hopkins 
University report the isolation of the first hES cells. The first team derived stem cells 
from spare IVF embryos donated for research, and the other from aborted fetuses. 
I August 2000 The NIH issues guidelines for federal funding of hESC research based on Clinton 
administration's decision to fund this type of embryo research. 
February 2001 President George W. Bush orders a review of the NIH funding guidelines and puts a 
hold on federal funds for hESC research. 
August 2001 President Bush announces a new stem cell policy restricting federal funding to the 
already existing hESC lines. Most of the hESC lines eligible for funding later prove to 
be contaminated or have genetic mutations and were thus unsuitable for research. 
November 2001 Scientists at Advanced Cell Technology claim to have cloned a human embryo with 
limited success - one of the eight cloned eggs divided into six cells before stopping. 
December 2002 Clonaid announces the world's first cloned baby was born on 26 December 2002. The 
claims were never proven by an independent source but re-opened the cloning debate. 
Ferbruary 2003 The House passes the Weldon-Stupak Human Cloning Prohibition Act. The bill 
prohibiting all types of cloning did not become a law since the Senate did not act on it. 
i June 2004 Legislators in New Jersey vote to grant $9.5 million to a new Stem Cell Institute. 
November 2004 California passes Proposition 71, a constitution amendment which authorizes the state 
to spend $3 billion on hESC research over 10 years. 
May 2005 The House passes the Castle/DeGrette bill to lift the federal restrictions on funding for 
I 
hESC research. That same month Connecticut approves $100 million funding for 
I research on both adult and embryonic stem cells over the next 10 years. 
I 
1 April 2006 
I 
Maryland Stem Cell Research Act signed. Provides $15 million for hESC research. 
I July 2006 The Senate passes a bill to expand federal funding for hESC research. President Bush 
I 
vetoes the bill. This is the first time Bush uses his veto power. 
1 November 2006 Missouri voters pass a referendum measure which protects and funds hESC research 
I 
April 2007 The Senate passes another bill to expand federal funding for hESC research 
June 2007 The House grants the final congressional approval for the Stem Cell Enhancement Act 
which eases restrictions on federal funding for hESC research. President Bush again 
vetoes the bill. 
March 2009 President Obama lifts the moratorium on federal funding for hESC research. FDA 
approves the first clinical trial with a hESC-derived therapy for spinal cord injuries. 
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Table 3. State Initiatives and Referendums on Stem Cell Research 
----- -- - ----· ··- ··-··1· ·--· - --··- -·-
~ate J St~te _ _ i Measure _ _ __ - · - 1 Outcome 
. June 2{2oo4 ___ --l New Jersey 
I 
1 
- - - - - - - ·- - J 
: Novemb-er 2~ 2004 · -1 California 
I 
\ d. -·---·- .••. - - _c_ ••• J 
State Legislature 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
(Proposition 71) 
May 31, 2005 
I 
Connecticut State Legislature 
l .. ~-- --
June 15, 2005 Connecticut Public act signed by 
Governor M. Jodi Rell 
July 13, 2005 Illinois Executive order by 
Governor Rod 
Blagojevich 
' -- -
'.-December-16, 2005 New Jersey Commission on Science 
and Technology 
, __ ---~--- -- -·---- ___ _......_ 
---- --~-------
$9.5 million budget for the 
new Stem Cell Institute 
$3 billion hESC research 
over 10 years. 
$100 million funding for 
research on both adult and 
embryonic stem cells over 
10 years. 
$20 million for embryonic 
or adult stem cell research 
$10 million from the state 
budget to fund a new stem 
cell research institute 
$5 million awarded to 
research teams working on 
hESC research 
April 6, 2006 Maryland Stem Cell Research Act $15 million for hESC 
·:- -:-._-::;; ::--- - -::;:: - - - --
: November 7, 2006 Missouri 
: February 28, 2007 Iowa . 
March 16, 2007 California 
signed by Governor 
Robert Ehrlich 
Constitutional 
Amendment2 
Legislation signed by 
Governor Chet Culver 
California's Stem Cell 
Agency 
research grant 
State funding and 
protection of hESC 
research 
Allows the creation of hES 
cells through cloning, 
while prohibiting human 
reproductive cloning 
$75.7 million funding for 
established scientists at 12 
non-profit and academic 
institutions in addition to 
$45 million approved in 
February, 2007 
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Table 4. State Laws on Human Cloning 
State Reproductive Therapeutic Statute Citation Additional Information 
Clonim?. Cloning 
Arizona Prohibits Prohibits HB 2221 (2005) This law prohibits the use of public funds for both types 
public funding public funding of cloning 
Arkansas Prohibited Prohibited §20-16-1001 to Punishable as a Class C felony and by a fine of not less 
1004 than $250,000 or twice the amount of pecuniary gain 
received by person or entity, whichever is greater 
California Prohibited Allowed Business & Licenses issued to businesses can be revoked if' 
Professions § 16004-5 violations occur. Prohibits the purchase or sale 0f ovum, 
Health & Safety zygote, embryo, or fetus for the purpose of clon;ing §24185, §24187, hu~an beings; subject to civil penalties §24189, §12115-7 
Connecticut Prohibited Allowed 2005 SB 934 Offenses punishable up to $100,000 dollars or 
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both 
Indiana Prohibited Prohibited 2005 Senate Allows for revocation of a hospital's license involved 
Enrolled Act No. in cloning; public funds may not be used for clo~ing; 
268 prohibits the sale of a human ovum, zygote, emoryo or 
fetus 
Iowa Prohibited Prohibited 707B.l to 4 Punishable as Class C felony; shipping or receiving 
[Amended Feb. punishable as aggravated misdemeanor; if violation of 
28, 2007 to allow the law results in pecuniary gain, then the individual is 
cloning for hESC liable for twice the amount of gross gain; a violation is 
researchl grounds for revoking licensure or denying 
Maryland Prohibited Allowed 2006 SB 144 Prohibits the following: reproductive cloning; ootyte 
donation for state-funded hESC research; purch~e, sale, 
transfer or obtaining unused IVF material that is ~onated 
to research; Punishable by up to 3 years in prisonl a 
maximum fine of $50;000 or both 
Massachusetts Prohibited Allowed 2005 SB 2039 Prohibits a person from purchasing, selling, transferring, 
or obtaining a human embryonic, gametic or cada.veric 
tissue for reproductive cloning; punishable by 
imprisonment in jail or correctional facility for not less 
than 5 or more than 10 yrs or by a fine of up to $1. mil. 
Michigan Prohibited Prohibited §§333.2687-2688, Prohibits human cloning for any purpose and pro~ibits 
§§333.16274-16275, state funding for human cloning; civil and criminail 
333.20197, penalties established 
333.26401-26403, 
750.430a 
Missouri Prohibits state Allowed § 1.217 Bans use of state funds for human cloning research 
funding which seeks to develop embryos into newborn child 
New Jersey Prohibited Allowed §2C:l IA-1, Reproductive cloning is punishable as a crime in tlie first 
§26:2Z-2 degree; prohibits sale or purchase, but not donation, of 
embryonic or fetal tissue, which is punishable as a crime 
in the third degree and a fine of up to $50,000 
North Dakota Prohibited Prohibited §12.1-39 Cloning or attempt to clone punishable as a class C 
felony; shipping or receiving violations punishable as 
class A misdemeanor 
Rhode Island Prohibited Allowed §23-16.4-l to 4-4 Punishable by a civil penalty or fine of not more than 
$1,000,000, or in the event of pecuniary gain, twice: the 
amount of gross gain, whichever is greater; for an 
employee without the authorization of the organization, 
punishable by a civil penalty or fine of not more than 
$250,000, or in the event of pecuniary gain, twice th,e 
amount of gross gain, whichever is greater ' 
South Dakota Prohibited Prohibited §34-14-27 cloning or attempt to clone is punishable as a felony and 
a civil penalty of two thousand dollars or twice the 
amount of gross gain, or any intennediate 
Virginia Prohibited Unclear §32.1-162.32-2 Unclear if therapeutic cloning is prohibited because 
human being is not defined in the definition of human 
cloning. The law establishes civil penalty not to exce'.ed 
$50,000 for each incident. 
Source: The National Conference of State Legislatures (http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 14284) 
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Table 5. Investment Priority and Spending under the 6th EU Framework Program for 
Research and Technological Development (2002-2006) 
Thematic p~iority Budget in million 
Euros 
Information society technologies 3 625 
Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health 2 255 
Sustainable development, global change and ecosystems 2 120 
(including energy and transport research) 
Nanotechnologies, multifunctional materials and new 1 300 
production processes 
Aeronautics and space 1 07 5 
Food quality and safety 685 
Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society 225 
TOTAL 11285 
Source: http:// ec. europa. eu/research/fp6/pdf/fag en. pdf 
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Table 6. Investment Priority and Spending under the 7th EU Framework Program for 
Research and Technological Development (2007-2013) 
Thematic priority Budget in million € 
Health 6100 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Biotechnology 1 935 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 9 050 
Nanotechnologies, Materials and Production 3 4 75 
Technologies 
Energy 2 350 
Environment (including Climate Change) 1 890 
Transport (including Aeronautics) 4 160 
Space 1430 
Security 1 400 
Socio-economic Sciences and the Humanities 630 
TOTAL 32 420 
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Table 7. EU Member States Regulations on Stem Cell Research 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech 
Re ublic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Gennany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxemburg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Sweden 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
Derivation of 
hES cells from 
supernumerary 
IVF embryos 
allowed by law . 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
X. 
x 
Derivation of hES 
cells from human 
embryos prohibited 
but the import of 
hES cell lines is 
allowed 
x 
x 
-
-
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Table 8. EU and Europe-associated countries that are members of the European Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Registry (hESCreg) and that have hESC-specific legislation in 
place 
I Country I Law/year 
Belgium Law on Research on Embryos in vitro (Loi relatif a la recherche sur les 
embryons in vitro )12003 
Czech Republic Act on Research on Human Embryonic Stem Cells (Zakon 227/2006)/2006 
Denmark Act on Artificial Fertilization (Lov nr. 460 om kunstig befrugtning som rendret 
ved/1997, Lov nr. 427/2003, Lov nr. 69/2004, Lov nr. 240/2004, Lov nr. 
53512006 
France Bioethics Law (Loi no. 2004-800 relative a la bioethique)/2004, Decree No. 
2006-126 
Finland Medical Research Act (Laki laaketieteellisesta tutkimuksesta)/1999 
Germany Stem Cell Law (Stammzellgesetz StZG)/2008 - hESC derivation prohibited 
Hungary Health Care Act (CLIV/1997) - hESC derivation not allowed 
Israel Prohibition of Genetic Intervention Act (Human Cloning and Genetic 
I Modification of Reproductive Cells)/1999, modified 2004 I Italy Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction (Norme in materia di procreazione 
medicalmente assistita)/2004 - hESC derivation not allowed 
I 
Netherlands Embryo Act/2002; phase 2/2007 
Norway Biotechnological Act (Lov om humanmedisinsk bruk av bioteknologi)/2007 
i 
Portugal Law on Medically Assisted Procreation (Procria9ao medicamente 
assistida)/2006; Opinion on Human Cloning (Parecer sobre clonagem 
humana)/2006 
Spain Law on Biomedical Research (Ley de Investigaci6n Biomedical)/2007 
Sweden Act on Stem Cell Research (Lag om atgarder i forsknings-eller 
I 
behandlingssyfte med agg fran manniska)/1991, with changes in 2006 (Lag om 
genetisk integritet m.m.) 
Switzerland Stem Cell Research Act (Stammzellengesetz)/2005 
United Kingdom Human Fertilization and Embryology Act/1990; Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Bill/2001 and 2008 (still under parliamentary review) 
I 
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Table 9. EU Member States Laws on Human Cloning 
Cloning of human embryos The creation of human embryo for research purposes 
for stem cell research and for the derivation of hES cells is prohibited by 
allowed by law law or by ratification of the Convention of the 
Council of Europe on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
signed in Oviedo on 4 April 1997 
Austria x 
Belgium x 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus x 
Czech Republic x 
Denmark x ' 
Estonia x 
Finland x 
France x 
Germany x 
Greece x 
Hungary x 
Ireland x 
Italy x 
Latvia 
Lithuania x 
Luxemburg 
Malta 
Netherlands x 
Poland 
Portugal x 
Romania 
Sweden x 
Slovakia x 
Slovenia x I 
Spain x 
United Kingdom x 
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Table 10. hESC Research Projects Funded under the EU FP6 
A given project can appear under several sub-domains, either in organ/tissues, or diseases. Projects not 
related to any of these domains were classified under "transversal issues." Projects are listed based on 
proposal acronyms. Full descriptions are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/p I /stem eel ls/pdf/stemcel I eu research fo6 en.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=bookmarks 
ORGANS & TISSUES DISEASES TRANSVERSAL ISSUES 
Neurectoderm-derived tissues and organs: Cancers 3G-SCAFF, 
ARTEMIS, EuroHear, EUROSTEMCELL, ALLOSTEM, Anti-tumor CARCINOGENOMICS, 
EVI-GENORET, INTERDEVO, NanoEar, targeting, CONTROL CellPROM, CLINT, 
NEURONE, NEUROscreen, NSR, CANCER STEM, E.E.T.- CRY ST AL, Custom-IMO, 
Plurigenes, RESCUE, STEM-HD, STEMS, Pipeline, EuroBoNet, DNA REPAIR, 
STEMSTROKE, STROKEMAP, X-ALD. EuroCSC, EUROPEAN EMBRYOMICS, EMRS, 
Ectoderm-derived epithelia: LEUKEMIANET, ESTOOLS, EU hESC 
CORNEA ENGINEERING, EPISTEM, EUROPEAN MCL registry, EUCOMM, 
EuroCSC, EUROSTEMCELL, MCSCs, NETWORK, EUROXY, EUROCITS, EuTRACC, 
SKINTHERAPY, STEPS, THERAPEUSKIN, FIRST, GIANT, M3CS- FunGenES, 
Ulcer Therapy TU TH, MCSCs, MOL imgbchimerashybrids, 
Endoderm-derived organs: CANCER MED, INDUSTRYVECTORTRA 
BARP+,BETACELLTHERAPY,CELLS MSCNET, ONCASYM, IN, INTHER, 
INTO ORGANS, EPI-VECTOR, EUGENE2, REGULATORY INVIVOVECTORTRAIN, 
EuReGene, EURO-Laminopathies, GENOMICS, SENECA, MODEST, NEURO, 
EuroSTEC, KIDSTEM, LIVEBIOMAT, TUMOR-HOST PREDICTOMICS, 
REGULATORY GENOMICS GENO MI CS REPROGENETICS, 
Mesoderm-derived tissues and organs: ReProTect, SIROCCO, 
AUTOBONE, CELLS INTO ORGANS, EPI- Rare diseases (and some StemCellPatents, THE 
VECTOR, EURO-Laminopathies, EuroBoNet, less rare heritable EPIGENOME, TherCord, 
EuroSTEC, EUROSTEMCELL, diseases) TRANSCODE, 
EXPERTISSUES, GENOSTEM, CONSERT, EPISTEM, VITROCELLOMICS 
HIPPOCRATES, MYOAMP, MYOCARDIAL EURO-Laminopathies, 
REPAIR, MYORES, NANOBIOCOM, SKINTHERAPY, STEM-
NEWBONE, HD, SyntheGeneDelivery, 
OsteoCord, SILKBONE, SmartCaP, STEPS, THERAPEUSKIN, X-
SyntheGeneDelivery ALO 
Organs and tissues of mesodermal and 
composite origin: 
BIOSYS, CELLS INTO ORGANS, EURO-
Laminopathies, EVGN, HeartRepair, 
INVITROHEART, 
L YMPHANGIOGENOMICS, 
MCSCs, MYOCARDIAL REP AIR, SC&CR, 
VASCUPLUG 
Other organs and tissues of composite 
origin: 
BARP+, BETACELLTHERAPY, CELLS 
INTO ORGANS, EPI-VECTOR, EUGENE2, 
EuReGene, EURO-Laminopathies, 
EuroSTEC, KIDSTEM, LIVEBIOMAT, 
REGULATORY GENOMICS 
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